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**WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION  
IN THE  
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY (U)**

**(PROPIN-CCA)**

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**WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION  
IN THE  
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY (U)  
(PROPIN-CCA)**

by  
**Barton Whaley**

Approved:

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Operating under Contract with  
The Department of the Army

September 1961

## **The Staff**

The survey research methodology and design for PROPIN-CCA were developed in 1958 under the direction of Dr. Egerton L. Ballachey at that time SORO Technical Director. The questionnaire was prepared by Irving A. Wallach. The administration of the interviews on Taiwan, analysis of the data, and preparation of the final report were by Barten Whaley. The coding and early phase of the data analysis were supervised by George K. Schueller. Certain suggestions on style, format, and presentation were incorporated on the recommendations of Dr. Earl H. DeLong, Dr. John Carver Scott, Nancy Clare Bewley, Theodore B. Olson, and Dr. Irwin Altman. Willie Mae Williams was PROPIN team secretary.

In addition to SORO staff members, Ramon Woon and Steven Ho contributed special documentary materials to the project.

## FOREWORD

Word-of-mouth communication is perhaps the most neglected means of transmitting information, news, and appeals in the whole arsenal of psychological operations. The principal barrier to its effective use in the past has been its seemingly unpredictable nature: some rumors die out quickly, message content is often wildly distorted, information may fail to reach the intended audience.

In recent years, however, an impressive body of research findings has been accumulating, in such diverse fields as psychology, sociology, political science, marketing, disaster relief, and agricultural innovation which suggests that regularities and patterns exist in the diffusion of information and influence from one person to another. An understanding of these patterns should make it possible to use informal communications with much greater confidence than in the past—either as an adjunct to the conventional media or as a substitute for them in regions and situations where, for any reason, access to press and radio is denied large segments of the population. These findings also suggest the potential for understanding and even making use of informal communications in operational situations.

Recognizing the need for research which could apply the accumulating knowledge of informal word-of-mouth communication to the needs of psychological operations, the Army requested SORO to undertake Project PROPIN, a series of studies of word-of-mouth communication in various countries.

Basically, the Project PROPIN studies attempt to answer the question: "WHO says WHAT through the WORD-OF-MOUTH CHANNEL to WHOM with what EFFECT?" In this study, PROPIN-CCA, data were collected relevant to all the key elements of this question. Several general tendencies and broad patterns—some of them not previously suggested by China area specialists—were discovered and are described in this report. Other PROPIN country studies now in progress are further developing and refining the theory and methods basic to this hitherto almost unstudied field of communication research.

I believe that in both its general and specific aspects the present report will provide the Army with a tool of substantive usefulness.



Kai E. Rasmussen

Director

Special Operations Research Office

Washington, D.C.  
September 1961



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	v
PART A: THE REPORT	
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY	
A. Introduction.....	3
B. Summary.....	5
CHAPTER II. STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION, AND POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE CCA.	
A. Political Tradition and Control.....	9
B. Organization	
1. Recruitment.....	12
2. Demobilization.....	13
3. Dependents.....	13
CHAPTER III. WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION IN THE CCA.	
A. Audiences of Word-of-Mouth Communication.....	15
1. EM.....	16
2. NCOs.....	17
3. Officers.....	17
4. Political Personnel (GPD).....	19
B. Sources of Information	
1. Word-of-Mouth.....	20
2. Newspapers.....	20
3. Political Officers.....	21
4. Leaflets.....	21
5. Loudspeakers.....	21
6. Radio.....	22
7. Other Sources.....	22
C. Networks of Word-of-Mouth Communication	
1. Formal Networks.....	23
2. Informal Networks	
a. Companions.....	24
b. Civilians.....	24
D. Disseminators of Word-of-Mouth Communication	
1. Types of Informants.....	27
2. Frequency of Information from Main Informants.....	28
3. Topics Discussed.....	29
4. Credibility of Information.....	30
5. Time and Place of Discussions.....	30
CHAPTER IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPER- ATIONS.	
A. Communicational Capabilities of Psyops Officers.....	31
B. Guiding Factors for Psyops Officers.	
General Implications.....	33
Media Implications.....	35
Other Implications.....	36
CHAPTER V. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE.....	39

## **PART B: THE RESEARCH**

(See detailed index at beginning of the section.)

<b>ANNEX 1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>47</b>
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE KOREAN WAR SAMPLE.....	51
3. COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR IN THE CCA, 1951..	65
4. UN LEAFLET AND LOUDSPEAKER MESSAGES: KOREA, 1951.....	84
5. THE CCA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, 1949-1961..	85
6. FORMAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS: A DOCU- MENTARY STUDY.....	99
7. A SURVEY OF POST-KOREAN WAR CCA PER- SONNEL.....	107
8. QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH RETRANSLATION)..	113
9. NUMBERED TABLES.....	131
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>151</b>

## **PART A: THE REPORT**

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

#### A. INTRODUCTION

PROPIN-CCA is a study of word-of-mouth communication in the Chinese Communist Army (CCA) today. It is one of a series of Project PROPIN research studies of word-of-mouth communication conducted for the Department of the Army by the Special Operations Research Office. It complements the PROPIN-China report (in process of publication), a general study of word-of-mouth communication in Communist China.

PROPIN-CCA is designed to serve as a guide to the use of the word-of-mouth medium in psychological operations by indicating to what extent and by what means messages could be introduced into streams of word-of-mouth information diffusion with a maximum chance of reaching preselected audiences in the CCA. In addition to fulfilling its psyops-oriented task, this study has discovered certain aspects of word-of-mouth communication relevant to unconventional warfare field operations.

The general character of this report may be summarized as follows:

- a. It describes the role of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA as a mass medium which supplements and, in some situations, replaces the conventional mass media.
- b. It broadly identifies and describes specific aspects of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA, during both peace and war, which make it a valuable weapon in the arsenal of psychological operations.
- c. It particularly identifies and describes a relationship between Chinese soldiers and civilians which suggests that effective use can be made of civilians as an intermediary between the psychological operations officer and the CCA.

This report synthesizes data from four SORO studies:

- I. A study based on interviews on Taiwan with 296 CCA veterans captured during the Korean War. This study intensively explores word-of-mouth communication factors as they existed in 1951. (Annexes 1-4)
- II. A documentary study of the CCA since the Korean War. This study examines the social structure within which communication occurs and provided hypotheses for up-dating the data in Study I. (Annexes 5 and 6)

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III. A study based on interviews on Taiwan with 28 CCA veterans who fled the mainland as recently as 1957. This study surveys word-of-mouth communication factors as they existed in 1954-57. It partially verifies the up-dated findings resulting from consideration of Studies I and II. (Annex 7)

IV. The PROPIN-CHINA study. The major findings of the CCA studies are compared for consistency with the general conclusions and insights obtained in this earlier study of word-of-mouth communication in China. (Published separately.)

This synthesis of several independent sets and types of data was necessary to up-date the findings of the basic interview material obtained from the CCA Korean War veterans, to describe the social context in which this communication occurred, and to test the findings against data derived from other sources.

PROPIN-CCA is presented in two parts:

- (1) Part A, The Report, synthesizes and summarizes only those findings of the research which remain applicable today and draws inferences and implications judged relevant to psychological operations. It may be read independently of the second part.
- (2) Part B, The Research, supplies the detailed data, analyses, and documentation underlying Part A. In format it is a series of annexes to Part A.

The following terms are used throughout this report with the meanings indicated:

**Word-of-Mouth Communication:** The oral dissemination or exchange of information by informal face-to-face contact between persons or between a person and a group.  
**Audience:** Any category of persons sharing certain characteristics which could be instrumental in implementing the objectives of psychological operations.

**Respondent:** Each of the 296 Korean War or 28 post-Korean War veterans interviewed by SORO on Taiwan.  
**Informant:** Any person who transmits information to either a respondent or a member of an audience.

**CCA:** An abbreviation for the Chinese Communist army which the Communists officially designate the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA). The navy and air force, although an integral part of the "PLA," are not included in this study. The militia and other non-"PLA" internal security forces are also excluded.

**CCF:** The official UN Command abbreviation for "Chinese Communist Forces," the elements of the CCA serving in Korea in 1950-53 as so-called "volunteers."

## B. SUMMARY

The general conclusions presented below take into account the extensive changes since the Korean War in the composition of the CCA, the characteristics of the Chinese Communist soldier, and the conditions under which he lives, works, and fights. Among these changes are some which presumably serve to make the soldier of today *less susceptible* to persuasion or subversion than the soldier of a decade ago:

- a. elimination of Nationalist army veterans who formed a major part of the CCA in 1951;
- b. intensified political indoctrination and control;
- c. generally better pay, food, clothing, and billeting.

Other changes, presumably making today's soldier *more susceptible*, include:

- d. increased literacy, so that all soldiers are now at least partly literate;
- e. greater stratification in rank, resulting in an army of 3-year conscripts serving under career officers, and creating new tensions between the ranks.

Taking these changes into account, the following general conclusions appear to hold true:

1. The Chinese Communist soldier, like the Chinese Communist civilian, depends heavily on other persons for information about his own country, the outside world, and all matters beyond his immediate observation. This dependence increases inversely with rank and education, that is, the lower ranking and less educated soldiers rely somewhat more on word-of-mouth informants.

2. There is less diffusion of information in the CCA from the few to the many than among Chinese civilians. It is likely to pass from man to man in the context of a friendship network. It mainly flows within each level of rank; however, there is some direct exchange between EM and NCOs, between NCOs and officers, and even between EM and officers.

3. The political officer is an important exception to this last generalization. He is a major source of information for all ranks and is the most important single informant on military developments for troops in combat. However, he would be most unlikely to knowingly pass any information or ideas contrary to Communist policy, and therefore is not a promising target for psyops.

4. Because of tight official control, the conventional mass media in Mainland China offer very limited opportunities for exploitation by U.S. psychological operations. Government and army newspapers are an important source of information for troops. Domestic radio broadcasts reach a small audience, and controlled distribution of short and medium wave sets renders foreign radio broadcasts

inaccessible except to certain politically reliable personnel. Magazines, books, films, and the theater are also closely supervised. Although it might be possible to infiltrate some subtly camouflaged propaganda into these media, this would unquestionably be most difficult.

5. Though the *immediate* (cold war) potential of psychological operations against the CCA is limited, the possibilities would be much more extensive under conditions of war, limited or total. UN leaflet and loudspeaker operations were effective with Chinese troops in Korea, and it is probable they would be effective again under similar conditions. Many SORO respondents considered leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts the source of most information about the military situation during the Korean War. Increased literacy should augment the accessibility of leaflets in future operations.

6. The most promising channel of access to the CCA is provided by civilians. They are a major source of information for soldiers in Mainland China, and the principal source of unofficial and potentially clandestine information. Efforts by the regime to limit contacts between soldiers and civilians have been only partly successful. The rudimentary CCA commissary system makes it necessary for each unit to purchase many supplies on the local market, and this provides regular opportunities for most soldiers to talk informally with civilians. Psychological operations addressed to Chinese civilians in the vicinity of troop concentrations would therefore offer a reasonable chance of infiltrating messages into CCA word-of-mouth channels.

7. If CCA expeditionary forces should be sent into Southeast Asia, the large Overseas Chinese communities there would constitute a highly important *potential* intermediary for subversive messages. Many Overseas Chinese are engaged in merchandising and would, therefore, be likely to encounter CCA personnel on purchasing details, as Chinese civilians on the mainland do now. Moreover, many have radios and read newspapers and are already familiar with U.S. broadcasts and publications. Presumably, therefore, they are both *accessible* and *susceptible* to U.S. propaganda.

8. Because information appears to flow slowly in a person-to-person chain rather than being rapidly diffused, effective psychological operations would probably require massive bombardment, approaching saturation, or constant repetition over a considerable period.

9. Propaganda addressed to CCA troops in combat is apt to be most effective in commanding attention and establishing credibility if it contains reliable news of the military situation. News from home also can be used effectively for the same purpose.

10. EM are the most *susceptible* of all CCA ranks to U.S. psyops. NCOs are less susceptible than EM, but much more so than officers who are the least susceptible rank. In general, all ranks are about equally *accessible* to existing psyops and mass media; however,

political officers assigned as monitors or analysts of foreign and enemy propaganda are a somewhat "captive" audience.

It may be concluded that the CCA does indeed offer a target for psychological operations. It is a tough, well-armored target; but it is not impenetrable. The most promising point of entry to Chinese troops both at home and abroad appears to be through local Chinese civilians. Information thus introduced would circulate within each rank and to some degree between ranks, although neither as rapidly nor as widely as among civilians. Furthermore, the CCA appears vulnerable to intensive leaflet and loudspeaker bombardment, particularly if this provides convincing news of the military situation or of home and family.

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## **CHAPTER II**

### **STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION, AND POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE CCA**

This chapter describes the organizational structure, changing composition, and the traditions of both political warfare and political control in the Chinese Communist army (CCA). Its purpose is to provide the background necessary for understanding communication behavior in the CCA and its implications for psychological operations described in the following chapters. A more comprehensive account appears in Annex 5.

#### **A. POLITICAL TRADITION AND CONTROL**

The CCA is a politically conscious army. From its creation in 1927, its commanders have successfully fused civil administration and political propaganda with the conventional military arts. Most senior army commanders and high government officials including Mao Tse-tung have alternated between civil and military posts. Similarly, half the CCA elite today also occupy top Communist Party offices.

Throughout its 34-year history the CCA has both employed and been subjected to intensive psychological warfare. It has waged psywar against the Chinese Nationalist Government and army continuously since 1927, against the Japanese invaders from 1937 to 1945, and against the United Nations Command in Korea from 1950 to 1953. Concurrently, it was the target of propaganda from the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the UN Command.

The political tradition in the CCA is an inheritance from the Kuomintang, which around 1923 adopted both agitation and propaganda techniques and the political officer and "democratic centralism" systems from President Sun Yat-sen's Soviet advisers. As both the Nationalist and Communist Governments and armies have retained much of this early Soviet organizational system, since 1927 any Chinese changing sides changes ideology but not necessarily routine.

The Soviet Army finally abandoned its system of political commissars in 1942 as a crippling interference with conventional military operations. However, the CCA retains a political hierarchy parallel to and integrated with the regular military hierarchy. This political hierarchy is called the General Political Department (GPD).

During the rapid expansion of the CCA from 1948 through the Korean War, the regular military officer was seldom a hard-core Communist and often an untrusted ex-Nationalist. Consequently, the GPD political officer was particularly prominent during that time as the overseer, spy, and propagandist for maintaining the regime's control over such politically unreliable personnel. Today, however, virtually all former Nationalist officers and men have been eliminated by a combination demobilization, extensive purge, and Korean War "cannon fodder" attrition. As all CCA officers now undergo intensive political screening and training both before and after receiving their commissions, more military commanders are now eligible to become GPD political officers.

Political orthodoxy in the CCA is promoted by two devices: (1) the policy of placing only hard-core Communists in senior command positions, and (2) the GPD system of political officers and cadres.

Party supervision of the army is exercised through the GPD hierarchical structure penetrating every level of the military hierarchy down to company level. In addition, the GPD utilizes politically reliable individuals at lower levels, including a "political warrior" in each squad.

To overcome hostilities which had developed both among officers and between military personnel and civilians, the Communist Party in 1956 started an intensive 5-year political indoctrination course for all officers with rank of major and above. Despite this effort, the Director of the GPD publicly admitted in late 1957 that serious ideological deviations still existed among CCA officers. In August 1958 Marshal CHU Teh announced a tightening of political control in the CCA. Finally, in September, the GPD ordered that all officers serve as privates at company level for a month each year in a unit other than their own. Within 6 months 150,000 officers, including 160 generals, had seen such service. This program of "simulated demotion" (*hsia-fang*) continues on an intensive and well-publicized basis.

The inauguration and strict maintenance of a formal hierarchy of military ranks has tended to discourage the comradeship between officers and men which characterized the CCA before 1955. Officers are now distinguished from the common soldiers by markedly different and superior uniforms, insignia, pay, food, billeting, and opportunities for advancement. The gap between officers and men is further increased by the 3-year conscription service which has eliminated the likelihood of a military career for EM and NCOs. Officers, however, being expected to make their career in the army, continue as a fully professional class.

A reportedly sham "friendship" between officers and men is now sometimes exhibited in the rare intervals of relaxation or during the public celebration of certain festive occasions. On such public occasions as Army Day, National Day, and the dedication of new

construction projects, officers and men may perform folk dances, opera, or other entertainments in mixed groups and may exchange comradely greeting with civilians. Following these special occasions, the officers and men revert to their own separate groups.

The ever-watchful GPD political personnel are instructed to disapprove the growth of any close friendships between officers and men. No officer is permitted to praise or reward his men except in official meetings of the unit. When officers are serving in the ranks under the policy of "simulated demotion," the common soldiers are instructed to treat the newcomers as if they were of their own rank. However, there is good evidence that few take this seriously.

As nearly all former Nationalist officers and men have now been eliminated from the CCA, this once major potential source of defection has disappeared. The substitution of a centralized regular army system for the field army system in 1953 and a centralized civil administration for the military government of regional areas in 1954 effectively removed both the temptation and likelihood of a reestablishment of semi-independent "warlords" at the provincial and regional levels.

In 1957, Mao Tse-tung encouraged the uninhibited public criticism of the regime. This so-called "hundred flowers" campaign continued into 1958 when the regime decided it had served its several purposes. However, a number of long-suspected CCA vulnerabilities had already come to full light. Both the Director of the GPD and the Chief of the General Staff confirmed serious strains existing between officers and their men, between Communist cadre and nonparty personnel, and between the CCA and the civil populace. These revelations prefaced an intensive campaign to reduce tensions among these groupings. Although these tensions undoubtedly persist, their present degree is insufficiently known to indicate whether they constitute major vulnerabilities to psychological operations.

The highly publicized introduction in July 1961 of the Regulations Governing PIA Educational Work at the Company Level is merely the latest CCA attempt to strike a necessarily uneasy balance between discipline and morale.

The combination of intensive political indoctrination and adequate provision for the physical and psychological needs of officers and men seems to insure generally high morale.

A proper assessment of these vulnerabilities and morale factors would require a detailed analysis of current intelligence reports, particularly those of a local character.

To sum up, the CCA is more politically conscious than any other major army. Despite this, its vulnerability to psychological operations was proved in the Korean War. Today, the fact of this vulnerability remains; but its extent and nature are subjects for further study.

## B. ORGANIZATION

In 1953 the CCA inaugurated a major reorganization leading toward creation of a modern military establishment. First, a centralized regular army organization was created to replace the former field army system of semi-independent armies under commanders who simultaneously served as the civil viceroys in the regions under their military jurisdiction. Then, in 1954, decentralized military government was replaced by centralized civil administration.

Since 1950, the first-line strength of the CCA ground forces has varied between 2 and 3 million, not counting regional security forces and the militia. Today the figure stands close to 2,500,000.

The CCA is now a fairly modern conventional army. It no longer has the organization, equipment, or training of a guerrilla force. However, a guerrilla potential remains: the tradition is proudly inculcated in the new recruits; and all officers who served before 1946—the great majority of marshals, generals and senior colonels—were guerrillas. In addition, the vast and growing militia is a potential guerrilla force in the event of invasion of the China Mainland.

### 1. Recruitment

Prior to 1955 the CCA recruited on the exclusive basis of "voluntary" enlistment mainly achieved by extreme application of what the Communists termed "social pressure."

The current conscription procedure is based on the 1955 Conscription Law. All males, 18 to 22 years of age, are subject to conscription. The law specifies 3 years active service for EM and NCOs and for gradual demobilization of the earlier "volunteers." This law also established an annual winter conscription period: registration from November through the new year with call-up on March first. Approximately one-fourth of the army is replaced annually by conscription. As a result of this new recruitment procedure, for the first time in its history the CCA contains (since 1959) only 3-year conscripts, except for officers and some NCOs.

As the annual quota of recruits is only a small percentage (about 12%) of available registrants, the conscription authorities are able to set and maintain high recruitment standards. These standards appear to include in approximate order of importance:

- (1) high political reliability
- (2) some previous military instruction
- (3) literacy
- (4) sound health
- (5) youth

Because of this great reservoir of manpower, deferment or exemption is generally granted college students, technical personnel, public servants, professionals, sole supports of families, only sons, the physically deformed or ill, and those denied political rights by law.

Mongols, Tibetans, Turks, and other non-Chinese are evidently underrepresented in the CCA relative to their percentage (6%) of the population of China. These minority groups are partially excluded, mainly because they are not considered sufficiently reliable politically. Those who are conscripted are integrated with Chinese units in their local regions and subjected to particularly intense political indoctrination.

Women no longer serve as combatants in the CCA as they did during the Civil War and continue to do in the militia.

Recruits are assigned by draft authorities directly to an active unit for on-the-job training rather than, as in Western armies, to special basic training units. However, the prior militia training of many recruits partly substitutes for basic training; and the recruits participate with their units in the annual spring training cycle required of all CCA units.

In sharp contrast with the former system of informal rank, the Regulations for the Service of Officers of 1955 inaugurated a formal military hierarchy. This regulation provides for commissioning as second lieutenants: (1) all graduates from military schools, and (2) those without formal military education who have demonstrated exceptional ability in work or rendered meritorious service in war. Initial commissions as first lieutenant may be granted to military school graduates with superior academic records. As the official criteria for officer selection are based equally on "political quality" and "professional ability," it is evident that the CCA makes no pretense of separating the political and military spheres. College students and secondary school graduates who seek army service generally must enter military school, whence they are directly commissioned as officers on graduation.

## **2. Demobilization**

The Conscription Law of 1955 provided for gradual demobilization of all veteran EM and NCOs. Those conscripted after 1955 are demobilized during the first March following 3 years service. By the end of 1956, virtually all former Nationalist, older, or unskilled troops had been demobilized. At present there are nearly eight million demobilized CCA personnel, comprising about 3½ percent of the adult male population of China. Approximately 1-1½ million are men drafted under the present 3-year service requirement. Demobilized soldiers are subject to service in the reserves until age 40.

## **3. Dependents**

All official matters involving dependents of CCA personnel are assigned to the GPD. During the Korean War, about one-fourth of both officers and other ranks of the CCA were married. In 1950, a ranking GPD officer declared that "soldier marriages are to be very limited in number" due to the severe financial shortages in the army. There is a tendency for political officers to discourage

their troops from marriage on the grounds that marriage would interfere with full-time military duties. Judging from the topics of private conversation among CCA soldiers, the SORO interviews indicated that many soldiers maintained interest in what was going on in their home communities. In this early period, and probably today, it was general policy for CCA personnel to be stationed far from their homes. This resulted in a widespread fatalistic attitude among troops toward their families, typified by one Chinese POW in Korea thus: "I think I have to give up my family at homeland for lost, at least for the time being."

The long-standing practice of giving soldiers free food and cigarettes plus a small allowance in lieu of regular pay was abolished in 1955. The new pay policy enabled soldiers to start or maintain families. Officers, mainly because of their better pay, were quick to make use of this new policy. Within a year, in the second quarter of 1957, three quarters of a million dependents moved to army posts. Their presence created such unexpectedly great demands on the time and facilities of the army that a half year later the GPD ordered them to return home. By the summer of 1958 most had complied. The morale problem which arose was met by promising annual furloughs to officers and men. As recently as the winter of 1960-61, however, many soldiers still had their families with them despite new regulations to push these dependents into agricultural production.

The Marriage Law of 1950 includes special provisions for the benefit of military personnel. The permission of those soldiers who "maintain correspondence" with their families must be obtained in order for the wife to apply for divorce, otherwise divorce may be granted to wives of soldiers who have not corresponded with their families for a period of 2 years.

## CHAPTER III

### WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION IN THE CCA

This chapter describes the structure and dynamics of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA. It represents the collation, analysis, selection, and synthesis of data derived from the several sources specified below in chapter V and presented in the annexes.

Four audiences merit detailed description: EM, NCOs, officers, and GPD political personnel. These were selected not merely because they represent the most obvious military (EM, NCOs, officers) or political (GPD, non-GPD) types. An intensive search was made to find the one typology which most sharply divides CCA personnel in terms of *communication behavior*. This preliminary analysis studied typologies based on differences in education, pre-CCA occupation, age, rural-urban origin, religion, length of service, and regional origin. Although all these proved to have some significance as indicators of communication behavior (roughly in the descending order above), none was as marked or consistent as rank. The category of GPD personnel is added to the rank categories not so much because of the differences revealed by the interview data as from the inference drawn from the documentary research that GPD personnel occupy a highly specialized role in word-of-mouth communication.

#### A. AUDIENCES OF WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION

Which military rank is the most suitable audience for psychological operations against an army? The psyops officer's choice of audience is based on his assessment of three basic factors:

1. The *influence* which any given rank has on the overall efficiency of the army.
2. The *accessibility* of that rank to psyops media.
3. The *susceptibility* of that rank to propaganda.

Because the greater "military worth" of personnel in the higher ranks does not quite compensate for their smaller numbers, it is unlikely that any one rank of an army has substantially greater ability than any other rank to influence overall army efficiency. This theoretical model, developed in 1950 by O. Litoff and K. Yarnold at the Operations Research Office, appears to adequately fit the CCA as presently constituted. Thus, according to this model, all ranks of the CCA are approximately equal in *influence* on the overall military efficiency. Therefore, the psyops officer's choice of a CCA audience will depend

on his determination of the relative *accessibility* and *susceptibility* of a given rank. These two latter factors will be explored below, both in this section on audiences and the following one on information sources.

### 1. EM

The standing army of Communist China has maintained a virtually constant strength of 2,500,000 men during the past decade. Judging from published plans and other indications, this number will remain constant in the future, barring any major policy change. Nearly two million of this number are enlisted men: recruits, privates, or privates first class.

As a result of the current conscription practice, some types of enlisted men common in the Chinese armies of the Civil War and Korean War periods have disappeared. Today, the average CCA soldier is younger, healthier, better educated, better fed, better equipped, better trained in military techniques, and more politically reliable than ever before. He is conscripted for 3 years under a universal service law and not impressed indefinitely, as before, by an informal but intense campaign of social pressure. The contrast between the CCA soldiers of past, present, and future is summarized in Table A below.

Table A. *The CCA Enlisted Man: Past, Present, Future*

	1951-52	1960-61	1963-65
NUMBER.....	2, 250, 000	2, 000, 000	2, 000, 000
AGE (mean, in years).....	25	19	19
AGE (range of over 95% of cases).	15-37	17-21	17-21
EDUCATION (mean, in years).	2	6?	8?
LITERACY.....	55% at least semiliterate.	100% at least semiliterate.	100% fully literate.
HEALTH AND PHYSICAL CONDITION.	Fair	Excellent	Excellent
COMMUNIST PARTY and COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS.	12%	40-45%	50-60%
MARRIED.....	25-30%	10%?	(?)
LENGTH OF ARMY EXPERIENCE (mean, in years).	2-4	1½	1½
EX-NATIONALIST SOLDIERS.	35-50%	None	None
SOME PREVIOUS MILITIA TRAINING.	Few?	40%	100%
POOR PEASANT FAMILY BACKGROUND.	80-85%	75%	75%

SOURCE: Based on data in Annexes 2, 5.



The CCA enlisted man is a ready audience for news which affects him personally—news of home, of political developments, of the military situation—and is likely to transmit it to others in his unit. Within the CCA he talks chiefly with other EM, but his civilian contacts outside the army are more frequent and diversified than those of his superiors. He is probably more vulnerable to antiregime propaganda than officers. These characteristics will be examined more fully below.

## **2. NCOs**

The CCA contains very roughly 300,000 NCOs (corporals and sergeants). The majority in this rank category are 19 or 20 years old, promoted from the lower ranks, serving the compulsory 3-year conscription period. Only a minority are older conscripts who have been permitted to remain as NCOs beyond their term of conscription. It is unlikely that any CCA veterans of the Civil or Korean Wars remain in the CCA as NCOs. The great majority of these veterans, including all ex-Nationalists, have been demobilized; and those few remaining in service have been promoted to officer grades. In general, therefore, the NCOs are now virtually indistinguishable from the EM, except for being slightly better trained and somewhat more reliable politically. (See table B below.)

In communication behavior as well, the NCO differs only slightly from the EM. His range of contacts is somewhat wider: in addition to EM, civilians, and other NCOs he has some informal communication with officers.

## **3. Officers**

Officers probably comprise less than 12 percent (or about 300,000) of the total personnel of the army. In general, all officers now in the CCA are expected to render active service for life. It is this fact which establishes the officer as the only professional category in the CCA. (See table B below.)

Second and first lieutenants are very young (18–23 years of age) and inexperienced. Most achieve these ranks by direct commission on graduation from an 8-month course at military school. However, they represent the pick of the country's young men: all are in excellent physical condition, politically reliable, and literate; and they usually have had a full middle school education prior to their brief military school course. It is this grouping which forms the replacement pool for the senior officer grades. Its older members are presumably already well entrenched in the grade of captain. Only a minority of these junior officers have been promoted from the senior NCO ranks.

Field grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and senior colonels) have rather less formal education and are considerably older than company grade officers. However, their value, both as officers and as Communists, is undoubtedly far greater because

Table B. Characteristics of CCA Ranks Today (1960-61)

	EM	NCOs	Company grade officers (2d Lieut.-Sr. Capt.)	Field grade officers (Maj.-Sr. Colonel)	GENERAL GRADE OFFICERS (Maj. Gen., Lieut. Gen., Col. Gen., Gen., Marshals)	Elite officers*
NUMBER (approx.)	2,000,000	300,000?	300,000?	300,000?		68
AGE (mean, in years)	19	20	25?	35?		55
AGE (range of over 95% of cases)	17-21	18-25	18-30	30-50		47-75
EDUCATION (mean, in years)	6?	3-7?	10-12	6-9?		10 (85% have some higher education).
LITERACY	All at least semiliterate.	All at least semiliterate.	All fully literate.	All at least semiliterate.		All at least semiliterate.
HEALTH and PHYSICAL CONDITION	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent to good.		Good to fair
COMMUNIST PARTY or COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS	40-45%	50%?	80%	100%		100%
MARRIED	10%?	10%?	40%	50%?		(?)
LENGTH OF ARMY EXPERIENCE (mean, in years)	1½	2-3	4-5	10-15		30-35
POOR PEASANT FAMILY BACKGROUND	75%	75%	70%	55%		35%

SOURCE: Based on data in Annexes 2, 5.

\*Those 68 senior officers (mainly Marshals and Generals) who hold commands or posts which give them the most influence over military planning.

it is this grouping, together with the general grade officers, which has the intensive combat experience of the Civil War (1946-49) and the Korean War (1950-53) periods. They are politically reliable, with a strong vested interest in the regime.

There are persistent and reliable reports, including admissions by the Communist regime, of tension between officers and both other ranks and civilians. The intensity of this tension is not assessed in this report; however, it is known to be connected to the following factors:

- a. *Political.* The officers are more closely identified with the Communist Party. Any tensions between Communists and non-Communists will tend to exacerbate tensions between officers and other ranks or civilians.
- b. *Professionalism.* The officers are a privileged class in the CCA, and the common soldiers resent this, particularly since they know that until recently there was an equalitarian comradeship between the ranks. The officer has a vested interest in the regime not fully shared by the common soldier.

The informal word-of-mouth contacts of officers are largely confined to other officers, except for those few who still have their families with them on post.

#### **4. Political Personnel (GPD)**

There are probably some 120,000 political personnel—officers and men—in the army. Directed by the General Political Department (GPD), the political system has been an integral part of the CCA since 1927. The GPD political hierarchy operates parallel to and integrated with the regular military hierarchy. The ranking political officer or cadre in each unit has the responsibility and authority to initiate and supervise *all* ideological and “cultural” activities in his unit. These activities are broadly defined to include propaganda, education, entertainment, relations with civilians and army dependents, postal service and censorship, and youth work. The GPD also maintains intelligence and counterintelligence networks both within and outside military units to guard the internal security of the CCA.

Personnel of the GPD work closely with all Communist Party (CP) and Young Communist League (YCL) members serving in the army. Of nonparty military personnel, a large proportion of the conscripts and most of the officers are recruited into either the CP or YCL during their army service. This recruitment, some 350,000 each year, is a result of both the intensive political indoctrination work of the GPD and the rewards associated with membership in the elite body of a Communist regime.

The senior GPD officers are veterans of the Chinese Civil War and Korean War. Many, perhaps most, have held military commands at some time in their careers. Indeed, it is important for any person attempting to make propaganda capital of differences between the political and military hierarchies to recognize that these are differences more of function than of personnel. That is, political personnel are not merely political specialists assigned to the army; they are army personnel assigned, often temporarily, to the army political branch. The only significant difference is that *all* GPD officers are hard-core CP members while a large proportion of other officers are not.

GPD personnel are the least *susceptible* audience of U.S. psyops. However, they are *accessible*. In addition to sharing the access available to their appropriate military rank, they are, as the CCA specialists in counterpropaganda, a "captive audience" for U.S. psyops. This is particularly true of the CCA foreign radio monitors and propaganda analysts and the senior officers who review their reports. Since these senior officers have direct knowledge of U.S. propaganda, it is a reasonable supposition that they would pass some of this on as rumors among their cliques: other GPD officers and politically reliable military officers. It seems unlikely that these persons would transmit the specific content of U.S. propaganda to the lower ranks. However, if the morale or efficiency of GPD personnel should be weakened by that propaganda, the infection would be likely to spread quickly throughout the CCA.

## **B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION**

### **1. Word-of-Mouth**

Word-of-mouth communication is the most important vehicle of information for CCA soldiers. It is more consistently accessible than any other medium, and the soldiers get more news from it than through any other channel. Furthermore, although the absolute use of all media declined among troops transferred to wartime service in Korea from peacetime garrison duty in China, the relative use of the word-of-mouth medium remained at the same high level presumably because its *accessibility* was less affected than that of the other media. These findings hold generally true regardless of rank, education, age, religion, rural-urban origin, or occupational background.

A detailed description of this medium will follow a brief account of the roles of the other leading information media.

### **2. Newspapers**

Newspapers are the second most important source of information. Today, as a result of careful recruitment policy and in-service training, virtually all officers and the majority of lower ranks are sufficiently literate to read simplified newspapers. However, even among the actual readers of newspapers, it appears

that more information is received by word-of-mouth. It may be assumed that newspapers, particularly the "wall" variety produced by GPD personnel at tactical unit level, will remain an important news source even during combat conditions wherever troops are relatively static and not widely dispersed.

### **3. Political Officers**

In general, the GPD political officers are the third most important source of information, particularly through the frequent indoctrination meetings which they conduct. The experienced, well-organized political hierarchy which they control—with personnel in every unit down to the squad with its "political warrior"—can be depended on to provide a continuous flow of officially approved information even under severe combat conditions. The propaganda effectiveness of the political officers in combat is borne out by the fact that Korean War veterans of all ranks considered them the source of most information on the military situation.

### **4. Leaflets**

In combat in Korea, UN Command leaflets were an extremely important source of information about the *military* situation. Virtually all the former veterans interviewed on Taiwan had seen such leaflets, and the consensus was that they had gotten more military news from UN leaflets than from any other source except political officers. Considering the intense leaflet bombardment of the Chinese units in Korea, it is not surprising that the great majority of CCF personnel had *seen* UN leaflets. However, it is remarkable that a majority also considered these leaflets an important source of information. Because of the low literacy rate in the CCF and because only about one-third of even the literate ever transmitted leaflet messages by word-of-mouth, illiteracy did constitute a serious barrier to diffusion of these messages, one which could only be overcome by leaflet saturation. At present, however, the high—and rising—literacy rate in all ranks would serve to facilitate the accessibility and diffusion of leaflet messages. Furthermore, it was found that the continuing Nationalist leaflet messages to the mainland do diffuse to the CCA.

### **5. Loudspeakers**

Most Korean War veterans interviewed had heard UN Command loudspeaker broadcasts. However, they did not rate these as high in *quality* of information as that imported by either UN leaflets or their political officers. This was undoubtedly because of the limitations on the use of this medium in the Korean theater: intermittent and virtually confined, except for airborne loudspeakers, to the front lines. Nevertheless, loudspeaker messages did reach a large audience, were accepted as reliable, and were diffused through word-of-mouth channels to about the same extent as leaflet messages. That both Communist and Nationalist Chinese continue to engage in

loudspeaker barrages and counterbarrages between the mainland and the offshore islands is a possible indication that this propaganda medium is still effective among Chinese troops.

#### **6. Radio**

The official Chinese Communist government radio remains a minor although growing information medium in the CCA. Radio receivers are probably a prerogative of a few officers. Wired radio may now be available to troops in garrison.

Radio sets capable of receiving foreign radio broadcasts in the CCA are available only to a few politically reliable GPD and military communications personnel. Similarly, few Chinese civilians other than government or Communist Party monitors have access to short-wave or medium-wave receivers. Consequently, except for selected personnel in the upper echelons of the CCA, it must be presumed that only a negligible proportion of the CCA audience can be reached by this medium even through the indirect channels of army monitors or civilians. Therefore, radio broadcasts can presumably have no more than a minor supporting role in any psyops campaign directed to the CCA.

#### **7. Other Sources**

Numerous other possible sources of information exist. As little data specific for the CCA were discovered about any of these, it is tentatively concluded that they are, at best, minor sources of uncertain utility in psychological operations. They include:

*a. Mail.* Close GPD censorship effectively limits the ability to communicate clandestine or subversive information to CCA personnel by letter. Exchange of mail between civilians, including Overseas Chinese, is much less closely watched; and some unofficial information undoubtedly reaches CCA personnel indirectly by this means through their civilian word-of-mouth informants.

*b. Telephone and telegraph.* Virtually all telephonic and telegraphic facilities in Red China are reserved for use by officials. However, these privileged users, both military and civilian, undoubtedly make some use of these facilities for informal, unofficial communication.

*c. Television.* Few television receivers have become available, and reception is still confined to viewers in major cities. As facilities expand, they presumably will become available to military personnel on post. However, even if television becomes an important information medium, it will be no more accessible to U.S. psyops than is the official Communist press and radio.

*d. Theater.* The Communists have full control over the cinema and stage which they thoroughly exploit as propaganda media.

*e. Clandestine infiltration.* All information media listed above theoretically offer possibilities for clandestine

infiltration to Chinese civilian informants of CCA personnel. The opportunities for starting word-of-mouth relay of information are quite promising *if* these civilians can themselves be contacted. The earlier PROPIN-CHINA study gives fresh insight to this difficult problem. Briefly, it strongly suggests using merchants as the initial audience in contacting almost any other ultimate target audience. The two SORO studies, PROPIN-CHINA and PROPIN-CCA taken together suggest, for example, that if merchants in market-towns, cities, or communes in the vicinity of troop concentrations are seeded with information there is a high probability that they can pass this information either directly to soldiers or indirectly to peasants or other civilians who, in turn, can pass it to soldiers.

*f. Personal observation.* Direct personal observation is a major source of information for Chinese soldiers. However, it is placed at the end of this list because the scope of any one person's observation would normally be extremely limited, and because the only effective means of exploiting it for psychological effect would be by planned action, which would rarely be practicable. Otherwise it is a natural by-product of ongoing military operations.

## C. NETWORKS OF WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION

### 1. Formal Networks

Although PROPIN-CCA was charged to study the *informal* aspect of word-of-mouth communication, the *formal* aspect also is of interest to the psychological operations officer. The networks or channels of formal communication existing in any hierarchical organization such as the CCA partly predetermine and partly interlock with the informal channels because virtually all members of the organization participate in both types of networks.

Unusually marked reliance on word-of-mouth communication is traditional in the formal command structure of the CCA. This was a direct result of the high incidence of illiterates and semiliterates diffused along the chain-of-command, but continues despite the recent achievement of a high level of literacy. This tradition can be traced from the immediate prototype of the CCA, the National Revolutionary Army of Sun Yat-sen. During the Chinese Civil War period (1946--1949), the Communists largely depended on messengers—travelling usually on foot—for village-to-village transmission of word-of-mouth or written messages regarding military intelligence. At the time of the Korean War, most military orders in the CCA from division level down were still transmitted verbally. Detailed battle maps and written orders were the rare exception; however, the Chinese soldier is generally credited with a retentive memory, a fair sense of terrain, and an ability to follow verbal orders and instructions literally.

The system of political indoctrination already described is an important segment of this formal network, and one which under

favorable circumstances could occasionally become a channel for unofficial information.

## **2. Informal Networks**

*a. Comparisons.* There are strong indications, particularly in the interview data, that networks of friends operate throughout the CCA. To whatever extent such informal networks do exist, they apparently consist of soldiers in the same unit (perhaps up to battalion level) whose basis of association is close friendship and mutual trust. The usual informal discussion group consists of two persons, only rarely of three or more. Thus these intercommunicating persons appear to be in a simple chain-like "friend-of-a-friend-of-a-friend" linkage rather than a complex network with numerous branches and cross-linkages. These small cliques are mainly composed of soldiers of the same rank. However, there is some reason to believe—and this was certainly true of the CCA in 1951—that enough crossing of rank lines (EM with NCOs, officers—both junior and senior—with both EM and NCOs) still exists to insure some degree of informal communications running parallel to the formal military hierarchy. No data were obtained regarding possible informal linkages between separate units. If such linkages exist, they would depend largely on the participation of headquarters and other liaison personnel.

Informal networks of communication exist, and they are used. However, there are severe limitations on frequency of meeting, number of participants per meeting, and freedom of discussion. First, soldiers of all ranks are almost fully occupied with compulsory activities such as military duties, indoctrination classes, and labors in civilian agriculture. Thus they have very little of the leisure time which they prefer to on-the-job periods for their discussions with their main informants. Secondly, the GPD—with overt personnel in every unit and covert counterintelligence agents scattered throughout the army—is alert to rumor-mongering. Persons suspected of dangerous rumor-mongering may be warned, transferred, isolated, imprisoned, or physically punished. Thus soldiers have little freedom of discussion.

*b. Civilians.* Fresh unofficial news or information is introduced into the informal word-of-mouth networks of the CCA from two sources: (1) very senior military officers and upper echelons of the GPD hierarchy, and (2) civilian informants of soldiers.

The senior officers staffing the upper echelons of the political and military command structures have official access to fresh unofficial information on a need-to-know basis. This information—from foreign books, magazines, newspapers, radio monitoring, direct contact with foreign officials and visitors—is converted into propaganda before being passed down the official hierarchy. Although some of this information probably gets transmitted as rumor to the



informal word-of-mouth network, it is presumed to reach the lower echelons only infrequently and even then in distorted form.

The remaining source of fresh unofficial news in the CCA is the civilian population. Although civilians are a less frequent source than EM, political officers, military officers, or NCOs, they comprise an extremely important channel of information for soldiers on garrison duty in China. Their importance derives from the fact that the extent and frequency of contact with civilians are probably sufficient to guarantee wide dispersion of that information they do convey to soldiers. Furthermore, the quality of the information which civilians transmit to soldiers is as high as, or higher than, that passed among soldiers. The high quality of this information derives from the fact that, compared with information from other soldiers, soldiers consider it to be unofficial, more credible, more important, more likely to be clandestine, and almost as recent.

The GPD personnel attempt close control of soldiers' contact with civilians. For example, as operators of the army postal system, they closely censor all correspondence between soldiers and civilians. Also, no soldier may subscribe through civil channels to newspapers or periodicals without the approval of the political officer. Furthermore, diaries are required of reportedly all personnel and examined daily by GPD personnel.

Furloughs and even overnight passes are rare for all personnel, officers and men alike. Even that minority who are married are now officially discouraged from having their families with them, although some officers and men have their wives assigned to local farms operated by the army. Visits of families to the post are rare, mainly because of the expense, inconvenience, and lack of opportunity for private travel. Bachelors are discouraged from marrying. Liaison with prostitutes is forbidden by the military authorities, and the rigorous suppression by the civil authorities of that profession has reduced the possibility of such contact to probably negligible proportions.

How then do soldiers make that important contact with civilians which interviews with former CCA personnel—both Korean War and Post-Korean War veterans—indicate do exist? Probably the most frequent and certainly the most regular face-to-face contact between soldiers and civilians results from the lack of a fully developed commissariat in the CCA. The army supplies only the basic essentials of daily life. There are no commissary stores or PXs which sell food, drink, or sundries. The on-post co-ops established in army units provide only simple stationery supplies and Communist Party publications. As a consequence, the enlisted men in almost every unit are organized into a purchasing detail sent each day to the local marketplace. There they buy such things as extra meat, vegetables, cigarettes, and other personal items with pooled funds of the unit.

Some units of the CCA raise some or all of their own meat and vegetables; but most of the small unit troops, scattered in both rural and urban posts throughout China, must purchase some supplies in local markets. This daily marketing probably provides the best opportunity for most troops to converse with civilians, particularly merchants, shopkeepers, and peddlers; and, as this army purchasing detail is organized on strict rotation, it undoubtedly provides the most frequent opportunity to converse with civilians. If officers do participate in marketing, it is certainly much less frequently.

Chinese armies traditionally used vast numbers of civilian laborers in their supply and medical services. Even today, the CCA must depend mainly on this form of transport because of the shortage of motor vehicles, the lack of railways and roads, and a deliberate policy of capitalizing on the ready availability of local mass labor throughout most of China and its bordering countries. Local civilians are impressed into this service and replaced by others when the unit moves on. In Korea, the CCF employed Korean civilians as coolie labor. Some exchange must be presumed to take place between Chinese expeditionary troops and impressed indigenous labor despite linguistic and other cultural barriers, but the evidence of the SORO respondents indicated that this was slight, at least in Korea in 1951.

A further opportunity for contact of both officers and men with civilians is provided by the compulsory participation of army units in civilian agricultural, industrial, and construction projects. It is usual in peacetime for most units to spend several weeks a year in such labor. This labor is usually contributed all at one time, but occasionally scattered through the year. This practice is certainly some aid to the overall national economy; however, the principal motive seems to be to project among civilians the image of a helpful, friendly army. In view of the presumably close supervision of these labor teams by political personnel and the intermittent character of the work, it seems unlikely that many close relationships are thereby established between soldiers and civilians. Judging from the answers of the SORO respondents, such contacts were not a major source of information at the time of the Korean War. However, the degree to which the army participates in such labor has greatly increased since then.

In the event that units of the CCA should enter service outside Mainland China, they would very likely find themselves in close proximity and contact with Overseas Chinese communities. These communities are found in large concentrations in most countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia, constituting 6 percent of the population in the latter region. They are either the majority or the largest nonindigenous ethnic grouping in 11 countries of Eastern Asia, excluding Mainland China itself. They are largely mercantile communities and are concentrated in the cities and towns. Over

90 percent of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia speak South China dialects, while the majority in Northern Asia speak Mandarin. Within each country, they typically form numerous competing groups, each being close-knit, propertied, and literate. A large proportion of them own short-wave receivers. In general, they are quite accessible to U.S. psyops and are already familiar with the extensive information programs conducted by USIA and private American agencies.<sup>1</sup>

#### D. DISSEMINATORS OF WORD-OF-MOUTH COMMUNICATION

##### 1. Types of Informants

Virtually all soldiers of every rank have some more-or-less regular word-of-mouth sources of information. The principal types of informants, persons who function as major disseminators or transmitters of news and information within those word-of-mouth networks in which soldiers in general participate, are listed in descending order of frequency:

1. EM
2. Political Officers
3. Military Officers
4. NCOs
5. Civilians

The relative order of these five categories of informants remains generally unchanged whether the criterion is: (a) the frequency of supplying *some* information, (b) the frequency of mention as supplying *most* information, or (c) supplying of information either *in* China or about China *in* the single expeditionary situation studied, Korea. Thus, the relative order of these five categories, an order which may be thought of as the order of importance of informants, remains unchanged for Chinese troops whether on garrison duty in China or in expeditionary service in a combat theater. However, while all five categories of informants are important for garrison soldiers, the category of civilian informants will probably decline to negligible proportions for soldiers in combat outside China unless they are in contact with local Overseas Chinese communities. Indeed, Chinese troops serving abroad evidently receive less information concerning the homeland and are almost completely isolated from unofficial news sources except, possibly, Overseas Chinese.

A special case exists for the informants about the *military* situation, which constituted one of the most important topics of

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<sup>1</sup> See the following table for the present distribution of Chinese in Asia. For psyops-oriented studies of Overseas Chinese see: Elegant (1959); Fall [June 1960], particularly Part Two, pp. 65-77; Hinton (June 1955); Committee for Free Asia [1953].

Table C. Distribution of Chinese in Asia (1960)

Country	Number	Percent of total population	Number short-wave receivers owned by Chinese
Hong Kong	2, 800, 000	98	100,000
Taiwan (ROC)	10, 000, 000	97	200,000
Macao	200, 000	96	5,000
Communist China (CPR)	610, 000, 000	94	(?)
Singapore	1, 200, 000	75	50,000
Malaya	2, 500, 000	37	45,000
British Borneo	300, 000	27	3,000+
Thailand	3, 500, 000	15	250,000
Vietnam, South	800, 000	6	20,000+
Cambodia	300, 000	5	2,000+
Indonesia	3, 000, 000	3	30,000+
Laos	40, 000	2. 0	1,000
Burma	320, 000	1. 6	3,000
Philippines	300, 000	1. 3	10,000
Outer Mongolia (MPR)	10, 000?	1. 0?	(?)
Korea, North (DPRK)	50, 000?	0. 6?	(?)
Vietnam, North (DRV)	50, 000	0. 4	(?)
Korea, South (ROK)	25, 000	0. 1	(?)
Japan	45, 000	0. 05	7,000 medium-wave
India	25, 000	0. 01	(?)
Pakistan, West	(?)	(?)	(?)

Note. Population estimates are for only those persons considered in their country to be ethnically "Chinese." The numbers of speakers of Chinese will in most cases be somewhat different depending on the numbers of both Chinese who do not speak Chinese and non-Chinese persons who do speak Chinese. With few exceptions, only very crude estimates can be calculated from the sources regarding the numbers of either the speakers of Chinese or the speakers of any given Chinese dialect. The data on numbers of short-wave receivers owned by Overseas Chinese are very rough, but conservative, approximations based mainly on published Department of State and USIA reports.

SOURCES: In addition to those sources cited in f.n. 1. above see: Skinner (Jan 1959), pp. 136-147; *Statesman's Year Book: 1960-61*.

conversation among soldiers in Korea. Measured both by the frequency with which they were mentioned, and the frequency with which they were listed as the most prolific source of military news, these informants fall roughly into the following rank order:

1. Political Officers
2. Military Officers
3. EM
4. NCOs
5. Civilians

## 2. Frequency of Information from Main Informants

Opportunities for receiving word-of-mouth information arise quite frequently. Of the main—that is, most informative—informants, the great majority provide information at least once a week and over one-third provide it every day. Only negligible differences exist between military ranks in terms of the frequency of

their receipt of information from main informants. While in Korea, however, the Chinese troops were in rather less frequent contact with main informants than in China.

Of major significance to the psychological operations officer is the fact that contact with civilians is sufficient in both number and frequency to suggest that civilians form an extremely important channel of information for soldiers on garrison duty in China. Furthermore, the information transmitted by civilians is considered by the recipients to be credible, important, novel, recent, unofficial, and often clandestine.

### 3. Topics Discussed

There are evidently no significant differences between the military ranks in regard to the general categories of topics discussed. Discussions range in content from serious politics to trivial gossip. The most frequently discussed matters include what the respondents themselves identify as "political affairs" and "economic problems," but the psychological operations officer should bear in mind that by these terms most soldiers probably mean matters of personal concern such as political executions of friends or prices of staples in the local market. Another very important conversational topic in the army is "military affairs," also ranging widely in meaning: from criticism of policy to concern with one's own condition in the service. The only other general topic importantly discussed is news about relatives and friends at home.

It is concluded that propaganda which focuses on themes surrounding

- a. political and economic conditions of the nation,
- b. conditions in the army, and
- c. nostalgia,

will reach a large and receptive military audience, particularly if these themes are presented in terms of immediate personal interest.

No significant differences were found in the relative importance of the several general topics of conversation as between Chinese troops on garrison duty in China and those at the front in Korea. It is particularly noteworthy that no heightened anxiety or interest in relatives or friends at home was registered by any increased weighting of that topic in conversation in Korea.

In general, most soldiers believe that news reaches them relatively soon (within a fortnight). Civilian informants are generally believed to provide somewhat more out-of-date information, but there is considerable evidence that this is merely a function of the generally longer interval between contacts with civilian informants.

The great majority of soldiers have as informants, both military and civilian, persons who usually provide novel or unfamiliar information.

While about half of all informants sometimes discussed matters which the respondents thought the Communist regime would not want soldiers to hear, fully three-fourths of civilian informants did pass such clandestine or antiregime information.

Furthermore, a somewhat larger proportion of civilian informants than army informants sometimes discussed matters which were not (in the opinion of the respondents) mentioned in Communist news media. It also appears that civilian informants discussed a greater variety of topics clearly of a clandestine nature, such as guerilla activities, Communist atrocities, Nationalist successes and activities, and extreme hardships under Communist rule.

#### **4. Credibility of Information**

The majority of respondents, both in China and Korea, believed the information provided by their main informant. Furthermore, they considered it more reliable than that coming from any other source, official or otherwise. In general, it is concluded that in the CCA, as in the Chinese population as a whole, the informal word-of-mouth medium enjoys a higher credence than any formal medium of news and information.

#### **5. Time and Place of Discussions**

As with Chinese civilians, Chinese soldiers tend to converse privately with their main informants. Whether off-post, on-post, or in a combat theater they usually limit their serious informal conversations to off-duty or rest periods at relatively secluded locations and to only one other person at a time. Such traditional public meeting places as teahouses, restaurants, and messhalls are now seldom used for conversations.

## CHAPTER IV

### IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

This chapter will extend the preceding analysis of the composition and communication behavior of the CCA to consider implications for U.S. psychological operations against the CCA.

Certain cautions are in order with respect to these implications. They are, in general, drawn from rough and somewhat speculative extrapolations from the research data. These projected implications are consistent with the analyses of the data, but they are not necessarily proved by these analyses. They represent SORO's judgment of the operational applicability of this particular study. The psychological staff or operations officer, however, may well discover additional or different implications for himself. Furthermore, on the basis of additional research or intelligence data, he may supplement, modify, or even discard items in this list of implications.

#### A. COMMUNICATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF PSYOPS OFFICERS

Although the capabilities of United States media to communicate with the personnel of the CCA are extensive in theory, they are sharply limited in fact. The U.S. arsenal of psyops media is both diverse and sophisticated, but the CCA is *not directly* accessible to much of it. Therefore, the psychological operations officer has the task of identifying those media which in any given operation can reach persons capable of transmitting word-of-mouth messages to or within the CCA.

##### 1. Radio

United States short- and medium-wave radio can *directly* reach only a small proportion of CCA personnel: the politically reliable GPD foreign radio monitors and some army communication specialists. Insofar as such auditors can be reached, they are likely to transmit through official channels only that information which they believe conforms with the interests and attitudes of the regime. However, they are also likely to pass into informal word-of-mouth rumor channels *some* obviously hostile material which they perceive as conforming with the actual military or political situation.\* In

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\*This was the case with WWII Japanese radio monitors. See U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (June 1947), pp. 128, 237-238; Houk (June 1955), Chapter II, Part 1; Linebarger (1954), p. 56.

addition, U.S. radio can indirectly reach some CCA personnel through those few remaining civilian listeners to foreign radio broadcasts in China who have contact with CCA personnel. At best, the potential of U.S. radio as an information source for the CCA is uncertain and probably capable of initiating only a slow diffusion of rumors of long-range value to the United States. An exception would probably exist where CCA units abroad were in contact with the Overseas Chinese communities possessing short- and medium-wave receivers.

## **2. Leaflets**

This study verifies previous studies showing that, in Korea, leaflets reached large CCA audiences and established high credibility. Leaflets demonstrated their potential as a psyops mass medium with a CCA audience. The rapidly rising literacy in the CCA (such that all soldiers are now at least semiliterate) would tend to make this medium even more accessible today. The study suggests that leaflets have a good chance of starting extensive word-of-mouth relay if a substantial proportion of the target audience is reached both directly and with sufficient dispersion to assure that all or most units are leafleted. The study also suggests that it might be worthwhile to use heavy leaflet bombardment of any Chinese civilian populations in the neighborhood of CCA military installations in China or abroad. Such action would very likely start extensive chains of word-of-mouth transmittal by civilians to CCA personnel of substantial amounts of damaging propaganda material.

## **3. Loudspeakers**

The loudspeaker effects studied were mainly those within the limited range of the combat area message. However, in view of the findings of this study that mass audience and high credibility have been established by frontline loudspeakers, it is suggested that extension of loudspeaker range and audience coverage would be worthwhile. Loudspeakers have proved effective in stimulating word-of-mouth relay of their messages among, at least, frontline CCA units, although evidently somewhat less so than leaflets.

## **4. Newspapers**

This study indicates that newspapers are second only to word-of-mouth informants as a *direct* source of information for CCA personnel. It demonstrates that soldiers and their civilian informants who receive information from newspapers often talk about it with others. If U.S. propaganda toward Communist China and the CCA could infiltrate Chinese Communist newspapers consistently and substantially, it probably would reach CCA personnel in sufficient degree to start extensive word-of-mouth relay of the material. However, the possibilities for placing U.S. material in a hostile and closely controlled press are sharply limited. The Chinese Communist government and army press agencies monitor foreign publications and radio broadcasts, but republish only what seems to



be beneficial to their interests. Clandestine infiltration is probably the only possibility for inserting open propaganda in the Chinese press. Such action is patently difficult at best and probably impossible on the scale required for assured, massive, and recurring circulation of the material to mass audiences. The further possibility exists of introducing into Mainland China large numbers of externally published newspapers. However, if this were done on a scale to reach a mass audience, the exercise would take on the characteristics of leaflet bombardment with essentially the same problems and possibilities.

#### **5. Other Sources**

Other media—telephone, telegraph, television, cinema, and stage—are too closely controlled by the regime to permit any but the most subtle infiltration of U.S. propaganda. Propaganda infiltration through the mails is possible, but unlikely to occur on a scale necessary to initiate widespread word-of-mouth transmission. In theory, clandestine contact might be established with select word-of-mouth informants, "key communicators," in the hope that they would start word-of-mouth relay. The research did not discover any standards for selecting such individuals, but it suggests that propaganda would be unlikely to spread rapidly and widely throughout CCA units from any small number of clandestine points of introduction. A highly spectacular item might, however, break this apparent pattern.

### **B. GUIDING FACTORS FOR PSYOPS OFFICERS**

The following conclusions emerge from consideration of CCA structure, composition, communication behavior, and U.S. media capabilities:

#### **General Implications**

1. The smaller the military unit, the greater the diffusion of informal word-of-mouth communication within it. That is, the informal transmittal of information is more rapid and certain among the persons comprising a squad or platoon than it is between these persons and other persons in another platoon or company of the same unit. It is unlikely that much informal exchange occurs between units above regimental size except between some senior officers who are closely linked in the chain-of-command. It is unlikely that "rumors spread like wildfire" even within CCA units, and improbable that they could do so from unit to unit throughout the army. Consequently, the U.S. psyops officers should attempt where feasible to pinpoint all units within his assigned target grouping. Internal diffusion cannot be trusted to spread information rapidly or thoroughly from merely one starting unit to large numbers of other units.

2. Because of the apparently general nature of the above phenomenon, U.S. special forces teams could exploit it to contact

local CCA units through Chinese civilian intermediaries or by direct leaflet distribution.

3. As CCA word-of-mouth communication seems to travel in narrow linear channels rather than by geometric proliferation, it is not likely that rapid diffusion can result from isolated or sporadic psyops efforts. Extensive word-of-mouth transmission of particular U.S. messages seems most likely if CCA personnel are contacted

- a. directly by saturation, or
- b. directly by continuous repetition, or
- c. indirectly by heavy bombardment or frequent repetition of messages among Chinese civilian intermediaries.

Assaturation and repetition are reciprocal factors in this case, anything less than saturation can be compensated for by greater frequency.

4. United States mass media propaganda can be addressed to the CCA simply for its direct effect on its immediate audience, or it can be used specifically to stimulate word-of-mouth relay of the content. If the latter is the purpose, the content must be closely tailored to the tendencies of the informant groupings who are to pass it on. Political officers, as a class of informants, can be expected to spread information quickly and widely throughout the CCA, but only if the subject matter seems to conform to their commitment to the Communist regime. It would be futile to expect them to relay obviously damaging information. Much the same inhibitions apply to military officers and, perhaps, NCOs. However, EM do not fully share these inhibitions, and civilians are least affected by them.

5. As Chinese civilians are major informants of a large proportion of CCA personnel and as they also are both reasonably *accessible* and *susceptible* to U.S. psyops, they constitute the surest channel for infiltration of U.S.-originated messages short of massive, direct contact with CCA personnel. Soldiers consider information from civilian informants to be more credible, more important, more likely to be unofficial, more clandestine, and almost as recent as that received from other soldiers. The combined extent and frequency of contact between civilians and soldiers is probably sufficient to guarantee wide dispersion of information from civilians to soldiers. Of these civilian informants, peasants constitute the largest grouping and merchants the second largest. As already noted in the PROPIN-CHINA study, merchants are the occupational type most active in word-of-mouth communication, while peasants are among the least active.

6. Chinese civilians are highly important as intermediary informants of CCA personnel in the present peacetime situation in Mainland China. Because of the virtual dependence of the CCA commissariat on local civilian merchants for supplies and local civilian labor for transportation, this situation seems likely to persist in Mainland China even during intense protracted war. The same situation very

probably will hold for the CCA in garrison or combat *abroad* if the troops are near Chinese civilians. Proximity to civilians occurred during the war in Korea, but there was little word-of-mouth exchange, presumably because of the language and other cultural barriers between the Chinese soldiers and Korean civilians.\* However, in most other countries bordering China, there are large numbers of Overseas Chinese. As these Overseas Chinese communities are largely mercantile in character, often monopolizing local trade, any CCA units in such countries would of necessity, if not preference, be in close contact with these civilians. These Overseas Chinese are considerably more *accessible* and *susceptible* to U.S. psyops than Chinese civilians in Mainland China.

7. The general usability of civilians as intermediary informants of CCA personnel suggests that special forces teams or military government officers could utilize local civilians in counter guerrilla or consolidation psychological operations against CCA units operating behind the lines where they are forced to live off the land in close contact with indigenous civilians.

### Media Implications

8. Leaflets and loudspeakers are the psyops media with the best potential range and power to stimulate extensive word-of-mouth communication in the CCA. With effective use of the bait of credible information on current military situations, these media have the capability of carrying plausible information of other types and of starting word-of-mouth transmission. In view of both the paucity of CCA sources for credible information on affairs in China and the proven interest of CCA troops in such information, this type of information offers additional possibilities for these media if it could be obtained. Because illiteracy in the CCA is no longer a factor, leaflet format is now free to place much greater emphasis on newsletters than during the Korean War.

9. It is probable that leaflet bombardment of CCA troops in China, as well as in expeditionary situations abroad, could initiate substantial word-of-mouth communication. However, the prospects for significant effect might be greater in a combat situation in which current military information can be used to establish credibility. The prospects for stimulating word-of-mouth relay by direct impact on CCA troops in China are best if the content is the type which can be handed on without danger of reprisal from the regime. For the purpose of reaching CCA troops in China with word-of-mouth information of antiregime character, the most promising channel would be

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\*Despite presumed control measures of the Chinese forces in Korea and the small proportion of Overseas Chinese (less than 0.3% of the population in 1944), some word-of-mouth contact with civilians, including local Chinese residents, did occur. (See Annex 3-C-2.)

leaflet bombardment of those civilians most likely to be in contact with troops. This last point would also apply to use of the local Overseas Chinese communities to transmit messages to CCA expeditionary units.

10. Foreign radio broadcasts do not reach a large enough direct audience in the CCA to be a dependable instrument for stimulating widespread word-of-mouth communication. Neither does this medium reach enough potential civilian intermediaries in China. However, the Overseas Chinese, who are well provided with short- and medium-wave receivers and who already listen to VOA, BBC, Radio Taiwan, and other foreign stations, could probably function as excellent intermediaries in transmitting radio messages to CCA occupation units, at least until these receivers were confiscated.

11. While the Chinese Communist press is a significant stimulator of substantial word-of-mouth communication in the CCA, it is not sufficiently accessible to U.S. psyops to make it useful. The output of such underground press facilities as exist would be accessible to CCA personnel only through their civilian contacts.

### Other Implications

12. The study demonstrates the appropriateness for the CCA of the Litoff-Yarnold criteria for selection of the one rank in any given army which is most suitable as a target for psyops. The choice of rank depends only on the psyops officer's assessment of each rank's relative *influence* on overall military efficiency, *accessibility* to psyops media, and *susceptibility* to propaganda. The distribution of personnel among ranks in the CCA today is such that it is unlikely that any one rank has a substantially greater ability than any other to *influence* the overall military efficiency of the CCA. That is, the *influence* which any given CCA rank—or the rank categories of EM, NCOs, or officers—has in determining the morale, policies, implementation of orders, etc., is roughly equal to that of each of the others. Therefore, the psyops officer's choice of audience can be more or less safely guided by his assessment of the relative *accessibility* and *susceptibility* of any one rank or rank category over another. There are slight variations in accessibility between CCA ranks (officers somewhat more accessible to U.S. radio, all ranks equally to written media and loudspeakers, EM and NCOs more to civilian informants); but, in general, all CCA ranks are about equally *accessible*, both in China and if serving abroad. On this basis, EM are indicated as the preferred target. Despite their present high morale and close indoctrination, the EM are probably more *susceptible* for the following reasons:

- a. They are less well indoctrinated than officers, or even NCOs.
- b. They are not professional soldiers as are the officers, nor do they share the officers' vested interest in the regime. Hence they probably have a less developed *esprit de corps*.

- c.* Those with families remain in a peculiarly unenviable position despite the regime's halfhearted attempts to alleviate the hardship problems associated with these dependents. Hence they are more susceptible to nostalgia themes in the media.
- d.* They are known to be resentful of the many new privileges of officers. This suggests effective use of several divisive propaganda themes.

13. This study tentatively suggests that the creation of interesting events within the range of personal observation of CCA troops would be a certain way to start them talking. While such planned action would be most difficult, its psyops payoff in special situations might warrant serious consideration.

## CHAPTER V

### METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This is a technical chapter outlining the methodology and limitations of the report and the research underlying it.

PROPIN-CCA derives primarily from original SORO research. This research was supplemented by data and insights from documentary sources. All data were then collected and analyzed in four subsidiary studies:

- I. A study based on interviews collected by SORO on Taiwan from 296 CCA veterans, all of whom were Korean War POWs repatriated to Nationalist China in 1954. These interviews intensively explored factors relevant to word-of-mouth communication. The study is deemed to give a detailed and fairly accurate description of such communication as it existed in the CCA as of 1951. (See Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4.)
- II. A documentary study of the CCA since the Korean War. The basic data on both the organization and composition of the CCA and the political and socio-psychological tensions within this army derive mainly from documentary sources spanning the decade from 1950 to 1961. These materials give the social structure within which word-of-mouth communication occurs. They further provide a historical perspective from which to derive hypotheses of the effect of changes over the past decade on that system of communication. (See Annexes 5, 6.)
- III. A study based on interviews collected by SORO on Taiwan from 28 CCA veterans who had deserted and fled the Mainland during 1954-57. The rather limited data on word-of-mouth communication during 1954-57 provided by this special sample are compared for consistency with the current word-of-mouth communication system extrapolated from Studies I and II. (See Annex 7.)
- IV. The PROPIN-CHINA study. All conclusions derived from the synthesis of Studies I, II, and III were checked, wherever possible, for consistency with the general knowledge of recent Chinese word-of-mouth communication obtained from the earlier (1959) social survey study of 2,075 Chinese refugees on Taiwan. (See PROPIN-CHINA (in process of publication).)

The present report, Part A, is the product of the synthesis of these four studies, using the historical or documentary research method. The synthesis of these studies, each representing independent sets and types of data, was necessary in order to up-date the findings of the basic interview material obtained from the CCA Korean War veterans and presented in Study I. This report summarizes only those findings believed to be currently valid and draws only those inferences judged relevant to psychological operations.

The concept of a special study of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA developed during the data collection phase of the PROPIN-CHINA study on Taiwan in 1959 when it became apparent that SORO could obtain access to a considerable number of former CCA soldiers who had become POWs of the United Nations Command during the Korean War. The General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, consented to make these persons available to the SORO field team of supervisors and interviewers. A total of 296 respondents was interviewed in June 1959. Nearly 250 were psyops or special forces troops of the Chinese Nationalist Army who were interviewed in army camps in northern Taiwan. The others were discharged servicemen who were interviewed in their workplaces or homes.

Study I (Annexes 1-4) is based on the interview data from these 296 former CCA personnel. This study alone does not provide a sufficient basis for analyzing the communication behavior of the CCA of today, for a number of reasons:

- a. As it derives from a sample of respondents not necessarily representative of CCA personnel, it was not possible to generalize directly to the CCA as a whole. The respondents were nonrandomly selected; consequently, at best, only qualitative assessments of possible biases can be determined. As they are a sample of the surviving sample of POWs repatriated to Taiwan of the CCF troops in Korea, themselves a sample of the CCA of 1950-53, they are at least three stages of generalization removed from the CCA of 1950-53. Hence it was necessary to seek insight concerning their possible representativeness.
- b. As responses apply to situations as they were 10 years ago, it must be assumed that at least some change occurred in the intervening time. Hence it was necessary to discover the extent to which these responses might remain applicable today.
- c. As the respondents, captured around 1951, were queried concerning events which had taken place some 8 years before, it was likely that their recollection was inaccurate in some particulars. Hence it was necessary to assess the extent of memory failure.

- d. The respondents had not been asked several questions whose relevance was only subsequently recognized. These questions would have covered such points as contact of soldiers with their relatives, relationship of formal to informal word-of-mouth communication, and the extent of diffusion of information through word-of-mouth networks. Hence it was necessary to seek answers to such questions from other sources.

The format of Study I is a straightforward analysis in the running text of the interview data from the 296 Korean War veterans, with all supplemental material from other sources, including Studies II, III, and IV, confined to the footnotes. This supplemental material is interpolated in Study I mainly to indicate both the degree of representativeness of the sample (limitation "a") and the degree of relevance of responses to the present-day CCA (limitation "b"). Distortion of responses due to any memory failure (limitation "c") is believed to be negligible because of the close agreement on all questions of communication behavior which are comparable between the POW sample (with an 8-year gap between events and recall), the PROPIN-CHINA sample (a 0- to 6-year gap with no apparent differences) and the 28 CCA veterans from PROPIN-CHINA (a 2- to 5-year gap with no apparent differences).

Study II (Annexes 5, 6) is a historical study of factors in the CCA believed to relate to word-of-mouth communication behavior. It describes these factors under the headings of size and organization, recruitment, indoctrination, demobilization, relations with civilians including dependents, and tensions between several major types of military and civilian personnel. All supplemental data on communication behavior (limitation "a" above) are introduced at this point.

Study III (Annex 7) is a brief study of communication behavior of 28 recent CCA personnel. It systematically compares, wherever possible, the 8-year-old POW data with the more recent data from the 28 veterans. The summary assessments of comparability were already incorporated in the footnotes of Study I, but Study III makes explicit the profitableness and limitations of this attempt to both up-date the data obtained from, and judge the representativeness of, the earlier sample by comparison with the more recent data from the quite different sample of 28 veterans.

Study IV (the PROPIN-CHINA study) provides a number of general conclusions and hypotheses which were checked for consistency against the findings of PROPIN-CCA. As the points of comparability were largely confined to the material obtained from the 296 Korean War veterans, these points are mentioned only in passing in the footnotes in Study I.

Each of the four subsidiary studies is based on a specific research methodology: that of social survey analysis applying to Studies I, III, and IV and the historical method applying to Study II. The



Report (Part A) represents the selection, synthesis, and summarization of only those findings believed in the researcher's *judgment* to remain applicable today. Consequently, the reader must be cautioned that the up-dated or extrapolated findings reported as existing in the CCA as of 1961 should be taken as tentative. Although the up-dated findings and inferences are *consistent* with the data as analyzed in the Annexes, they do not *ineluctably* follow from the data. They represent only the researcher's considered judgment that they do so follow: another person might well select other findings from the subsidiary studies for inclusion in the Report. However, any reader with access to either additional current intelligence or research can verify for himself the findings of the Report and, depending upon the recency of this additional data, further up-date them.

## **PART B: THE RESEARCH**

## PART B: THE RESEARCH

### Study I

	Page
<b>ANNEX 1. INTRODUCTION</b>	
A. Origin and Objectives of the Research.....	47
B. Definitions.....	48
C. Methodology.....	48
D. Plan of the Annexes.....	48
<b>ANNEX 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE KOREAN WAR SAMPLE.</b>	
A. Introduction.....	51
B. CCA Service Record	
1. Rank.....	52
2. Age at Capture.....	53
3. Type of Unit and Military Specialty.....	54
4. Length of Service.....	55
5. Membership in Communist Organizations.....	56
C. Pre-CCA Background	
1. Geographical Characteristics.....	57
2. Occupation.....	58
3. Ethnic Type.....	60
4. Religion.....	61
5. Education.....	62
<b>ANNEX 3. COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR IN THE CCA, 1951</b>	
A. Introduction	
B. Information About China While Respondents Were on Duty in China.	
1. Sources of Information.....	65
2. Informants.....	66
3. Frequency of Discussion with Main Informants.....	69
4. Topics Discussed.....	69
5. Credibility of Information.....	71
6. Situation of Meetings.....	72
C. Information About China While Respondents Were Serving in Korea.	
1. Sources of Information.....	72
2. Informants.....	74
3. Frequency of Discussion with Main Informants.....	75
4. Topics Discussed.....	75
5. Credibility of Information.....	75
6. Situation of Meetings.....	75
D. Information About the Military Situation While Serving in Korea.	
1. Sources of Information.....	76
2. Other Aspects.....	76
E. Friendship Networks.....	77
<b>ANNEX 4. UN LEAFLET AND LOUDSPEAKER MESSAGES: KOREA, 1951.</b>	
A. Introduction.....	81
B. Leaflets.....	82
C. Loudspeaker Broadcasts.....	83

Study II		
ANNEX 5. THE CCA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, 1949-1961		Page
A. Psychological Operations and the CCA.....		85
B. General Character of the CCA		
1. Organization.....		87
2. Recruitment.....		88
3. Indoctrination.....		91
4. Demobilization.....		94
5. Dependents.....		95
C. Tensions in the CCA.....		97
ANNEX 6. FORMAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY.		
A. Formal Networks.....		99
B. Informal Networks.....		101
Study III		
ANNEX 7. A SURVEY OF POST-KOREAN WAR CCA PERSONNEL.		
A. Personal Background Characteristics.....		107
B. Communication Behavior.....		108
C. Conclusions.....		110
Study IV (See PROPIN-CHINA published separately)		
Other Annexes		
ANNEX 8. QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH RETRANSLATION).....		113
9. NUMBERED TABLES.....		131
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....		151

## ANNEX 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

This study is a product of research conducted for the Department of the Army by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), The American University, Washington, D.C. The PROPIN-CCA<sup>1</sup> study supplements the earlier PROPIN-CHINA study.<sup>2</sup> Project PROPIN consists of research in informal word-of-mouth communication both in selected countries and as a general aspect of human communication.<sup>3</sup> PROPIN-CCA covers an analysis of SORO interviews with an opportunity sample of 296 former Chinese Communist soldiers supplemented by findings from the PROPIN-CHINA study and other relevant materials. It is offered as providing insights specifically relevant to word-of-mouth communication in the Chinese Communist army.

The general findings of the PROPIN-CCA research may be summarized as follows:

- a. It describes the role of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA as a mass medium which supplements and, in some situations, replaces the conventional mass media.
- b. It broadly identifies and describes specific aspects of word-of-mouth communication in the CCA during peace and war.
- c. It particularly identifies and describes a relationship between Chinese military and civilian groupings which suggests that these civilian groupings are effective word-of-mouth transmitters to CCA personnel.

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<sup>1</sup> "CCA" is an abbreviation for the Chinese Communist army. The CCA is officially designated by the Communist regime the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA). "CCF" is the official UN Command abbreviation for "Chinese Communist forces", the elements of the CCA serving in Korea in 1950-53 as so-called "volunteers." Throughout the study, CCA is used to designate the army in China and CCF the expeditionary force in Korea.

<sup>2</sup> Whaley: *PROPIN-CHINA Word-of-Mouth Communication in Communist China* (in process of publication). Hereinafter identified as PROPIN-CHINA.

<sup>3</sup> The origin, history, and specific objectives of the Project PROPIN research series are described in the initial report, PROPIN-CHINA Chapter I, and the *Project PROPIN Research Design* of 21 April 1958.

## B. DEFINITIONS

The following terms have been used throughout the annexes with the denotations indicated:

**Word-of-Mouth Communication:** The oral dissemination or exchange of information by informal face-to-face contact between persons or between a person and group.

**Respondent:** Each of the 296 Korean War or 28 post-Korean War veterans interviewed by SORO on Taiwan.

**Informant:** Any person who transmitted information by word-of-mouth to a respondent.

## C. METHODOLOGY

During the data collection phase of PROPIN-CHINA on Taiwan in 1959, it became apparent that access could be had to a substantial number of former Chinese Communist soldiers who had served in the Korean War. To exploit this opportunity, arrangements were made with the authorities in the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China to make these persons available to the SORO field team of supervisors and interviewers.

The basic PROPIN-CHINA questionnaire then being administered to Mainland Chinese refugees was revised for use with soldiers by the Washington staff of the PROPIN team and forwarded to the field team in Taiwan for translation, printing, and interviewing.<sup>4</sup> Some 15 of the PROPIN interviewers were assigned to these Communist ex-soldiers. These PROPIN-CCA interviews took place during 7-26 June 1959. Nearly 250 interviews were obtained from respondents on active service in the Nationalist army: 200 in army camps in northern Taiwan and 50 off-post. Some 50 others, discharged servicemen, were interviewed either on the job or at their places of residence. A total of 296 interviews were thus collected.

Analysis of the interview protocols was begun in July 1959 with the coding of data for machine tabulation. The data were transferred to Hollerith cards in August by the Data Processing Center of the American University. Further analysis was then deferred until completion of the draft PROPIN-CHINA report in March 1960. Then tabulation and analysis of the data were reintiated, continuing intermittently until late August 1960.

## D. PLAN OF THE ANNEXES

Some supplementary data on the CCA and CCF in 1951 will be presented both for comparative purposes and for the record. The material from the *Chinese General Survey Census*, a rare work existing only in manuscript, is of particular value because it supplies virtually

<sup>4</sup> See Annex 8 for English retranslation of questionnaire.

the only detailed, yet reliable, background statistics for the CCA as of 1951-52.<sup>5</sup>

The PROPIN-CCA research data and analyses are presented in three SORO studies:

- I. A study based on interviews on Taiwan with 296 CCA veterans captured during the Korean War. This study intensively explored word-of-mouth communication factors as they existed in 1951. (Annexes 1-4)
- II. A documentary study of the CCA since the Korean War. This study examines the social structure within which communication occurs. It may suggest to the reader hypotheses for up-dating the data obtained in Study I. (Annexes 5 and 6)
- III. A study based on interviews on Taiwan with 28 CCA veterans who fled the mainland as recently as 1957. This study surveys word-of-mouth communication factors as they existed in 1954-57. It may be used to verify the up-dated findings resulting from consideration of Studies I and II. (Annex 7)

The earlier PROPIN-CHINA study obtained completed interviews on Taiwan from 2,075 Chinese refugees who had fled the mainland from 1954 to 1958. To the limited extent that this study serves to supplement or verify the data from the PROPIN-CCA interviews, it is drawn upon.

PROPIN-CCA is presented in two parts:

Part A, *The Report*, is a description of communication behavior in the CCA as it exists today. In essence, it applies the historical or documentary method to the four available "documents": Studies I, II, III, and PROPIN-CHINA

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<sup>5</sup> UN Command, CIE Section, *Chinese General Survey (Census)*, typescript, 28 Mar 1952. (Hereinafter cited as the *POW Census*.) A copy of this work is available at the Federal Records Center, WWII Records Division, Alexandria, Virginia, filed under "Record Group Number" 982 A56-537. This is a detailed and careful census of 16,768 Chinese POWs in compounds 72 and 86, omitting only about 1 percent who were hospitalized or otherwise unavailable. The authors conclude (p. 20): "From the estimated error and reliability coefficient it can be safely concluded that the results obtained are reliable." These two compounds contained 79.6 percent of all Chinese POWs in UN hands at the time of the survey in February 1952. The authors of the survey seem willing to project their findings to the entire grouping of Chinese POWs, but do not specify their justification. In any case, the authors themselves do not attempt to extrapolate to the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea and, in addition, give strong reasons (such as the disproportionate use of ex-Nationalist troops as cannon fodder in Korea) to doubt the uncritical projectibility of their data to the Chinese army as a whole. The *POW Census* is, however, in apparent agreement with the consensus of impressionistic "statistics" of Western military observers of the CCA and CCF in 1948-52. Some data of the *POW Census* are summarized in Hansen (1957), pp. 315-324.

(Study IV). It results from the collation, analysis, selection, and synthesis of the data compiled in these four studies.

Part B, *The Research*, supplies the detailed data, analyses, and documentation underlying Part A to which it is, in format, a series of annexes.



## ANNEX 2

### GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE KOREAN WAR SAMPLE

#### A. INTRODUCTION

This annex presents those military and preservice background characteristics essential to describe and identify the 296 CCF respondents as a type and suggests some relationships between certain background characteristics and some aspects of communication behavior. Communication behavior characteristics in general are discussed in Annexes 3 and 4.

The sample was subject to a quota of 300 adult males, one-third former CCA officers and two-thirds former CCA enlisted grades, who met the following criteria:

- (1) had served in the CCF during the Korean War,
- (2) had become POWs of the UN forces, and
- (3) had subsequently been repatriated to Taiwan.

Access to respondents was obtained through the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China. Almost five-sixths of the respondents were on active service in the Nationalist Army at the time of interview.

Interviewing was completed during the period 7-26 June 1959 by the full team of four Chinese supervisors and some 15 of their interviewers.<sup>1</sup> Nearly 85 interviews were with troops in the Anti-Communist Korea Returnees' Combat Team in Taoyuan. The Psywar Group in Linkow contributed some 70 respondents, mainly former CCF military officers but also including several former CCF political and cultural personnel. Some 40 interviews were with discharged servicemen working in a motor vehicle maintenance shop near Taipei. About a dozen other discharged servicemen were interviewed at their homes or places of work. The remaining 90 respondents were scattered among several Chinese Army units in northern Taiwan.

Because of the pressure of time it was not possible to select respondents systematically, and the SORO field team interviewed all potential respondents as they were made available by the Chinese authorities. Nevertheless, the quota and criteria specified for the sample were substantially met.

<sup>1</sup> See PROPIN-CHINA, Chapter I, Part E, Section 2, for an account of recruitment, composition, and training of the SORO field team.

The 296 CCF veterans interviewed represent 2 percent of all such veterans repatriated to Taiwan.<sup>2</sup>

## B. CCA SERVICE RECORD

### (1) Rank

The distribution of the sample by rank immediately prior to capture is as follows:

Rank	Number	Percent
EM.....	192	64.9
NCO.....	41	13.8
Officer.....	63	21.3
Totals.....	296	100.0

The grouping of 63 officers consists of:

- 55 Junior grade (platoon, company grade),
- 5 Senior grade (battalion, regimental grade), and
- 3 Cultural officers (civilians attached to military units).

During the Korean War, neither the CCA nor the CCF had a formal system of military rank. Authority, responsibility, and position in the military hierarchy were defined by assignment rather than by a formalized combination of commission and promotion. Nevertheless, by both practice and tradition, there existed a sharp, if informal, hierarchial distinction among the three principal rank categories: private soldiers (designated throughout this study as EM), the CCF equivalents of non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. Today, however, the CCA has formal titles and positions of rank, introduced by the Regulation for the Service of Officers promulgated in February 1955.<sup>3</sup>

Political personnel are regular CCA personnel. They are in a special branch, the General Political Department (GPD), parallel to the conventional military hierarchy, but integrated with it at all levels as with the Soviet Red Army intermittently until 1942.<sup>4</sup> Cultural personnel were nominally civilians attached to the army, and they carried equivalent informal military rank. This last

<sup>2</sup> Of all 21,000 Chinese POWs in Korea, 14,343 were ultimately repatriated to Taiwan in 1954. Hansen (1957), pp. 295-299. These repatriates entered:

Chinese Nationalist Army.....	5,000+
Industry or business.....	4,000+
Agriculture.....	2,000
Civil service or teaching.....	1,000+
College or military school.....	1,000+

"The Anti-Communist Chinese Ex-POWs" (Jan 1961), pp. 6-8.

<sup>3</sup> Chiu (1958), p. 169. See also Annex 5-B-2.

<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski (1954), pp. 3-6.

category appears to have been an improvisation abandoned following the Korean War.

## (2) Age at Capture

The questionnaire asked the respondent's year of birth. Although it did not ask the date of his capture (or surrender), it is possible to closely estimate ages at capture for the respondents as a whole on the reasonable assumption that the overwhelming number were taken prisoner in 1951.<sup>5</sup>

As the mean age of all respondents was 34 years at the time of the interviews in 1959, their mean age at time of capture would be about 26 years, assuming a mean date of capture some time in 1951.<sup>6</sup> Distribution of the entire sample by age categories is as follows:

Age at capture (1951)	Number	Percent
14-17 years.....	8	2.7
18-22.....	77	26.1
23-27.....	115	39.0
28-32.....	65	22.0
33-37.....	21	7.1
38-42.....	9	3.1
Totals.....	*295	100.0

\*One respondent whose date of birth was recorded as 1940 is omitted here both because internal evidence indicates he was considerably older and because official UN data record no Chinese POWs of less than 14 years of age in February 1952.

There are no significant differences among the mean ages or age spread of the three categories of military rank.<sup>7</sup> The mean ages at capture of EM, NCOs, and officers were 26 years for each. Although it is known that officers in the CCA and CCF achieved and held their ranks more for reasons of political reliability than because of accumulated experience or maturity of judgment, one would expect these officers to be at least somewhat older as a whole than the other grades. It is suggested that the passage of 8 years from capture until interview removed from the SORO sample a disproportionate number of older officers through death, retirement, or promotion to senior

<sup>5</sup> The Chinese forces entered Korea in October 1950, and the armistice was signed in July 1953. Within this possible range of capture, the actual rate of capture for all 21,000 Chinese POWs was approximately as follows: 4 percent in 1950, 95 percent in 1951, 1 percent in 1952-53. Nearly 70 percent of all these prisoners were captured in April-June 1951 alone. *POW Census*, pp. 2, 8-9, 14-15, 17.

<sup>6</sup> The POW Census, (pp. 1, 6, 11-12, 15) also indicates a mean age (projected back to their date of capture) of 26 years for all Chinese POWs surveyed. The distribution of age categories among the POW sample also closely parallels that of the PROPIN-CCA sample.

<sup>7</sup> Table 1. All numbered tables are in Annex 9.

rank (of some 80 respondents currently serving as officers in the Nationalist army, none were above the rank of major). The *POW Census* found mean ages of 31 years for officers and 26 years for the lower ranks.<sup>8</sup>

The distribution of ages of the several pre-CCA occupational categories is quite what one would expect: professional soldiers and merchants are the oldest and students the youngest grouping.<sup>9</sup>

### (3) Type of Unit and Military Specialty

All respondents were from ground force elements of the CCF. Over 82 percent of the sample served in CCF infantry units. The distribution of the sample by type of military units is as follows:

Type of unit	Number	Percent
Infantry.....	244	82.4
Political.....	12	4.1
Artillery.....	10	3.4
Signal.....	7	2.4
Engineer.....	4	1.4
Quartermaster.....	4	1.4
Cavalry.....	1	0.3
Armor.....	0	0.0
Other.....	14	4.7
Totals.....	296	100.1

In terms of military specialties (MOS), the sample distributes as follows:

MOS	Number	Percent
Infantry.....	201	67.9
Political.....	24	8.1
Communications.....	10	3.4
Artillery.....	10	3.4
Engineering.....	4	1.4
Machinegunnery.....	3	1.0
Cavalry.....	1	0.3
Other.....	44	14.9

N=296.  
(Note. One double response renders percentages nonadditive.)

<sup>8</sup> The *POW Census* (pp. 3, 6, 11-12) reported data on 545 CCF officers in the 4th Battalion of prisoner Compound 72, who were surveyed in February 1952. For these officers, the mean age at capture in 1951 can be estimated at 31 years. While the PROPIN-CCA sample of officers included only 9.6 percent over 33 years of age, the *POW Census* found 13.1 percent over 36. In their studies of the CCA military elite, both Rigg (1952), p. 58, and Pool (1955), p. 137, found the mean and median ages of the senior general-grade officers to be very close to 50 years. In 1957, the 10 CCA marshals ranged in age from 50-71 years with a mean average of 59. Martynov (1957), pp. 115-134.

<sup>9</sup> Table omitted.

These figures on type of unit and military specialty seem close to those which would be expected of the CCF and CCA in general. The extremely low division slice evident here is probably as much a reflection of the CCF and CCA policies of using civilian conscript labor for line-of-communication and supply functions <sup>10</sup> as it is a result of any predominance of front-line combat personnel among POWs.

#### (4) Length of Service

The distribution of the sample in terms of length of service in the CCA and CCF before capture is as follows: <sup>11</sup>

Length of service	Number	Percent
Less than 6 months.....	22	7.4
6 months—1 year.....	65	22.0
1—2 years.....	126	42.6
2—4 years.....	52	17.6
4—6 years.....	24	8.1
6 years or more.....	7	2.4
Totals.....	296	100.1

In general, officers had seen longer service in the army than other military ranks: 46 percent of the officers against only 23 percent of the other ranks with more than 2 years service.<sup>12</sup> This suggests that the officers also had somewhat greater exposure to Communist political indoctrination. Although there is no significant difference between NCOs and EM in regard to length of CCA-CCF service, the greater professionalism of the NCOs is apparent in the

<sup>10</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 64-66.

<sup>11</sup> The *POW Census* (pp. 2, 10, 13, 16, 20) revealed the following lengths of service in the CCA and CCF prior to capture:

Length of service	Percent
1-6 mos.....	19.1
7-12 mos.....	27.6
1-2 years.....	32.7
2-3 years.....	15.0
3-5 years.....	4.7
Over 5 years.....	0.9
Total (N=16,768).....	100.0

<sup>12</sup> Table omitted. The comparable figures from the *POW Census* (p. 13) are 53 percent of the officers against only 19 percent for other ranks. Studies of the CCA elite (Rigg [1952], p. 60, and Pool [1955], p. 137) indicate that more than half the senior general-grade officers have seen at least 25 years service in the CCA.

fact that a larger proportion of NCOs than of other ranks also had prior service experience with the Nationalist army.<sup>13</sup>

What were the qualifications for the new recruit being assigned as an officer or NCO within 6 months of his induction? Preliminary analysis indicates that the more highly educated raw recruit stood a distinctly better chance of achieving NCO or officer rank within that period: the majority of officer recruits having a middle school education, NCO recruits being about equally divided between those with primary schooling and middle schooling, and few EM recruits having advanced beyond primary grades.<sup>14</sup>

#### (5) Membership in Communist Organizations

Of the soldiers, 21 percent were members of the Communist Party or other Communist organizations while serving in the CCA.

Type of Communist Organization	Number	Percent
Communist Party.....	35	11.8
Young Communist League.....	19	6.4
Labor or professional organization.....	0	0.0
Other (specified).....	4	1.4
Other (unspecified).....	4	1.4
No CP affiliation.....	234	79.0
Totals.....	296	100.0

Such membership in Communist organizations increases sharply with military rank, ranging from 12 percent for EM up to 41 percent for Officers.<sup>15</sup> Although this increase with military rank is consistent with what is already known of the CCA in general, the percentage figures are lower than expectation.<sup>16</sup> This is apparently due to the high proportion in all ranks of former Nationalist troops whose previous political affiliation tended to bar them from Communist Party membership.

<sup>13</sup> Table 2.

<sup>14</sup> Tables omitted. As ex-Nationalist soldiers were inducted into the CCA-CCF due to special circumstances existing only in the period 1949-51, these persons were omitted from this analysis to obtain a sounder basis for insight on the role of education as a factor in determining rank of recruits.

<sup>15</sup> Table omitted. Excepting a handful of ex-Nationalist officers in powerless positions, 100 percent of the CCA general-grade officer elite hold Communist Party membership. Rigg (1952) pp. 60-61; Pool (1955), pp. 135-136, 138.

<sup>16</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 21, 124, 135, 160-163. Dissembling on this, as with other seemingly compromising questions, is deemed unlikely because the Nationalist authorities (whose cooperation the respondents knew we had) do not stigmatize former CCP members and already have full political dossiers on the respondents who, of course, knew of the existence of the dossiers.

## C. PRE-CCA BACKGROUND

### (1) Geographical Characteristics

The respondents were asked their regular (five or more years) place of residence before entering the CCA. Analysis of answers to this question reveals the following regional and locality distributions:

Region	Number	Percent
North China Plain.....	89	30.1
Szechuan Province.....	70	23.6
Yangtze Lowlands.....	68	23.0
South Coastal China.....	18	6.1
Manchuria.....	11	3.7
Other.....	39	13.2
No answer.....	1	0.3
Totals.....	296	100.0

Careful analysis of the data in the *POW Census* indicates a generally close parallel with the PROPIN-CCA sample except that while 11 percent surveyed in the *POW Census* were from Manchuria there were only 4 percent in the PROPIN interviews.<sup>17</sup> The PROPIN-CCA sample contains 24 percent from Szechuan, seemingly an overrepresentation of a province which was remote from the theater of military operations in Korea and contains under 11 percent of the population of China.<sup>18</sup> However, this probably reflects the presence in the Chinese POW compounds of nearly 29 percent native-born Szechuanese. The bulk of the Szechuanese POWs were veterans of the Nationalist 95th Army who, in the opinion of the authors of the *POW Census*, were dispatched to Korea as "gun-fodder."<sup>19</sup>

Analysis of the three categories of military rank in terms of provincial and regional origin uncovered few significant differences. Officers were disproportionately from the North China Plains provinces.<sup>20</sup> NCOs came disproportionately from Szechuan.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *POW Census*, pp. 1-2, 6-7, 14, 17.

<sup>18</sup> Kirby (1956), p. 153, citing the 1953 census.

<sup>19</sup> *POW Census*, pp. 2, 7.

<sup>20</sup> 40 percent officers against 27 percent other ranks. Furthermore, the *POW Census* (p. 14) indicates a similar differential: 47.4 percent officers from North China against 30.1 percent other ranks. No explanation for this difference is offered either in the *POW Census* or in this present study. Studies of the CCA elite (Pool [1955], pp. 139-141; Rigg [1952], p. 58) indicate that only a negligible proportion of senior general-grade officers were born in North China.

<sup>21</sup> 37 percent against about 20 percent for both EM and officers. No data is presented in the *POW Census* on this point.

The number of respondents whose last regular place of civil residence was a city or market-town is rather overrepresented in the sample compared to a national population which is estimated to be 87 percent rural.<sup>22</sup> This is, however, consistent with an underrepresentation of peasants in the SORO sample as noted in the next section on occupation.

Type of locality	Number	Percent
City.....	81	27.4
Market-town.....	45	15.2
Village.....	169	57.1
No answer.....	1	0.3
Totals.....	296	100.0

Although the villages were the main source of all ranks, cities supplied a disproportionately large number of officers and NCOs.<sup>23</sup> This is probably a function of education. For example, among occupational groupings, students and merchants had mostly urban, that is, city or market-town origins; professional soldiers, peasants, and other occupations had mainly village origins.<sup>24</sup>

## (2) Occupation

This section analyzes the sample in terms of occupations held prior to entering the CCA. Until at least the end of the Korean War, the CCA recruited on the basis of availability, measured against desperate political considerations. In this manner, Nationalist soldiers were readily absorbed, often as intact units; and large numbers of civilians were recruited regardless of political reliability, age, or education.<sup>25</sup> This special situation has often been urged as one reason the Chinese units in Korea freely expended their forces as mere "cannon fodder," a calculated utilitarian device to eliminate political undesirables. The CCA now has a very different recruitment policy, one stressing high political, educational, and physical standards. It is this one fact, probably more than any other, which renders difficult any attempt to extrapolate from a study of CCF members in 1951 to CCA members of 1961.<sup>26</sup>

The earlier PROPIN-CHINA study had demonstrated the marked importance of a person's occupational background as an index of his communication behavior. It had also suggested that

<sup>22</sup> Kirby (1956), p. 152; Krader and Aird, (1959), pp. 626-627.

<sup>23</sup> Table omitted. In his study of the CCA elite, Pool (1955), p. 142, notes that of the 68 senior general-grade officers, virtually all had been born in villages.

<sup>24</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>25</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 123, 273-278.

<sup>26</sup> *POW Census*, pp. 2, 7; Hansen, (1957), pp. 317-318. See Annex 5-B-2.



the process of moving from one occupation to another increased a person's participation in the word-of-mouth network probably as a result of an expanded social horizon.

Regarding primary occupation prior to service in the CCA, the open ended responses of the sample were the basis for establishing eight occupational categories.

Former occupations of propin sample	Number	Percent
Professional Soldier (Nationalist only)-----	142	48.0
Peasant-----	51	17.2
Student-----	40	13.5
Merchant-----	25	8.4
Government Official-----	8	2.7
Laborer-----	8	2.7
Other*-----	11	3.7
No Occupation-----	2	0.7
No Answer-----	9	3.0
Totals-----	296	99.9

\*Category contains 2 landlords, 2 teachers, 2 skilled workers, and 5 persons each with unique occupations.

The greatest measurable difference between the SORO sample and the CCF or CCA in 1951 is in occupational background. The best data available, the *POW Census*, gives the following breakdown for the CCF:<sup>27</sup>

"Civilian Occupations" from POW census	Percent
"Professional Soldier" (Nationalist and CCF veterans)-----	54.6
Peasants ("Agricultural" or "Farmers")-----	30.9
"Student"-----	3.3
Merchant ("Commerce")-----	4.7
Government Official ("Gov't Service")-----	0.4
Laborer (2.7% "unskilled," 2.1% "skilled")-----	4.8
Others (0.6% "professional," 0.6% "miscellaneous")-----	1.2
No Occupation ("None")-----	0.2
Total (N=16,768)-----	100.1

The criterion used by the *POW Census* was self-identification by the respondents according to the categories quoted above. As the SORO questionnaire used an open end question for occupation, the SORO categories do not necessarily coincide with those of the *POW Census*. This is certainly true of the SORO category of

<sup>27</sup> *POW Census*, pp. 2, 7-8, 12.

"Professional Soldier" which means a non-CCA veteran soldier (by inference an ex-Nationalist soldier); while the *POW Census* category of "Professional Soldier" includes pre-Korean War Communist veterans, although the authors say: "The overwhelming majority of them originally belonged to the Nationalist Army."<sup>28</sup>

Other differences between the *POW Census* and PROPIN-CCA in proportional contributions of any one occupation may be mainly attributable to special unknown background requirements of those Nationalist units in Taiwan which supplied the bulk of the SORO respondents.

Former Nationalist soldiers constitute nearly 50 percent of each of the three CCF military rank categories and are by far the largest occupational grouping in each of these ranks. The proportion of students and merchants increases significantly from EM to NCOs to officers, probably as a result of the higher education of these occupational groupings. Conversely, the proportion of peasants is higher among EM than among the other ranks.<sup>29</sup>

### (3) Ethnic Type

The sample is virtually confined to persons who are ethnically Chinese.<sup>30</sup> As only 2 percent are non-Chinese (4 Manchus, 1 Mongol, and 1 Turk), no effort is made to analyze these separately; although clearly, the linguistic and other cultural patternings of the ethnic minorities who comprise 6 percent of the population of China are so very different from the Chinese majority that these must be

<sup>28</sup> *POW Census*, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Table 2. Calculations from the *POW Census* (p. 12) reveal the following breakdown of occupational background by rank—figures which are roughly parallel to the findings based on the PROPIN-CCA sample. The *POW Census* conclusion that: "This indicates that the officers generally came from the well-to-do classes and represents a higher socioeconomic group" is consistent with that of PROPIN-CCA.

"Civilian Occupations"	EM and NCOs (N=16,223)	Officers (N=646)
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Soldier (incl. CCA veterans)-----	54.8	48.7
Peasant-----	31.2	21.0
Student-----	2.9	14.4
Merchant-----	4.7	5.9
Government Official-----	0.4	1.5
Laborer-----	4.7	6.0
Other-----	1.2	2.4
No occupation-----	0.2	0.1
Totals-----	100.1	100.0

<sup>30</sup> Among Chinese, successful "passing" as a Chinese is the main test of being Chinese. The ethnic self-identification of the respondents is thus free of the genetic dissembling common in "Western" social surveys.

assumed to manifest themselves in different patterns of word-of-mouth communications.

#### (4) Religion

The respondents were asked their religious or philosophical belief. Their answers distribute as follows:

Religion	Number	Percent
None.....	111	37.5
Buddhist.....	104	35.2
Confucianist.....	46	15.5
Taoist.....	15	5.1
Protestant.....	12	4.1
Roman Catholic.....	6	2.0
Muslim.....	1	0.3
Other.....	1	0.3
Totals.....	296	100.0

Over one-third of the soldiers disclaimed even inactive inclination to any of these beliefs, although the question was designed to elicit the maximum number of specific responses. This conforms with the frequent statements of China area specialists that the Chinese are not a people who strongly commit themselves to or identify with a particular religion.<sup>31</sup> Some verification of this is suggested by the respondents' answers to Question 18 on the full range of topics which they discussed with their main (most informative) informants: only 13 (4.4%) mentioned "religious matters." Further verification is indicated by the fact that 8.4 percent of all respondents did not specify the religion of this informant. The strongest verification is suggested by the fact that, while 37.5 percent of the respondents specified no religion for themselves, fully 71.5 percent listed their main informants' religion as "none," which is twice the expected percentage if it is assumed that non-religion is not a special attribute of main informants. This suggests that the respondents were largely guessing the religious beliefs of their main informants, and indication of lack of concern by Chinese regarding the religious beliefs held by their intimate associates.<sup>32</sup>

When the religious beliefs of officers are compared with those of other ranks, it is seen that Confucianism and Christianity are markedly more characteristic of officers and Buddhism and Taoism more characteristic of the other ranks.<sup>33</sup> These differences are prob-

<sup>31</sup> The PROPIN-CHINA study of Chinese civilians, for example, contained 32.6 percent who disclaimed adherence to any religion.

<sup>32</sup> The PROPIN-CHINA study also suggested lack of interest by the respondents in the religious beliefs of their 2,076 main informants of whose religion 3.8 percent were unknown to the respondents and fully 60.6 percent were listed as "none."

<sup>33</sup> Table omitted.

ably a function of the educational and occupation backgrounds dividing the three categories of rank, Confucianism and Christianity being more characteristic of the more highly educated and higher status occupational groupings.

The students include significantly large proportions of both Confucianists (22.5%) and Christians (10.0%), larger proportions than any other occupational groupings. Otherwise, there is little significant difference in religious affiliations among the occupational groupings.<sup>34</sup>

#### (5) Education

Assuming that every soldier who had any formal education is at least partly literate, the sample contains only 12 percent who were illiterates in 1951.<sup>35</sup>

Educational level <sup>34</sup>	Number	Percent
No Schooling.....	36	12.2
Primary*.....	158	53.4
Middle**.....	96	32.4
University.....	6	2.0
Totals.....	296	100.0

\*Includes 34 by tutor only, less than 5 years.

\*\*Includes 4 by tutor only, 5 or more years.

<sup>34</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>35</sup> Official Chinese Nationalist estimates state that in 1949 only 21.8 percent of their troops on Taiwan were totally illiterate and 43 percent were capable of reading newspapers or magazines, and 22.4 percent had middle schooling or above. By 1951 only 0.26 percent were total illiterates, 59 percent could read newspapers, and 30 percent had at least some middle schooling. Barber (1953), p. 18. Reliable literacy and education data on China are spotty. UNESCO demographers (UNESCO [1957], pp. 16-17, 70) very roughly estimate 50-55 percent of Chinese above 15 years of age to have been illiterate in 1950, noting that males included a much smaller proportion of illiterates than females. The *POW Census* (pp. 1, 3, 5-6) revealed the following educational levels for Chinese POWs in Korea:

Educational level	Percent
"No Schooling".....	44.8
Primary ("1-6 yrs").....	48.8
Middle ("7-12 yrs").....	6.3
University ("over 12 yrs").....	0.2
Total (N=16,768).....	100.1

<sup>36</sup> Since 1927 the levels of formal education and the cumulative number of years of schooling which they represent are as follows:

Primary.....	1-6 years
Middle (incl. Junior and Senior Middle).....	7-12
University (incl. Institutes and Colleges).....	13 or more

Hu Chang-tu (1960), pp. 413-414, 419.

In addition to the 38 persons (13%) whose only formal education was obtained from tutors, 6 others had received tutorial education supplementary to regular schooling. Thus a total of 44 soldiers (15%) had experienced this traditional private or family educational system.

The general level of formal education of officers is only slightly above that of NCOs but is markedly above that of EM.<sup>37</sup> A special analysis of the 13 percent whose formal education was *entirely* by private tutoring revealed no significant differences among the three military rank categories.<sup>38</sup>

Among occupational groupings, the general level of achieved education of former students in the sample is by far the highest. The former merchants, professional soldiers, and others are more evenly distributed over the categories of education. The former peasants are the least well educated occupational grouping.<sup>39</sup> A special analysis of the 13 percent of the sample whose education was received entirely by private tutoring revealed these were most characteristically either professional soldiers, peasants, or merchants

<sup>37</sup> Table 3.

<sup>38</sup> The *POW Census* (pp. 1, 5-6, 11, 15, 19-20) provides data which when analyzed gives the following educational levels by military ranks of Chinese POWs in Korea:

Educational level	EM and NCOs (N=10,223)	Officers (N=545)
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
"No Schooling"-----	45.5	23.4
Primary ("1-6 yrs")-----	48.9	44.6
Middle ("7-12 yrs")-----	5.5	29.7
University ("over 12 yrs")-----	0.0	2.2
Totals-----	100.0	99.9

Taken together with the UNESCO data cited in Footnote 34, these figures from the *POW Census* seem plausible expressions for the Chinese army as a whole as of 1952. Col. Rigg's statement (p. 160) in 1951 that "Informed sources estimate that 70 percent of the junior officers in the PLA [i.e., CCA] are essentially without any formal education . . ." is consistent with the above sketchy data only if those officers with primary education are taken together with those of no education, recognizing that the former will include a fair number of semiliterates or retrogressive illiterates. Pool (1955), p. 134, in a study of the 68 senior general-grade officers comprising the CCA elite, notes that 85 percent had at least some higher education in either universities or military academies.

<sup>39</sup> Table 4.

## ANNEX 3

### COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR IN THE CCA, 1951

#### A. INTRODUCTION

This annex analyzes in detail the communication behavior of the respondents both while in military training or on garrison duty with the CCA in China and while under combat conditions with the CCF in Korea.

The following three ranks are singled out for description: EM, NCOs, and officers. These three were not selected merely because they represented the most obvious military typology. An intensive effort was made to find the one typology which most sharply divided the Korean War CCA personnel in terms of *communication behavior*. The preliminary research studied typologies based on differences in education, pre-CCA occupation, age, rural-urban origin, religion, length of service, and regional origin. Although all of these typologies proved to be significant indicators of communication behavior (roughly in the descending order given above), none were as marked or consistent as rank. The nature of the data did not permit detailed analysis of such other presumably important factors as differences in ethnic type, dialect, or branch of service.

#### B. INFORMATION ABOUT CHINA WHILE RESPONDENTS WERE ON DUTY IN CHINA

##### (1) Sources of Information

All respondents were asked (Q. 1, 2): "When . . . stationed in Mainland China, how did you find out what was happening in other parts of China?" and "From what source did you obtain most of your information?"<sup>1</sup> Their answers clearly indicate that the word-of-mouth medium was both the most widely used vehicle for information and the source of most information for the great majority of all respondents.<sup>2</sup>

The rather marked utilization of newspapers generally parallels the relative degree of education, the more highly educated making greater use of newspapers.<sup>3</sup> The slight use of radio was

<sup>1</sup> Annex 8, the questionnaire, indicates all alternative checkoff answers presented to the respondents.

<sup>2</sup> Table 5.

<sup>3</sup> Tables 6, 7. For a recent account of the press in China and the CCA see Houn (1959), pp. 435-448. The CCA has a long tradition of producing its own newspapers, usually simple mimeographed newsheets. The GPD political personnel in each CCA headquarters detachment publish these so-called "wall newspapers" for every army unit.

largely confined to professional soldiers, presumably officers. Other significant sources of information included personal observation ("I witnessed things myself") and the regular political meetings conducted by the political or cultural officers. In general, the degree of dependence on these other sources varied inversely with the degree of education, the more educated depending less on their political officers or personal observation.<sup>4</sup>

There is a sharp increase in use of the radio and newspaper media and a gradual decline in use of the word-of-mouth medium with rise in military rank. Among officers the increased use of radio probably reflects both their higher educational level and greater access to radios as a prerogative of rank. The greater use of newspapers by officers is probably mainly a result of their presumably greater literacy. Their greater access to and utilization of both newspapers and radio seemingly provides enough information to lessen their dependence on word-of-mouth sources. As the residual category of "other" sources consists in large part of group meetings in which a political or cultural officer addressed the lower ranks, it is only mildly surprising that it is, for officers, the least important category. It is, indeed, a no more important source of information for officers than radio.<sup>5</sup>

Among the several categories of pre-CCA occupational background, the use of radio was largely confined to professional soldiers. The relative use of newspapers exactly parallels the degree of education of each occupational category, the more highly educated the occupational grouping the greater the use of newspapers. In no single occupational category did the use of word-of-mouth sources fall below 92 percent.<sup>6</sup>

To the question (Q. 2) as to the source of most of their information, word-of-mouth remained the most frequent answer for all occupational types. Newspapers were a much less frequent source except among students. "Other" sources fell to negligible proportions and radio virtually disappeared.<sup>7</sup>

## **(2) Informants**

The 96 percent of the respondents who mentioned word-of-mouth sources about events in China were asked (Q. 3): "Who were these people from whom you found out what was happening in other parts of China?"

The high frequency with which EM, NCOs, and officers were mentioned as informants confirms only the obvious: that soldiers primarily use fellow soldiers as sources of information about national affairs. The quite high frequency of political or cultural officers as

<sup>4</sup> Tables 6-11.

<sup>5</sup> Table 8. For a recent account of radio in China see Howse (Apr/June 1960), pp. 59-68.

<sup>6</sup> Table 10. See Table 4 for educational level of occupational types.

<sup>7</sup> Table 11.

sources is particularly noteworthy because of their small number in CCA and CCF units. It is known from both Western military observers and Red Chinese sources that these persons, by the very nature of their assignments as propagandists, were important as information sources despite their small proportion in the Chinese forces.<sup>8</sup> The relatively high incidence of civilian informants of all types is of singular importance, one which suggests that they served as an important channel of information dissemination to the military.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, of all respondents, over one-fourth mentioned at least one civilian source of information; and, excluding political officer informants, over one-fifth considered a civilian the source of *most* of their information about events in China.

Of all their word-of-mouth sources, EM and NCOs used mainly other EM and NCOs, while officers used mainly other officers. EM and NCOs had political officers as their second most important word-of-mouth source. Officers had EM and NCOs as their second and political officers as their third most important sources. The cultural officer's role, although much less than that of the political officer, was of some importance particularly as it presumably tended to reinforce that of the political officer.

Of great interest and importance was the role of Chinese civilians as informants of garrison troops: 35 percent of the officers', 27 percent of the EMs', and twenty percent of the NCOs' responses involved civilians. These civilian contacts existed on a scale sufficient to mark them as highly important channels of infiltration of fresh and unofficial information into the word-of-mouth communication networks within the army in China.<sup>10</sup>

The following table presents the occupational type (other than political officers) of each respondent's *main* informant:

Occupational type of main informant	Number	Percent
EM.....	111	38.0
NCO.....	47	16.1
Junior officer.....	35	12.0
Peasant.....	26	8.9
Other civilians.....	23	7.9
Senior officer.....	23	7.9
Merchant (incl. peddlers, storekeepers).....	16	5.5
Civilian with army (coolies, cooks, etc.).....	11	3.8
Totals.....	292*	100.1

(Note. \*Four "no answers" as to informant's specific occupation are omitted. However, all four are known to have served in the army either as soldiers or attached civilians.)

<sup>8</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 23-24, 108-116.

<sup>9</sup> Table 12.

<sup>10</sup> Table 13. If only *main* informants (excluding political officers) are considered, the order of importance of sources for each rank remains as reported in this paragraph; however, the percentage figures for civilian informants diminishes slightly to 30 percent for officers, 21 percent for EM, and 15 percent for NCOs. See Table 14.



Consequently, of the main word-of-mouth informants:

58 percent were low ranking persons in the army (EM, NCOs, or attached civilians).

22 percent were civilians outside the army, and

20 percent were army officers.

Each respondent was asked from what source his main informant had obtained the information passed to the respondent (Q. 12, 13). The following table indicates the approximate percentages of all informants who were identified with a particular source.<sup>11</sup>

Informant's source	Percent
Official news media.....	31
Personal observation.....	18
Word-of-mouth (specified persons).....	18
Word-of-mouth (unspecified persons).....	14
Don't know.....	14
Other.....	13

(Note. Multiple [317] responses render percentages nonadditive. N=295.)

A detailed analysis<sup>12</sup> broadly indicates the extent to which various groupings (as defined by their pre-CCA occupational backgrounds) turned to civilians as main informants. The majority of respondents, regardless of their pre-CCA occupational background (professional soldiers, peasants, students, merchants, and "other civilians"), had as their main informants persons serving with them in the CCA. Former peasants and the professional soldiers relied least on civilians as their major source of information. However, of soldiers with other occupational background, 30 percent had as their main informant a civilian, usually a merchant or peasant. Significantly, the soldiers who formerly were merchants reported the greatest reliance on civilian informants. Fully 46 percent of the former merchants continued to go outside the army for their main informant. All pre-CCA occupational categories of soldiers, except the former peasants, recorded some contact with merchants outside the army. The proportion of each occupational grouping referring to such contact ranges from 4 percent to 16 percent.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> All percentages are rather suspect, as both the number and composition of the categories "word-of-mouth (unspecified persons)" and "other" are doubtful.

<sup>12</sup> Summarized in Table 15.

<sup>13</sup> The Chinese Communist army, from its beginnings until the present, has never known an elaborate commissariat, much less a post-exchange system. Therefore, a number of soldiers selected in rotation within each unit are sent every day to the local market to purchase both personal items for their comrades and meat and supplementary vegetables for the unit's kitchen. Their tendency to loiter in the marketplace has been deplored in the Communist Press. See Woon (1960).

### (3) Frequency of Discussion with Main Informants

This section reports the data on the frequency of discussion between respondents and their main (most informative) informants about China while in China.

Of the main informants, those of low military rank were in most frequent, officer informants less frequent, and civilians least frequent contact with the SORO respondents. Although civilian informants were in least frequent contact, the fact that fully 25 percent were in daily communication with SORO respondents suggests that civilians were readily accessible to soldiers as regular sources of information.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, that nearly 14 percent of each day's informants were civilians is sufficient to mark civilians as a major source of information for the individual soldier; although on any given day, persons of low rank formed the largest number of informants, officers the second largest, and civilians the fewest. Or put another way: contact with civilians was sufficient in both number and frequency to suggest that these persons formed an extremely important channel of information for soldiers.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the quality of this information, as confirmed by subsequent analyses, was credible, important, novel, recent, unofficial, and often clandestine.

NCOs were in most frequent receipt of information from their main informants, officers only slightly less so, and EM rather markedly less. However, as over 77 percent of even the EM had such contact at least once a week, it may be inferred that the opportunities for receiving information arose rather frequently even for this grouping.<sup>16</sup>

### (4) Topics Discussed

The topics usually discussed in China with the main informants about China are presented in the following table. The figures represent the percentages of all respondents who identified each topic as a "usual" topic.

Topics usually discussed	Percent
Political affairs.....	81.4
Military information.....	72.3
Economic problems.....	32.4
Information about friends or relatives.....	23.0
Mere gossip.....	4.7
Religious problems.....	4.4
Escape information.....	1.0
News about Taiwan (Formosa).....	0.0
Other topics.....	6.8
No answer.....	0.3

(Note. Multiple responses. N=293.)

<sup>14</sup> Summarized from Table 16.

<sup>15</sup> Derived from Table 16.

<sup>16</sup> Table 17.

"Political affairs" were uppermost in conversations, with "military information" a close second. From occasional specific responses, it was clear that "political affairs" and "economic problems" were interpreted to cover a wide range: from national policy to the prices of staples in the local market. That "information about friends or relatives" was mentioned as a topic by 23 percent of respondents suggests a moderate degree of civilian orientation among soldiers.<sup>17</sup> There are no significant differences between the categories of military rank in regard to topics discussed.<sup>18</sup>

Civilian informants talked somewhat more about economics, friends or relatives, and religion but markedly less about military developments than did military informants.<sup>19</sup>

The respondents were asked (Q. 16) for their estimates of how recent were the events described by their informants. Fully 71 percent thought that the information had usually reached them recently, that is, within a fortnight of the event.<sup>20</sup> No significant difference existed between officer informants and other informants in the army in this regard, but a smaller percentage (36%) of civilian informants were thought to have usually provided information within a fortnight of the events discussed.<sup>21</sup> This is consistent with the finding that civilians were in less frequent contact with soldiers than other informants.<sup>22</sup>

The respondents were asked (Q. 15) if their informants were usually bearers of unfamiliar or novel information. Fully 85 percent of all respondents stated that this information was usually relatively novel.<sup>23</sup> No significant differences with regard to novelty of information existed between officer, other military, or civilian informants.<sup>24</sup>

The respondents were asked (Q. 21) if their main informants sometimes talked about things which, in their opinions, the Communist regime would not want soldiers to hear. The responses clearly marked the civilian informants as a richer source of such clandestine or anti-regime information than informants serving with

<sup>17</sup> The *POW Census* indicated (pp. 8, 13) that almost 28 percent of all Chinese POWs were married, with no significant differences between officers and non-officers.

<sup>18</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>19</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>20</sup> In the PROPIN-CHINA study of word-of-mouth communication within the civil population, 69 percent of the 1,913 civilian respondents who replied to an approximate question thought their main informants' information reached them within a fortnight.

<sup>21</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>22</sup> Table 16.

<sup>23</sup> In the PROPIN-CHINA study of Chinese civilians, the 1,936 respondents to an almost identical question gave almost identical answers as to the novelty of the information from their main informants.

<sup>24</sup> Table not reported.

the respondents in the army: while less than half of the military informants ever passed such information to the respondents, fully three-fourths of the civilians did so.<sup>25</sup>

The respondents were asked (Q. 19): "Did [your main informant] sometimes discuss things which were not mentioned over the radio or in the newspaper?" The responses indicate that a somewhat larger proportion of civilian than military informants did sometimes discuss such topics: 66 percent of the civilians against 45 percent of the military.<sup>26</sup> Detailed, if somewhat crude, analyses of the specific topics not available in these official media indicate that a distinctly larger proportion of civilian than military informants discussed a greater variety of such specific topics, particularly those clearly of a clandestine nature as guerrilla activities, Communist atrocities, Nationalist successes and activities, and extreme hardship under Communist rule.<sup>27</sup>

#### (5) Credibility of Information

The respondents were asked (Q. 17) if the information received from their main informants about China in China was usually accurate. The responses indicate that this information, regardless of (but presumably related to) the credibility and intentions of the informants, was generally accepted as accurate or true. Information from civilian informants was particularly accepted as true.<sup>28</sup>

The majority in each military rank category believed the information received from their main informants to be usually true. However, NCOs placed slightly greater trust in their informants' information than did the other ranks.<sup>29</sup>

The respondents were asked (Q. 26) to evaluate the "reliability" of the information received from their main informants in China in comparison with that from other sources. It was found that the majority of all respondents considered their main informants' information to be more reliable than that from any other sources including, presumably, official news media and other persons. The majority within each military rank category considered the information received from their main informants to be more reliable than that from any other source, the officers and NCOs placing rather

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<sup>25</sup> Table 18. Of the 1,933 respondents to a similar question in the PROPIN-CHINA study of civilians, 63 percent indicated that their main informant did sometimes pass such clandestine information.

<sup>26</sup> Table 19. The figure of 50 percent for all informants of soldiers is of the same order of magnitude as that (45%) for the informants of Chinese civilians on a very similar question in the PROPIN-CHINA study.

<sup>27</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>28</sup> Table 20. Data on Chinese civilians and their main informants in the PROPIN-CHINA study show substantially the same conclusion.

<sup>29</sup> Table omitted.

greater reliance on this informant than did the EM.<sup>30</sup> The information from civilian informants did not enjoy any significantly greater evaluation of reliability than that from military personnel.<sup>31</sup>

#### **(6) Situation of Meetings**

In answer to open-ended questions (Q. 22, 23) about the usual place of meeting with the main informant in China, the respondents overwhelmingly specified places which afforded a measure of privacy: the barracks, "in the field," "a secluded spot," or on guard post, in that order. Restaurants were specifically mentioned by only 2 respondents and all other public places by only 15, or respectively 0.7 percent and 5.1 percent of the sample. Of the contacts with civilian informants, about half occurred when the soldiers went to the informants' own houses or places of residence. This finding suggests a relationship with these civilians based on friendship or some mutual interest other than commercial transaction.<sup>32</sup> All these findings apply to each of the military rank categories used in this study; although officers tended somewhat more than the other ranks to utilize places, times, and conditions conducive to privacy.<sup>33</sup>

### **C. INFORMATION ABOUT CHINA WHILE RESPONDENTS WERE SERVING IN KOREA**

#### **(1) Sources of Information**

All respondents were asked (Q. 28): "When you were on active duty in Korea, how did you find out what was happening on the Chinese Mainland?" In Korea there was a general decline in use of all news sources or media (radio, newspapers, word-of-mouth, and other) as compared with the use of these media while on duty in China. Not only were there more persons who had no source of information about China, but there was a decline in the frequency of use of all sources by those who did have some source. However, more respondents defined the word-of-mouth medium both as a source and as the single source of *most* information than listed all other media taken together.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, although the absolute use of each of these media was less in Korea than in China, the relative use of the informal word-of-mouth medium remained at the same high

<sup>30</sup> Table 21. Findings regarding reliability of information in the PROPIN-CHINA study were substantially the same.

<sup>31</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>32</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>33</sup> Tables 22, 23. The findings of PROPIN-CHINA are quite similar as regards the general situation in which civilian respondents and their main informants met: places usually of a type to guarantee a measure of privacy, the times usually during leisure periods, and conversations usually restricted to two persons.

<sup>34</sup> Table 24. Compare Table 5.

level probably because its *accessibility* suffered less than that of either radio or newspapers. These findings hold generally true for each of the three categories of military rank, the five categories of pre-CCA occupational background, and the four categories of educational background.<sup>35</sup>

Although the frequency of mention of newspapers as a source of information about China while the respondents were in Korea was only about one-fourth of that while they were in China, the use of newspapers was sufficient to indicate that they remained *an* important source in Korea. In Korea, as in China, the more highly educated generally made greater use of newspapers.<sup>36</sup>

Official political indoctrination meetings were an important source of information; and, as for the troops while in China, the degree of use of this source varied inversely with the degree of education, the less educated depending more on their political officers.<sup>37</sup>

While in China all respondents had some source of news, in Korea 34 percent had none. In Korea the total absence of any news or information concerning their homeland was closely linked to the soldiers' educational level: 50 percent of troops with no education, 40 percent of those with primary schooling, 30 percent of those with middle schooling, and none of those few at university level lacked any news of China.<sup>38</sup>

The general decline in use of all media for all ranks in Korea as compared with use of media in China applies to each military rank. This remains true even when the 34 percent of all respondents who had no source of information while in Korea are omitted from the calculations.<sup>39</sup> However, two points are clear: (1) conventional media were retained in greatest degree by officers, less by NCOs, and least by EM, and (2) word-of-mouth channels continued in most frequent use by EM, less by NCOs and least by officers.

The fact that over 30 percent in each military rank category had no information about their homeland while on active duty abroad suggests either that these were professional soldiers

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<sup>35</sup> Tables omitted.

<sup>36</sup> Tables omitted.

<sup>37</sup> Tables omitted.

<sup>38</sup> Table omitted. The use of sources on any given subject is, of course, not merely a matter of availability; that is, a source may be available, comprehensible, and recognized yet go unused because it does not transmit information of interest or value as defined by the respondent. However, there are indications (unchanged ranking of the "news from friends or relatives" topic for respondents after *POW Census*) that the "value" of homeland news was a constant factor among the several ranks in this study.

<sup>39</sup> Table 25. Compare Table 8.

who did not use sources of such information because they were not interested or that they were soldiers who had no access to such information despite a felt need-to-know.<sup>40</sup> If the latter case is true (and the PROPIN-CCA interview data did not provide conclusive evidence), this further suggests a state of knowledge and morale which could have been effectively exploited by UN Command psychological warfare. In fact, the Psywar Section of the UN Command did strongly emphasize nostalgia themes in leaflet material directed to Chinese forces in Korea.<sup>41</sup>

## (2) Informants

The rank-order (measured in terms of frequency of mention) of the several types of persons who functioned as word-of-mouth sources for information about China is virtually the same for troops whether serving in Korea or in Mainland China.<sup>42</sup> As in the former case, the high frequency of mention of EM, NCOs, and military officers merely reflects the fact that each rank tends to draw most frequently on persons of the same rank as sources of information. The relatively great importance of political or cultural officers as informants about China is still apparent in the new setting of Korea. The role of civilians as informants declines to a level which is slight but not negligible.<sup>43</sup> In general, Chinese troops serving outside their own country appear to receive considerably less information concerning their homeland and are almost completely isolated from unofficial news sources.

While serving in Korea, EM and NCOs relied mainly on other EM and NCOs for word-of-mouth information about China and only secondarily on political officers. Officers depended mainly on political officers for this information, secondarily on EM and NCOs, and surprisingly in only third place other military officers.

<sup>40</sup> Table 26.

<sup>41</sup> In an early study by Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 44-47, of Chinese soldiers (mainly ex-CNA troops, all captured prior to April 1951), about 52% of those who responded (N-94) had heard their leaders threaten reprisals against families of soldiers who might surrender or desert, indicating that the Chinese commanders believed many of their troops were vitally interested in their distant homes. Indeed, 47% (N-117) specifically indicated concern with their families and 24% were married men. Regarding communication with their families, 97% (N-125) had no communication, 3% had some.

<sup>42</sup> Table 27. Compare Table 12 and Annex 3-B-2.

<sup>43</sup> Only 10 civilians were mentioned as sources about China. Three respondents mentioned civilians as main informants. Four other respondents who had a political officer as their main informant mentioned a civilian as their second most important source. None of these civilians were local Koreans. The study by Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 3, 53, 58, 75, also suggests that there was some, but very limited, contact between CCF troops and civilians. In 1944 the number of Overseas Chinese in Korea was 71,400, less than 0.3% of the population at that time with no substantial change since that time. McCune (1956), p. 57.

It is also surprising that civilians continued to play a small but not quite negligible role as a direct source of information for these troops on foreign duty.

### **(3) Frequency of Discussion with Main Informants**

There is some indication that while in Korea the troops were in rather less frequent contact with their main informants about China than while they were serving in Mainland China. Only a slight difference exists between the military ranks in their frequency of contact with their main informants, officers being in less frequent contact than either EM or NCOs.

### **(4) Topics Discussed**

The relative importance of each of the several categories of general topics of conversation between respondents and their main informants about China does not appear to be significantly different as between troops serving in China and those in Korea. And as with the respondents while in China, there do not appear to be any significant differences between military ranks as to the importance of any given general topic.<sup>44</sup>

### **(5) Credibility of Information**

As with their main informants while on duty in China,<sup>45</sup> the majority of respondents believed their main informants' information about China while in Korea to be usually true. And as in China, there was little difference between ranks in this regard; officers were somewhat more willing than EM and NCOs to accept as true the information transmitted by their main informants.<sup>46</sup>

While serving in Korea, the majority of all troops considered the information received from their main informants to be more reliable than that from any other sources (official news media as well as other persons). This again is true of each military rank, although officers placed rather greater reliance on their informants than did the other ranks. In general, this is quite similar to the attitudes of the respondents towards their main informants while still serving in China.<sup>47</sup>

### **(6) Situation of Meetings**

The respondents in Korea, as earlier in China, overwhelmingly selected, for their meetings with their main informants about China, places which appeared to give some assurance of privacy. This is verified both by the fact that the respondents overwhelmingly utilized off-duty periods for these conversations and that these conversations were specified to be private in the sense of being limited to

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<sup>44</sup> Tables omitted.

<sup>45</sup> Table 20.

<sup>46</sup> Tables omitted.

<sup>47</sup> Tables omitted.



two persons (the respondent and his informant). In general, these remarks apply equally to each of the three military ranks.<sup>48</sup>

#### **D. INFORMATION ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION WHILE SERVING IN KOREA**

##### **(1) Sources of Information**

All respondents were asked (Q. 52): "When you were on active duty in Korea how did you usually learn about the military situation?" The answers indicate that the loudspeaker and leaflet media of the United Nations Command together with CCF political officers were considered to be the main sources of information about the military situation. Each respondent was next asked (Q. 53) to indicate the source of *most* of his information about the military situation. Fully one-third of all respondents specified either UN leaflets (22%) or UN loudspeakers (12%).<sup>49</sup> The remarkably high rating of these media and the question of possible respondent bias to these questions will be discussed in the subsequent annex on leaflet and loudspeaker operations.<sup>50</sup> Despite the probably biased answers, the data is accepted as giving a strong indication of the effectiveness of these two UN propaganda media in disseminating news of the military situation.

The fact that UN leaflets were more frequently mentioned by officers than NCOs and more frequently by NCOs than EM is probably a direct result of the level of formal education (and presumed literacy) of these three military ranks.<sup>51</sup>

The effectiveness of the system of political officers in the CCF is borne out by the fact that for all respondents, regardless of military rank, the political officers constituted both the most frequently mentioned source and the source of most information on the military situation. Also, it is noteworthy that in the combat theater, the regular military officers were rated higher as sources than either EM or NCOs by all ranks.<sup>52</sup>

##### **(2) Other Aspects**

A cursory examination<sup>53</sup> of the data available from the respondents concerning the news and information they received while in Korea about the military situation indicates that, in general, the types of fellow soldiers selected as main informants for military information were quite similar to those utilized by these same respondents

<sup>48</sup> Table omitted.

<sup>49</sup> Table 28.

<sup>50</sup> Annex 4-A.

<sup>51</sup> Table 3.

<sup>52</sup> Table 28, 29.

<sup>53</sup> Based only on inspection of marginal totals.

in China.<sup>54</sup> The use of civilians outside the army as informants in Korea on the military situation was virtually nil, presumably because of the linguistic and other cultural barriers existing between Chinese soldiers and Korean civilians and the relative absence of Overseas Chinese in Korea.<sup>55</sup>

There is some indication that the troops in Korea were in less frequent contact with their main informants for the military situation than with their main informants for homeland news while in China.

The respondents usually attributed a high degree of credibility to the information received from their main informants on the military situation and also considered this informant's information more reliable than that received from other sources: official news media, political officers, or other persons.

Information on the military situation was transmitted mainly during off-duty periods in relatively secluded places. These conversations were almost equally divided between private discussions and conversations with third parties present.

### **E. FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS**

Does some form of "buddy" network exist in the Chinese Communist army? No documentary materials appearing since the Communist takeover on the China Mainland in 1949 have been seen which cast light on this question.

It has long been recognized by "common sense" and verified by careful and repeated research that among the most widely distributed and intensively used informal word-of-mouth networks are those created and sustained largely or entirely on the basis of personal friendship or mutual trust.<sup>56</sup> This is probably characteristic of networks or "grapevines" transmitting clandestine information; and one would suspect it to be a particularly important and common form of

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<sup>54</sup> Indeed, as shown in the following section on friendship networks, at least half the main informants functioned in this role in both China and Korea.

<sup>55</sup> No more than 10 civilians were mentioned, only one of whom was a Korean, a farmer who talked about an expected UN offensive with an educated EM in the field.

<sup>56</sup> Some general studies which stress friendship links within informal word-of-mouth networks are cited in Kishler, et al. (1952), pp. 24-33. For *esprit de corps* and the "buddy" system in the American Army in WW II, see Stouffer, et al. (1940), v. 2, pp. 119, 130-149, 255-259, 280, 348-350, 382-383. For a survey of the literature on the primary group in the American Army see Janowitz (1959), pp. 64-82.

such networks in Communist countries because of the wide range of officially forbidden topics of conversation.<sup>57</sup>

The importance of bonds of friendship and mutual trust in informal interaction and communication among Chinese has long been recognized by indigenous and foreign observers of the Chinese scene. The earlier PROPIN-CHINA study, although it did not specifically probe the respondents' motivations for interaction with their discussants, nevertheless collected a number of volunteered responses on this point. These give an impression that friendship and mutual trust played a major role in informal word-of-mouth communications in general and discussion of clandestine information in particular.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>57</sup> For friendship and mutual trust links in the USSR see: Berliner (Jan/Feb 1954), pp. 22-31; Bauer and Gleicher (Fall 1953), pp. 298, 304; Inkeles and Bauer (1959), pp. 199-202. Through the generous cooperation of Dr. Raymond Bauer the great mass of unpublished data from the Harvard Study of the Soviet Social System has been made available to SORO. The Harvard Study was based on interviews in 1950-51 in Munich and New York with a large number of Soviet refugees. It queried them on their life in the USSR as of 1940. Of 2,718 respondents, 58 percent indicated frequent or occasional discussions with friends. Of these same 2,718 respondents, 52 percent said they obtained information from rumors. Of those who did cite rumors, 72 percent volunteered the nature of their sources as follows:

Sources of rumors in USSR (1940)	Percent
Friends, acquaintances.....	56
Trusted people (unspecified).....	6
Family, relatives.....	6
Co-workers.....	5
People "in the know" (officials, travelers, etc.).....	7
Overheard conversations (unspecified persons).....	5
Other sources.....	25

(N=1,023. A total of 1,133 responses render percentages non-additive.)

That is, over half the persons hearing rumors received these from friends or acquaintances. Furthermore, the next highest source, "people in the know," represents only 7 percent; and the category "trusted people" may very well include friends and acquaintances. The circumstances that this represents an unsolicited specification of source and that there were only negligible differences between the two samples (702 in Munich and 321 in New York) justify some measure of confidence in this data for the USSR.

<sup>58</sup> Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 3-4, 54-63, 82-83, studied interaction factors in their interviews with 154 Chinese POWs and found low morale to be closely related to "lack of intra-group cohesiveness—i.e., cleavages between groups within units, limitations on communication between unit members, [and] absence of personal friendships." Of these POWs, 48 percent said they had close friends in their units. Although few (5%) reported complete absence of discussion in their units, only 16 percent indicated they spoke freely with unit members about such topics as war aims and surrender.

The question of the persistence through time and across distance of close interpersonal relations in the Chinese Communist army was probed in the PROPIN-CCA interviews by three questions relating to main informants (other than political officers) in three topic-situation conditions:

- (1) About China while in China.
- (2) About China while in Korea.
- (3) About the military situation while in Korea.

Each respondent may be placed in one of six mutually exclusive categories on the basis of whether his main informant on any one topic-situation also functioned as the main informant on one or both of the others:<sup>59</sup>

	Military in Korea	China in Korea	China in China	Number	Percent
1.-----	YES	YES	YES	0	0.0
2.-----	YES	no	YES	150	50.7
3.-----	no*	YES	YES	80	27.0
4.-----	YES	YES	no	11	3.7
5.-----	no**	YES	no	52	17.6
6.-----	YES	no	no	3	1.0
Totals-----				296	100.0

Note. \*Row #3 contains 24 possible additional "YES"s. Any actual ones would fall in row #1.

\*\*Row #5 contains 13 possible additional "YES"s in the first column. Any actual ones would fall in row #4.

The above table indicates that more than three-fourths of all persons who functioned as main informants for the respondents while in China continued in this role (for information about either China or the military situation) after the respondents' transfer to Korea.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, if the 65 civilians outside the army who functioned as main informants while the respondents were still in China<sup>61</sup> are omitted from these calculations, *all* but one of the 231 main informants in China not only accompanied the respondents to Korea but continued to function there as main informants about either China or the military situation. This represents an almost complete persistence of main informants across both time and situational intervals.

<sup>59</sup> As the three sorting questions (Q. 33, 54a, 54b) were introduced in broken sequence and asked in such a manner that considerable burden was placed on the respondent's memory, it is recognized that the "halo effect" has very likely tended to overemphasize the role of the earlier mentioned informants. For example, 15 questionnaires were completed in a logically inconsistent manner, the respondents admitting the identity of their main informants for topic-conditions (1) and (2) and also (2) and (3) but then illogically denying that of (1) and (3).

<sup>60</sup> Row #2 plus row #3 equals 230 persons or 77.7 percent of all main informants.

<sup>61</sup> See Annex 3-B-2.

Although the respondents were not asked to indicate if their main informants in the army in either China or Korea were members of their own units, it may be safely presumed that this was virtually always the case as, except for one man, there was no attrition of main informants involved in the respondents' transfer from China to Korea. The implication is clearly that they were transferred to Korea in the same unit with their main informant. It can be concluded that while in China a substantial proportion (22%) of the soldiers had civilians outside their own military units as their main informants, they did not have soldiers in other units as main informants.<sup>62</sup>

It is concluded that a network of friends or companions operates in the Chinese Communist army, and that it exists on a large scale.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> As respondents were not asked the unit of their informants, if there had been any sizeable attrition of main informants in moving from China to Korea, it could equally have been ascribed to death, transfer, fickleness in choice of informants, as well as to the informants belonging to units other than those of the respondents.

<sup>63</sup> This conclusion receives some important verification in the early interviews by Kahn and Nicrman (1952), pp. 53-59, where factors determining group cohesiveness were probed in depth interviews with a small sample of Chinese POWs. Of these (N recalculated at 95), 78 percent said they had a close friend or friends in their unit and 81 percent (N-97) said they had discussed surrender with a member of their unit. It is quite unlikely in view of the close political control and severe sanctions that a soldier would discuss this forbidden topic with anyone other than an intimate and trusted friend.

## ANNEX 4

### UN LEAFLET AND LOUDSPEAKER MESSAGES: KOREA, 1951

#### A. INTRODUCTION

This annex analyzes the respondents' answers to a series of questions about their receipt of and reactions to United Nations Command leaflet and loudspeaker messages in Korea during the Korean War.<sup>1</sup>

In describing sources of information used inside China, only one respondent mentioned that his main informant had discussed a leaflet which the informant had seen. This particular leaflet was presumably of Nationalist Chinese origin.<sup>2</sup>

It has been noted above<sup>3</sup> that UN loudspeakers and leaflet messages were two of the three main sources used by the CCF for information on the military situation in Korea, GPD political officers being the other source. Asked the single source of *most* information, 22 percent of all respondents answered leaflets and another 12 percent answered loudspeakers. That is, fully one-third of all respondents listed UN Command propaganda as the source of most of their information about the military situation in Korea.

During the Korean War, the saturation of the Korean peninsula with nearly 30,000 leaflets per square mile was probably sufficient to insure that almost all Chinese troops would at least see UN leaflets;

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<sup>1</sup> Of the 22 questions about leaflet and loudspeaker messages, most were omitted from detailed analysis. This decision was based on limitations present in the questionnaire, not on the potential value of this type of information.

<sup>2</sup> Of the 2,075 Chinese refugees queried during the earlier PROPIN-CHINA study, 7.0 percent volunteered having seen Chinese Nationalist leaflets at one time or other while still in Communist China, and having used these as a source of information about conditions in China and/or discussed their contents with other persons. As this data was compiled from unsolicited "open-end" answers to several questions, there is no clear indication of the circumstances in which these leaflets were seen. It is presumed that most were seen in the south coastal provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, as most Nationalist leaflet drops were presumably in this region, and all but a few of the refugee respondents passed through this area. Of 28 CCA soldiers who deserted between 1954-57, 8 volunteered mention of Nationalist leaflets as either a source of information or a topic of conversation. For comments of recent Chinese refugees in Hong Kong concerning Nationalist Leaflets see Labin (1960), pp. 355, 359-360.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 3-D-1.

indeed 93 percent of the respondents did.<sup>4</sup> On many occasions the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (now 1st RB&LBn) produced more than 20 million leaflets and newsletters per week and the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company averaged 3½ million per week.<sup>5</sup> Over 2½ billion UN Command leaflets were dropped in Korea.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the Korean War, loudspeaker operations were of a much more limited character than leaflet operations: (1) being far more limited in personnel, and (2) being virtually confined in range to frontline positions by the inherent technological limitations of the medium. Loudspeaker broadcasting from aircraft began in October 1950 but never came to occupy a major role in the full range of UN Command psywar operations.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the limited scope of the loudspeaker medium, fully 94 percent of the SORO respondents had heard loudspeaker broadcasts. This high percentage of hearers is almost certainly attributable to the fact that all respondents had been either frontline soldiers or had passed across the frontlines to become POWs. Thus, they were the most likely of all CCF troops to be exposed to this medium.

## B. LEAFLETS

To the question (Q. 74) if they ever saw a UN leaflet while serving in Korea, the 296 respondents answered as follows:

Saw leaflet(s) ..... 93.2 percent

Never saw a leaflet ..... 6.8 percent

Each of the 276 soldiers who answered that he did see leaflets was then asked (Q. 75, 76) to recall one particularly memorable leaflet and tell if he kept it for any reason. Of these soldiers, 32 percent said they had kept such a leaflet for an unspecified time; the others had either immediately discarded or destroyed it. Of the 276 who saw leaflets, 33 percent said they had discussed at least one of these leaflets with a fellow soldier other than the political officer. Again, as with informants in general, soldiers tended mainly to talk (in this case about leaflets) with persons of their own military rank.<sup>8</sup>

The degree of the respondent's literacy (as inferred from level of formal education) evidently had little effect on his either seeing leaflets

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<sup>4</sup> Of a special sample of 154 Chinese captured by the end of March 1951, well before the rate of leaflet distribution reached maximum, 82 percent had seen or heard of UN leaflets; and most of these accurately described specific leaflet messages to confirm their having read or been told of them. Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 84-85.

<sup>5</sup> Linebarger (1954), p. 307.

<sup>6</sup> Gulley (May 1953), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 84-85. Of 154 Chinese POWs studied by Kahn and Nierman, only 6 percent had ever heard airborne loudspeaker broadcasts. The PROPIN-CCA questionnaire did not study airborne separately from ground loudspeaker operations.

<sup>8</sup> Tables 30 and 31.

or talking about these leaflets. Illiterates both saw and talked about leaflets only slightly less than did the literate soldiers.<sup>9</sup>

To the question (Q. 84): "Did anyone mention to you that he had obtained a leaflet?", 173 respondents <sup>10</sup> answered as follows:

Someone mentioned leaflets.....	49.7 percent
No one mentioned leaflets.....	50.3 percent

### C. LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS

To the question (Q. 86) if they ever heard a UN loudspeaker message while serving in Korea, the 296 respondents answered as follows:

Heard message(s).....	92.9 percent
Never heard a message.....	6.4 percent
No answer.....	0.7 percent

Of the 275 soldiers who heard broadcasts, 25 percent had discussed at least one memorable broadcast with a fellow soldier other than the political officer.

To the question (Q. 94): "Did anyone ever talk to you about a loudspeaker message that he had heard?", 144 respondents <sup>11</sup> answered as follows:

Someone mentioned loudspeakers.....	41.0 percent
No one mentioned loudspeakers.....	59.0 percent

<sup>9</sup> Table 31.

<sup>10</sup> Because of errors in the printed questionnaire, belatedly corrected by verbal instructions to the interviewers, answers were obtained from only 173 of 296 potential respondents. Of 154 Chinese POWs studied by Kahn and Nierman (1952), pp. 86-87, 20 percent had learned UN leaflets contents from others, including 9 percent by rumor.

<sup>11</sup> Because of errors in the printed questionnaire, belatedly corrected by verbal instructions to the interviewers, answers were obtained from only 144 of 296 potential respondents.



## ANNEX 5

### THE CCA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, 1949-1961

No detailed, comprehensive, unclassified study of the Chinese Communist army has appeared since the publication in 1952 of Colonel Rigg's *Red China's Fighting Hordes*. There have been a number of books, monographs, and articles on the structure or early history of the CCA and some general descriptions which appear as mere chapters or passages buried in larger works on Communist China. Pending the production of such a study, this annex only surveys that documentary material relating to the composition, organization, and political system of the CCA pertinent to word-of-mouth communications.

Only the regular land army is studied at present. The air force and navy, although officially part of the CCA, and the militia and other public security units are omitted from this study.

#### A. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE CCA

The CCA is a politically conscious army.<sup>1</sup> From its creation in 1927, its commanders have successfully fused civil administration and political propaganda with the conventional military arts. The state's leading political theorist, Mao Tse-tung, has simultaneously functioned as the army's leading strategist. Many other senior government and Communist Party officials have successfully served the army as tacticians and commanders. Conversely senior army officers have occupied high government and party positions.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout its 34 year history the CCA has both employed and been subjected to intensive political propaganda or "psychological warfare." It has employed propaganda against the Chinese Nationalist government and army continuously since 1927, against the Japanese invaders from 1937-45, and against the United Nations Command in Korea from 1950-53. Concurrent with these operations, it was the target of propaganda from the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the UN Command.<sup>3</sup>

The political tradition in the CCA is an inheritance from the Kuomintang, which, in 1923-24, adopted both agitation and propaganda techniques and the political officer and "democratic centralism"

<sup>1</sup> For a general account of the intimate relationship between political and military doctrine and practice in the CCA see Garvey (1960). See also Nanes (1960), pp. 339-340; Ostrowska (Jan 1960), pp. 82-87.

<sup>2</sup> Walker (1957), pp. 39-40; Rigg (1952), pp. 19-61; Pool (1955), pp. 128, 145; Hinton (1956), pp. 41-53; Chao (1959), pp. 40-50.

<sup>3</sup> Daugherty (1958), pp. 844-850.

systems from Sun Yat-sen's Soviet advisers. Much of this early Soviet organizational system has persisted since 1927 in both the Nationalist and Communist governments and armies in China. Consequently, any Chinese changing sides changes his ideology but not necessarily his routine.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet Army finally abandoned its policy of dual command of military officers and political commissars in 1942 as a crippling interference with conventional military operations. However, the CCA continues a political hierarchy parallel to and integrated with the regular military hierarchy.<sup>5</sup> This special political hierarchy is called the General Political Department (GPD). During the rapid expansion of the CCA, from 1948 through the Korean War, the regular military officer was seldom a hard-core Communist and often an untrusted ex-Nationalist. The GPD political officer was particularly prominent during that time as the overseer, spy, and propagandist for maintaining the regime's control over such politically unreliable personnel. All CCA officers must now undergo intensive political screening and training before, as well as after, receiving their commissions. Many military commanders have recently been trusted to function temporarily as their own political officers where the need has arisen.<sup>6</sup>

Around the beginning of October 1960, Marshal Lin Piao, in addressing a conference of high ranking officers about political work in the CCA, revealed that since May 1960, 120,000 "army functionaries" had engaged in this work at the company, platoon, and squad levels.<sup>7</sup> This is probably a close approximation of the number of GPD personnel in the army.<sup>8</sup>

The CCA is more politically conscious than any other major army. Despite this, it proved vulnerable to UN Command psychological operations in the Korean War. Today, the fact of this vulnerability to psychological operations remains. Only the extent and nature are open to speculation and enquiry.

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<sup>4</sup> Tang (1957), pp. 35-48; Liu (1956), pp. 17-18, 43-48, etc.; Carlson (1940), pp. 14, 32, 35-37; Chiang Kai-shek (1957), pp. 6, 35, etc.; Pool (1955), pp. 123-126, 138; Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 200-202; Leng and Palmer (1960), pp. 68, 75-77. For a description of the Nationalist's political officer system see Barber (1953).

<sup>5</sup> Brzezinski (1954), pp. 3-6; Garvey (1960), pp. 83, 109, 158-163, 212, 380; Galay (1958), pp. 7-8; Hinton (1956), pp. 45-46; Carlson (1940), p. 36; Rigg (1960), p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 23-24, etc.; Rigg (1957), p. 3; Chin (1958), pp. 173-174; Pool (1955), pp. 132-133; Woon (1960).

<sup>7</sup> Peking, NCNA despatch, 8 Oct 1960; *SCMP*, No. 2358 (14 Oct 1960) p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> A SORO estimate based on independent data shows the following minimal number of GPD personnel in the 1958 CCA Table of Organization. From this it

## B. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE CCA

### 1. Organization <sup>9</sup>

From 1949 until 1953, a period including the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the bulk of the CCA was organized into a field army system composed of four such armies. Concurrently, all Mainland China was divided into six administrative regions, each (except Manchuria) having as its senior "civil" governor the military commander of the field army geographically coterminous with it. Thus, the fusion of military and civil authority at the regional level was virtually complete, being in fact military government. In 1951 this army consisted of 2,650,000 men.<sup>10</sup>

In late 1953 a major reorganization deliberately based on "advanced Soviet experience" was begun,<sup>11</sup> leading toward creation is concluded that the official statement of Marshal Lin is substantially correct.

*Estimated (GPD) Personnel, Table of Organization Strength (1953)*

Echelon	Number of units <sup>a</sup>	GPD per unit <sup>b</sup>	GPD per echelon
GPD Directorate.....	1	(?)	(?)
Military District, 1st Class.....	11	(?)	(?)
Mil. Dist., Provincial.....	22	(?)	(?)
Army.....	40	500	20,000
Division.....	120	150	18,000
Regiment.....	520	80	41,600
Battalion.....	1,920	3	5,760
Company.....	6,880	2	13,700
Platoon.....	(?)	0	0
Squad.....	(?)	* 0	0
Total GPD personnel.....			99,120+

<sup>a</sup> Lee (1958), pp. 15, 38-39.

<sup>b</sup> Lee (1958), pp. 50-51.

\* One or two "political warriors" (non-GPD) per squad.

<sup>9</sup> Chiu (1960), pp. 59-66; Lee (1958); Grayson (1955), pp. 46-47.

<sup>10</sup> Supplementing the regular army was a Public Security Force of 2,450,000 men (1951) composed of units concerned with internal movement and other police functions directly controlled by the Ministry of Public Security in Peking and units used for guard duty on stationary defense under direct control of the army. In addition there was a militia of 5,480,000 (1950) composed of home guard and army reserve units. Lapp (1960), pp. 61-62; Walker (1955), pp. 31-32; Rigg (1952), pp. 66-77.

<sup>11</sup> From August 1958, when Marshal Chu Teh dramatically announced in *Pravda* that the CCA must not "dogmatically" accept the Soviet Army as its model, there was marked coolness both between the CCA and Soviet Army and within the senior ranks of the CCA. This phase ended with the replacement of Marshal Peng Teh-huai by Marshal Lin Piao as Minister of Defense in September 1959. The former eulogizing of the Soviet Army has reappeared in the Chinese press. Erickson (1960), pp. 246-247; Alexandrov (1959), pp. 26-29; Galay (1960), pp. 11-12; Galay (1958), pp. 7-9; Chinese Communist press and radio reporting of the 23 February 1961 CCA celebrations of Soviet Army Day; Kashin (1960).

of a modern military establishment. This reorganization first replaced the field army system with a centralized regular army system. Then, in June 1954, military government of the regional areas was replaced by regular civil administration.<sup>12</sup>

Since 1950, the firstline strength of the CCA ground forces has varied only between 2 and 3 million. In 1953 the newly organized regular army system consisted of 2,250,000 men plus regional security forces and the militia. Today, the firstline strength of the CCA, excluding the navy and air force, is close to 2,500,000.<sup>13</sup> Since 1959, for the first time in its history, the army contains only 3-year conscripts, except for officers and NCOs.

As a result of reorganization, the CCA is now a fairly modern type of conventional army. It no longer has the tactics and training, equipment, or organization of a guerrilla force. The transition in tactics to large field formations occurred during the Civil War (1946-49); the transition in equipment, during and after the Korean War (1950-present); that in organization, particularly in 1953-55. However, a guerrilla potential remains: the tradition is proudly inculcated in the new recruits, and all officers who served before 1946—the great majority of marshals, generals, and senior colonels—were guerrillas.<sup>14</sup>

The militia, even the 10-15 million firstline personnel, ill-trained and lightly armed, is not intended for use as light infantry. It is primarily an instrument of internal security to guarantee quiet in the new communes. Secondly, it provides a massive, partly trained reserve for the CCA, the regular army. Finally, it is a potential guerrilla force in the event of invasion of the China Mainland.<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Recruitment

Prior to 1955 the CCA recruited on the exclusive basis of "voluntary" enlistment. The great mass of enlistments was achieved only by extreme application of what the Communists termed "social pressure." These recruits were officially listed and informally treated as volunteers. For this reason, and because they had in a sense entered into a morally binding contract with both state and

<sup>12</sup> Lapp (1960), p. 62; Walker (1957), pp. 40-41; Walker (1955), p. 31; Rigg (1957), pp. 3-4.

<sup>13</sup> Lapp (1960), p. 63, has 2,500,000-3,400,000. As the air force and navy are an integral part of the CCA the larger figures presumably include 400,000 air force personnel (75,000 flying and technical plus 325,000 attached ground forces) and 56,000 naval personnel (28,000 sailors, 28,000 marines). Rigg (1957), p. 4, estimates that at the end of 1956 there were 2,500,000 firstline soldiers plus 200,000 airmen and sailors, plus nearly 1,000,000 public security troops.

<sup>14</sup> O'Ballance (1959), pp. 245, 246; Chiu (1958), p. 168; Nanes (1960), p. 340; Kashin (1960). The guerrilla tradition is a major theme in the Chinese Communist public and military press. See particularly the Army Day (Aug. 1) press and radio coverage for 1960 and 1961.

<sup>15</sup> Powell (1960); Nanes (1960), p. 339; O'Ballance (1959), p. 247; Walker (1957), p. 42; Ting (1955).

society, the resulting climate of enlistment produced a somewhat higher morale than the "rope and tie" impressment traditionally used by Chinese warlords.<sup>16</sup>

The currently used conscription procedure is founded on the Draft Conscription Law of 30 July 1955.<sup>17</sup> By this law, all males between 18 and 22 years of age, that is, 17 through 21 by Western age reckoning, are subject to conscription. Reserve obligations continue until age 40. It also provides both for 3 years active service for EM and NCOs in the army and Public Security Force and for gradual demobilization of the earlier "volunteers."<sup>18</sup> This law also established an annual winter conscription period from the beginning of November until the end of February, active service dating from March 1st. This schedule has been closely approximated from the first conscription wave of 1955-56 to the recently concluded fifth conscription wave of 1959-60.<sup>19</sup> Thus, under the 1955 Conscription Law, up to one-third of the army should be replaced annually by conscription; and the first conscription wave of 1955-56 did include about 500,000 new recruits.<sup>20</sup>

The Conscription Law of 1955 closely resembles the special compulsory call-up regulation of the previous year under which 830,000 men between 18 and 22 years of age were inducted during the period November 1954 through February 1955 with active service dating from 1 March 1955. This special call-up marked the beginning of change from voluntary to conscript service.<sup>21</sup>

In the fifth conscription wave concluded in February 1960, a substantial proportion of recruits came directly from the militia, where they had already received a rudimentary orientation to the army.<sup>22</sup> From a presumably model county in Heilungkiang province,

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<sup>16</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 127-129.

<sup>17</sup> Lapp (1960), p. 63; Tang (1957), pp. 344-346; Chiu (1958), p. 170; Kirby (1956), p. 234; Hinton (1956), pp. 47-48.

<sup>18</sup> Service in the air force and coast guard is 4 years, in the navy, 5 years. By contrast, the Soviet army calls up 19 year olds for 2 years service. Lapp (1960), p. 63.

<sup>19</sup> Tang (1957), p. 346.

<sup>20</sup> Chiu (1958), p. 170. However, see Lapp (1960), p. 63, who writes: "In excess of 1 million men were reported drafted between November 1955 and February 1956." See also Kirby (1956), p. 222, which states 450,000 inductees were planned and Walker (1957), p. 41, who writes "more than half a million" were inducted.

<sup>21</sup> *Communist China*: 1955 (Nov. 1956), p. 133; Kirby (1956), pp. 216-222, 242; Chiu (1958), p. 172.

<sup>22</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2218 (17 Mar. 1960), p. 8. Radio Peking singled out Chekiang as an apparently model province where, of all recruits, 37 percent had received marksmanship training with their militia units and an additional 12 percent had at least some militia experience. All recruits from Anhwei province were from the militia, according to a report of the provincial Conscription Bureau (*SCMP*, No. 2235, 11 Apr. 1960, p. 8.).

73 percent of the recruits were 18 years of age, 86 percent were "A-grade" in physical condition, 75 percent were from "poor peasant families", and 31 percent were Communist Party or Young Communist League members.<sup>23</sup> As the annual quota of recruits is only a small percentage<sup>24</sup> of available registrants, the conscription authorities are able to set and maintain high standards for recruitment. Those standards actually applied appear to include, in approximate order of priority:<sup>25</sup>

- (1) high political reliability
- (2) some previous military instruction
- (3) literacy
- (4) sound health
- (5) youth

Owing to the vast pool of registrants available for conscription, deferral or exemption is usually granted college students, technical workers, public servants, professionals, men who are the sole support of their families, only sons, the physically deformed or ill, and those denied political rights by law.<sup>26</sup>

Although no clear evidence has been noted, it appears likely that the proportion of non-Chinese in the CCA is considerably below that of their proportion (6%) in the entire population of China. The best indications are that these national minorities—Tibetans, Mongols, Turks, etc.—are disproportionately excluded mainly because they are not believed to meet the prime requirement of high political reliability, and special efforts are made toward political indoctrination of those that are conscripted. In any case, the majority of CCA troops in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang are evidently Chinese, those relatively few local minority troops being fully integrated into the ranks with the Chinese troops.<sup>26a</sup>

Recruits are assigned by draft authorities directly to an active unit for on-the-job training rather than to special basic training

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<sup>23</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2235 (11 Apr. 1960), pp. 7-9. It was officially reported that in Dec. 1956, 53.7 percent of those enlisting in Peking were CP or CYL members. *SCMP*, No. 1476 (25 Feb. 1957).

<sup>24</sup> Roughly 12 percent, assuming 700,000 recruits out of approximately 6 million males who reach the age of 18 each year. There are now over 110 million Chinese males 18-40 years of age, all of whom are subject to registration and conscription or reserve service. Estimates extrapolated from demographic data in Krader and Aird (1959), pp. 625-626. Tang (1957), p. 352, independently estimates: "Approximately 5 million men reach the age of 20 each year. . . . the new Conscription Law furthermore, was expected to apply to 80 million men of military age . . . ." Nanes (1960), p. 339, estimates "125 million men of military age." For data from the Sino-Japanese War period, see Liu (1956), pp. 131-152.

<sup>25</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2235 (11 Apr 1960), pp. 8-9; *SCMP*, No. 2218 (17 Mar 1960), p. 8.

<sup>26</sup> Woon (1960); Kirby (1956), p. 234; *SCMP*, No. 2248 (2 May 1960), pp. 16-17.

<sup>26a</sup> Urumchi Radio, 28 July 1961, 1405 GMT. See also Annex 2-C-3.

units as in Western armies. However, prior militia training partly substitutes for basic training. The recruits participate with their units in the annual spring training cycle observed in all CCA units.<sup>27</sup>

In sharp contrast with the former system of informal rank, the Regulations for the Service of Officers of 8 February 1955 inaugurated the formal military hierarchy in the present-day CCA. This regulation provides for commissioning as second lieutenants: (1) all graduates from military schools, and (2) those without formal military education who have demonstrated exceptional ability in work or rendered meritorious service in war.

In the selection of officer material, "political quality" stands at least equal with "professional ability" as a prerequisite. It is evident from the specification of these criteria in Article 25 of the Regulations that the CCA does not maintain any fiction of the separation of the political and military spheres.

The authority for promotion or demotion of officers varies with grade or rank: marshals and general grades are assigned directly by the Central Government, field grades by the Ministry of National Defense, and company grades by field commanders.<sup>28</sup>

Beginning in the spring of 1951, a system of military specialist schools for junior officer candidate training was established in the major Chinese cities. Newspaper advertisements encouraged secondary school graduates to enroll for specialized courses lasting from 8 months to 2 years, depending on the branch of service. An estimated 40,000 men enrolled in the first term. It appears likely that all college students and secondary school graduates who apply for CCA service are sent to these military schools. Under the Regulations for Officers of 1955, all graduates are directly commissioned either as second lieutenants or, in the case of those with superior academic records, as first lieutenants.<sup>29</sup>

Women no longer serve as combatants in the CCA as they did during the Civil War.<sup>30</sup>

### 3. Indoctrination<sup>31</sup>

The political orthodoxy of the CCA is promoted by two devices: (1) the policy of placing only hard-core Communists in

<sup>27</sup> Chiu (1958), p. 171.

<sup>28</sup> Tang (1957), pp. 345-347; Chiu (1958), p. 169. For the symbolism of the newly issued officers' uniforms of 1955 see Rigg (1957), p. 3. See also "New Titles and Tunics for Red China's Army Brass," *Life*, 17 Oct 1955, pp. 58-59. See Pool (1955), pp. 125-126, for the high political quality of officers even before the Regulations of 1955.

<sup>29</sup> Chiu (1958), pp. 169-171; Woon (1960). Aviation and naval school courses last 2 years; armored force school courses, 8 months.

<sup>30</sup> Women do, however, continue to serve as combatants in the militia. O'Ballance (1959), p. 246; Nanes (1960), p. 339; Yang (1959), no. 6, pp. 27-29.

<sup>31</sup> For the nature of the overlapping functions of education, indoctrination, and propaganda see Chen (Jan 1957), pp. 43-48. See also Mills (Dec 1959), pp. 71-77.

senior command positions, and (2) the system of political officers and cadres institutionalized in the General Political Department (GPD).

At the beginning of the Korean War, a substantial proportion of the CCA officers were former Nationalist officers who had received only cursory political screening and indoctrination. Virtually all these officers, as well as the former Nationalist lower ranks, have now been eliminated by a combination of demobilization, extensive purge, and Korean War, "cannon-fodder" attrition.<sup>32</sup>

According to the official English text of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution of 26 September 1956,<sup>33</sup>

"The [Communist] Party organizations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army carry on their work in accordance with the instructions of the [CP] Central Committee. The General Political Department in the People's Liberation Army, under the direction of the Central Committee, takes charge of the ideological and organizational work of the Party in the army."

Party supervision of the CCA is exercised through a formal hierarchical structure of political officers (down to company level) and cadres supplemented by regular Communist Party members penetrating every level of the military hierarchy down to the squad with its "political warrior."<sup>34</sup> The Party Constitution explicitly provides for Communist "committees" in army units at company or other primary unit levels where three or more full party members exist; if less than three, they should join cells in a nearby unit.<sup>35</sup>

Personnel of the GPD work closely with all Communist Party (CP) and Young Communist League (YCL) members serving in the army. Of non-Party military personnel, a large proportion of the conscripts, and most of the officers, are recruited into either the CP or YCL during their army service. Their recruitment is a result of either the intensive political indoctrination work of the GPD personnel or the rewards associated with membership in the elite body of a Communist regime. As over 80 percent of all discharged servicemen are now demobilized as members of the CP or YCL and probably less than 30 percent were members before conscription, the CCA is clearly a major instrument of Communist indoctrination and

<sup>32</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 124, 272-278; Daugherty (1958), pp. 635-641.

<sup>33</sup> Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Adopted 26 Sept 1956), Article 35, quoted in Tang, v. 2 (1958), p. 125.

<sup>34</sup> Lapp (1960), pp. 65-66; Chiu (1958), pp. 173-175; Crocker (1957), p. 98; Chiu (1960), p. 62.

<sup>35</sup> CCP Constitution, Article 47, quoted by Kirby (1958), p. 132.



party recruitment. In fact, over 350,000 *new* CP or YCL members are demobilized each year.<sup>36</sup>

Because *all* EM are youths as a result of the Conscription Law of 1955, ever increasing stress is being placed on the political indoctrination conducted by the CCA branches of the Young Communist League.

The YCL is the main indoctrination and recruiting institution among EM for the Communist Party. Indeed, of all personnel who achieve full CP membership during their military service, over 95 percent are recruited out of the army's YCL branches.<sup>36a</sup>

The GPD controls all political aspects of the CCA. These aspects are broadly defined to include propaganda, "cultural" affairs, entertainment, relations with civilians and army dependents, youth work, education, postal service and censorship, and, through intelligence and counterespionage networks, the internal security of the armed services. Although the GPD is administratively under the government Ministry of National Defense, it is directly responsible either to the party Politburo or a committee of the Politburo. The present Director of the GPD is General T'an Cheng.<sup>37</sup>

In an effort to overcome hostilities which had developed among officers and between officers, enlisted men, and civilians, the Party Central Committee ordered a new and intensive 5-year political indoctrination course beginning in 1956 for officers above the rank of senior captain. Despite this effort, as late as 23 September 1957, the Director of the GPD was still publicly admitting the persistence of serious ideological deviations among CCA officers.<sup>38</sup> In October 1957, as part of the Communist "rectification" program, the policy of assigning civilian cadres for training and work at lower echelons was established. In August 1958, Marshal Chu Teh announced retrospectively a tightening of political control in the CCA. Finally in September, the GPD ordered that the CCA assign all officers to serve as privates at company level for at least a month each year. Within 6 months, 150,000 officers, including 160 generals, had seen

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<sup>36</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2248 (2 May 1960), p. 20. See also *SCMP*, No. 2219 (18 Mar 1960), p. 9. Based on an estimated annual demobilization of 700,000 EM and NCOs. In September 1957, the CP had 12,700,000 members. In August 1956, the YCL had 20 million members. Chao (1959), p. 50; Chao (13 May 1957), p. 20. It was officially announced that 90 percent of the men demobilized in 1957 were CP or YCL members averaging 25 years of age. Chiu (1958), p. 172.

<sup>36a</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2503 (25 May 1961), pp. 2-8; *SCMP*, No. 2460 (21 Mar 1961), pp. 6-8.

<sup>37</sup> Lapp (1960), p. 66. For the GPD Agitprop Section and CP Youth League in the army around 1936, see Snow (1957), pp. 47-50, 52-55. See pp. 64-68, 131-142, for biographies of senior GPD officers.

<sup>38</sup> Gen T'an Cheng cited in Walker (1957), p. 415; Chiu (1958), p. 169; Chiu (1960), pp. 65-66.

such service. This program of *hsia-fang*, "simulated demotion," continues on an intensive, well-publicized basis.<sup>39</sup>

In a further effort to reduce tensions and improve discipline between officers and men, the Regulations Governing PLA Educational Work at the Company Level were promulgated on 5 July 1961 with much fanfare. This new decree stresses that between ranks there should be: (1) "class brotherhood," (2) equality in status with differences supposedly being only in job description, and (3) mutual respect and harmonious relations (the "respect officers and love soldiers" slogan).<sup>39a</sup>

Traditionally, but with steadily increasing emphasis since 1957, large numbers of units are periodically detached for assignments to productive labor alongside civilian workers in agriculture and industry.<sup>40</sup> This policy is pursued more for reasons of public relations than economics.

In January 1959 the GPD initiated a 10-year plan for general education among servicemen. This program concentrates on middle school education and will gradually move toward college-level material.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4. Demobilization <sup>42</sup>

The Draft Conscription Law of 1955 provides for demobilization of EM and NCO's. Those conscripted after 1955 are due for demobilization following 3 years service. The separation or discharge date for all conscripts is March 1st. Those who enlisted in 1955 or before were to be gradually demobilized either by placing them on the reserve list or retiring them.<sup>43</sup> However, considerable demobilization had taken place before this law. By 10 December 1955, 4,510,000 soldiers of the CCA had already been returned to civilian status.<sup>44</sup>

More than 5,000,000 men were demobilized in the 7 years preceding 5 November 1956 with an additional 800,000 scheduled for release during 1957. By this time, virtually all of the former

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<sup>39</sup> Chiu (1960), p. 66; Galay (1958), p. 8, quoting Chu Teh in *Pravda*, 3 Aug 1958; Peking Radio, 28 July 1960; Rigg (1960), p. 70; *SCMP* No. 2184 (26 Jan 1960), p. 9. The *China Yearbook: 1958-59* (1959), pp. 511-512, gives the date for civilian cadres incorrectly as 1958. It also says the simulated demotion of officers is on a rotation basis over a 3-to-5-year period. Woon (1960) says the simulated demotion period is a fortnight each year.

<sup>39a</sup> Peking Radio, 5 July 1961, 0229 GMT; *SCMP*, No. 2535 (12 July 1961), pp. 1-2.

<sup>40</sup> Lapp (1960), p. 66; *SCMP*, No. 2248 (2 May 1960), pp. 19-20; *SCMP* No. 2299 (19 July 1960), p. 15; NCNA dispatch of 30 July 1960.

<sup>41</sup> *SCMP*, No. 2266 (26 May 1960), pp. 2-6; NCNA dispatch of 21 Aug 1960.

<sup>42</sup> Chiu (1958), pp. 172-173, for a detailed account of demobilization. *SCMP*, No. 2248 (2 May 1960), pp. 20-22; Lee (1958), pp. 30-32.

<sup>43</sup> Tang (1957), p. 346; Kirby (1956), p. 232.

<sup>44</sup> Tang (1957), p. 346.

Nationalist, older, or unskilled troops had been demobilized, many of the former Nationalists being assigned to construction and water conservation projects.<sup>45</sup> By 1 July 1958, some 6,800,000 CCA personnel had been demobilized.<sup>46</sup>

There are at present nearly eight million demobilized CCA personnel comprising about 3½ percent of the total adult male population of China.<sup>47</sup> Approximately 1-1½ million are men who who were drafted during the first and second conscription waves under the present 3-year service requirement.

Considerable effort is made by the regime to assist the demobilized servicemen and their dependents. "Preferential treatment" is granted demobilized servicemen, disabled veterans, and the dependents and survivors of servicemen and veterans. This assistance takes the form of counseling services, certificates of honor, adjustments in computation of man-days of labor, cash grants on demobilization, periodic subsidiary payments, special outright subsidies in personal items and staples. The objective is to maintain their livelihood at a level not lower than that of the local populace. Demobilized personnel are assisted to find suitable employment, and sanatoria are provided for aged or disabled veterans and dependents. However, "certain shortcomings" have been admitted in the prompt and complete fulfillment of this assistance.<sup>48</sup>

All demobilized men who had been conscripted under the provisions of the 1955 Conscription Law are subject to service in the reserves until they reach the age of 40. Special reserve categories exist for men inducted before 1955. Many of these reservists are known to serve as cadre in the militia. Comparable reserve provisions are made for officers who leave active service; however the army normally intends and expects that its officers will serve for life.<sup>49</sup>

##### 5. Dependents

In 1950, GPD General T'an Cheng, now Director of the GPD, declared that "soldier marriages are to be very limited in number" due to severe financial shortages in the army. At that time, and possibly even today, there was a tendency for political officers to discourage their troops from marriage on the grounds that marriage

<sup>45</sup> Chiu (1958), pp. 170, 172; Rigg (1957), p. 6; Lapp (1960), p. 63; Walker (1957), p. 41.

<sup>46</sup> Chiu (1958), p. 170; *SCMP*, No. 1786, (6 June 1958), p. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Allowing for 10 percent deaths among an estimated 8,300,000 men demobilized since 1949 and extrapolating to an adult (15 years and over) male population of 325 million in 1960. Based on demographic data in Krader and Aird (1959), pp. 625-626, 628-629.

<sup>48</sup> Radio Nanchang, 2 Feb 1961, 1415 GMT; NCNA, 11 Feb 1961, 0816 GMT; Radio Foochow, 13 Feb 1961, 0345 GMT; Radio Peking, 14 Feb 1961, 1309 GMT; Radio Peking, 14 Feb 1961, 2215 GMT; Radio Nanchang, 25 July 1961, 1415 GMT; *SCMP*, No. 2440 (20 Feb 1961), pp. 13-15; *SCMP*, No. 2447 (2 Mar 1961), pp. 5-9; Lee (1958), pp. 32-35; *Free China and Asia*, VIII, 2 (Feb 1961), p. 33.

<sup>49</sup> Hinton (1950), pp. 47-48.

would interfere with a supposedly full-time professional military career.<sup>60</sup> As of February 1952, 28 percent of all CCF POWs were married, with no significant difference between officers and other ranks.<sup>61</sup> Judging from the topics of private conversation among CCA soldiers, the SORO interviews also indicated a moderate degree of civilian orientation in the Army.<sup>62</sup> In this early period, if not now, it was the general policy for CCA personnel to be stationed far from their homes. This resulted in a widespread fatalistic attitude among troops toward their families, expressed by one Chinese POW in Korea thus: "I think I have to give up my family at homeland for lost, at least for the time being."<sup>63</sup>

The long standing practice of giving soldiers free food, cigarettes, and a small cash allowance in lieu of regular pay was abolished in 1955. This change made it possible for soldiers to start or maintain families.<sup>64</sup> Officers, mainly because of their better pay, were quick to make use of this new policy. Within the year ending in the second quarter of 1957, three quarters of a million dependents moved to army posts to join their men. The great majority were dependents of officers, and 80 percent were from rural areas. The presence in army posts of these dependents created such unexpectedly great demands on the time and facilities of the army that a half year later on 28 Nov 1957 the GPD ordered that these dependents return to their homes. By the summer of 1958, most had complied except for a temporarily exempt minority of wives who either had been with their soldier-husbands since before 1949 or were locally employed. A morale problem arose which was met by promising annual furloughs to the officers and men. As a result of the agricultural production drive of the 1960-61 winter, it is now required that all dependents except those already assigned to army-operated vegetable or livestock farms must remain in or return to civilian agricultural production when their husbands are transferred to another post. This policy has reportedly resulted in considerable dissatisfaction among and complaints by the officers and men affected.<sup>65</sup>

Although the Marriage Law of 1950 which applies generally to civilians provides that "divorce shall be granted without delay," special provisions are made for the benefit of military personnel. The permission of those soldiers who "maintain correspond-

<sup>60</sup> Rigg (1952), pp. 12, 14, 15, 109. See the *New Statesman* (10 Sept 1960), p. 328, for an analysis of the current Chinese Communist views on "proletarian love" versus "bourgeois love" as a basis for marriage.

<sup>61</sup> *POW Census* (1952), pp. 8, 13.

<sup>62</sup> PROPIN-CCA Annex 3-B-4.

<sup>63</sup> Kahn and Nierman (1952), p. 45. For a contrary view, see Pool (1955), pp. 139-140.

<sup>64</sup> Lee (1958), pp. 25-30.

<sup>65</sup> Chiu (1958), p. 170; NYT, 1 Dec 1957, p. 149; Rigg (1960), p. 70; *Review of Hong Kong Chinese Press* (10-11 Dec 1960), p. 3; Lee (1958), pp. 63-64.

once" with their immediate families must be obtained in order for their wives to apply for divorce, and divorce may be granted to spouses of CCA personnel who have not corresponded with their families for a period of 2 years.<sup>56</sup>

### C. TENSIONS IN THE CCA

As virtually all former Nationalist officers and men have now been eliminated from the CCA, this once major potential source of defection has disappeared.<sup>57</sup>

The substitution of a centralized regular army system for the field army system in 1953 and a centralized civil administration for the military government of regional areas in 1954 effectively removed both the temptation and likelihood of a reestablishment of semi-independent "war-lords" at the provincial or regional level.<sup>58</sup>

In February 1957, Mao Tse-tung encouraged uninhibited public criticism of the regime, the so-called "hundred flowers" of internal contradictions. The lush blooming of "fragrant flowers" and "poisonous weeds" continued into 1958, when the regime decided this campaign had served its several purposes. However, a number of long-suspected CCA vulnerabilities had already come to full light. Both the Director of the GPD<sup>59</sup> and the Chief of the General Staff<sup>60</sup> confirmed serious strains existing between officers and their men, between Communist cadre and non-party personnel, between "intellectual" and "worker-peasant" cadre, and between the CCA and the civil populace. These revelations prefaced an intensive campaign to reduce tensions among these groupings. Although these tensions, both within the army and between the military and civil areas of the society, undoubtedly persist, their present degree is insufficiently known to enable us to judge if they still constitute major vulnerabilities.

The combination of intensive political indoctrination and adequate provision for the physical and psychological needs of officers and men seems to inspire a generally high level of morale.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Fu in Kirby (1956), pp. 130-131. Special provisions for the CCA are in Article 19 of the New Marriage Law promulgated 1 May 1950.

<sup>57</sup> See Annex 5-B-3.

<sup>58</sup> See Annex 5-B-1. Also Pool (1955), pp. 16, 129-132, 140-146; Crocker (1957), p. 98; Lapp (1960), pp. 65-66; Tang (1957), p. 186.

<sup>59</sup> Gen T'an Cheng in the Jen-min jih-pao (Peking), 21 Apr. 1957 as cited in *The New York Times* (17 June 1957), p. 2 and Lapp (1960), p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> Gen Su Yü in an NCNA despatch from Chungking on 22 May 1957 as cited by Lapp (1960), p. 20.

<sup>61</sup> This assessment of Tang (1957), pp. 354-357, made before the revelation of "contradictions" in 1957, is probably still applicable. See also Wilson (1954), p. 44. For a contrary view see Eitner (Nov 1960), pp. 577-593.

## ANNEX 6

### FORMAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY

Although PROPIN-CCA was charged to study the *informal* aspect of word-of-mouth communication, the *formal* is also of great importance because it partly predetermines and partly interlocks with the informal channels or networks. The structure of any organization such as the CCA is its formal communication network: the hierarchy is the chain-of-command. In addition to determining all networks of *formal* communications, it may be inferred that the formal hierarchical structure of the CCA also partly predetermines the *informal* networks because virtually all members of the CCA participate in both types of networks. Indeed, much of the restriction on informal communications and particular types of informants used by CCA personnel is inferred to be a consequence of the particular formal hierarchical structure which conditions to some extent all actual and potential communication links between members of this organization.

#### A. FORMAL NETWORKS

An unusually high degree of reliance on formal word-of-mouth communication is traditional in the command structure of the CCA. This is a direct result of the high incidence of illiterates and semi-literates diffused along the chain of command, a condition only recently corrected. This tradition can be traced from the immediate prototype of the CCA: the National Revolutionary Army of Sun Yat-sen. In 1925, General Vassili Blücher ("Galen"), Chief of Staff of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, urged upon the Academy Commandant, Chiang Kai-shek, the need to establish a special course on telegraphic and telephonic communications. The Soviet adviser cited the primitive state of military communications, noting that the "local populace is relied on for help in relaying information between officers of different units."<sup>1</sup> During the Chinese Civil War period (1946-49), the Communists depended on messengers—traveling usually on foot but sometimes by horse—for village-to-village transmission of word-of-mouth or written messages of

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Galen to Chiang dated April 1925, cited in Wilbur and How (1956), p. 174.

intelligence concerning Nationalist troop movements.<sup>2</sup> At the time of the Korean War, the bulk of CCA military orders from division level down were still transmitted verbally. Detailed battle maps and written orders were the rare exception; however, military experts and observers have attributed to the Chinese soldier a retentive memory, a fair sense of terrain, and an ability to follow verbal orders and instructions literally.<sup>3</sup>

Which military rank is the most suitable audience for psychological operations against an army? The communicator's choice of audience is based on his assessment of three basic factors:

1. The *influence* which any given rank has on the overall efficiency of the army.
2. The *accessibility* of the operator to that rank.
3. The *susceptibility* of that rank to propaganda.

Because of the "military worth" of the higher ranks is largely offset by the proportionately larger numbers of lower ranks, it is unlikely that any given rank has a substantially greater ability than any other rank to influence overall army efficiency. According to Litoff and Yarnold, this generalization holds for *any* army which meets certain criteria and assumptions set forth in their study.<sup>4</sup> The Litoff-Yarnold model appears to adequately represent the CCA over the past decade and, barring drastic changes in hierarchical organization or recruitment and demobilization policies, in the future.<sup>5</sup> Thus, according to this model, the *influence* of any given rank of the CCA on the overall military efficiency is approximately equal. Therefore, the communicator's choice of audience may be confined to his determination of the *accessibility* and *susceptibility* of a given rank. These two latter factors have already been explored above, in Annexes 3, 4, and 5.

The inauguration and strict maintainance of a formal hierarchy of military ranks has tended to discourage the comradeship between officers and men which characterized the CCA before 1955. Officers are now distinguished from common soldiers by markedly different

<sup>2</sup> Ting (1955), p. 92. Belden (1949), pp. 111-112. The regular use of long-distance footrunners to carry official messages is one of several traditional means of communication in China, as noted by Marco Polo.

<sup>3</sup> Baldwin (1951), p. 57; Rigg (1952), p. 177; Rigg (1957), p. 5; Liu (1956), pp. 142-143; Wilson (1954), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Litoff and Yarnold (1950).

<sup>5</sup> The model also appears to fit all major modern armies—East or West—except the Soviet Army, because of its recent most atypical distribution of ranks: 25 percent officers, 50 percent NCOs, 25 percent EM. However, a more usual balance of ranks (and with it the applicability of the model) should be restored by the Fall of 1961 if the presently envisaged reorganization of the Soviet Army is carried forward as planned. See Galay (1960), particularly pp. 4-5. For some relevant remarks, pertaining at least to the American Army, on the shift from a pyramidal to a diamond-shaped rank hierarchy in highly technical units, see Janowitz (1959), pp. 31-34.

and superior uniforms, insignia, pay, food, billeting, and opportunities for advancement. The gap between officers and men is further increased by the 3-year conscription service which has largely eliminated the possibility of a military career for EM and NCOs. Officers, however, being expected to make their careers in the army, continue as a professional body with the addition of most symbols and special privileges characteristic of a stratified or class society.<sup>6</sup>

The initial equalitarian, largely unstratified, character of the original "Red Army" in China was officially explained as pure communism in action: the application to the military of the Communist philosophy of the "classless" society. This policy was effective propaganda in early days when the Chinese Communists were in desperate competition with the Nationalists. However, with mounting success and the transformation from a guerrilla to a conventional type army, social stratification was gradually intensified. In fact it was quite evident during the Korean War, and by 1955 it was mandatory.<sup>7</sup>

A reportedly sham "friendship" between officers and men is now sometimes exhibited in the rare intervals of relaxation or during the public celebration of certain festive occasions. At such public occasions as National Day, "army-civilian social meetings," and the dedication of new construction projects, officers and men may perform folk dances, opera, or other entertainments in mixed groups and may exchange comradely greetings with civilians. Following these special occasions, the officers and men revert to their own separate groups.<sup>8</sup>

The ever-watchful GPD personnel are instructed to disapprove the growth of any close friendships between officers and men. No officer is permitted to praise or reward his men except in official meetings of the unit.<sup>9</sup>

The new policy of "simulated demotion" makes it mandatory for all officers to spend a brief period each year serving in the ranks in some unit other than their own. Common soldiers are instructed to treat the newcomer as if he were one of their own rank. However, it is reported that few take this seriously.<sup>10</sup>

## B. INFORMAL NETWORKS

The existence of informal word-of-mouth networks within the army has been investigated above in the section (Annex 3, Part E) on the friendship networks. Some of the factors and conditions operating

<sup>6</sup> Woon (1960).

<sup>7</sup> Among other observers who witnessed and described the early "classless" society of "leaders" and "fighters" in the CCA were Carlson (1940), pp. 35-37; Snow (1938), pp. 69-70; Belden (1949), pp. 330-334. See also Rigg (1960), p. 70.

<sup>8</sup> Woon (1960); Radio Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia, 16 Feb. 1961, 0907 GMT.

<sup>9</sup> Woon (1960).

<sup>10</sup> See Annex 5-B-3.



against the growth of such networks have been mentioned in the immediately preceding section of the present annex and others are mentioned below.

Informal networks of communication exist, and they are used. However, there are severe restrictions on frequency of meeting, numbers of participants per meeting, and freedom of discussion. First, soldiers of all ranks are almost fully occupied with military duties, indoctrination classes, laboring in civilian agriculture, industry, and construction projects. Thus, soldiers have little time to themselves. Secondly, the GPD—with overt political officers and cadre in every unit and covert counterintelligence agents scattered throughout the army—is alert to rumor-mongering. Persons suspected of spreading dangerous rumors may receive warnings, transfer, confinement, isolation, and sometimes corporal punishment.<sup>11</sup> Thus soldiers have little freedom of discussion.

The introduction of fresh unofficial news or information into the informal word-of-mouth networks of the CCA derives from two sources: (1) very senior military officers and upper echelons of the GPD hierarchy, and (2) most importantly, civilian informants of soldiers.

The senior officers staffing the upper echelons of the political and military command structures have official access to fresh unofficial information on a need-to-know basis. This information—from foreign books, magazines, newspapers, radio monitoring, direct contact with foreign officials and visitors—is converted into propaganda before being passed down the official hierarchy. Presumably some of this information is transmitted down the informal word-of-mouth network; but, in the absence of data, it is presumed to reach the lower echelons only infrequently and even then in distorted form.

The remaining source of fresh unofficial news is the civilian population. Although civilians are a less frequent source than either EM, political officers, military officers, or NCOs, they comprise an extremely important channel of information for soldiers on garrison duty in China. Their importance derives from the fact that both the extent and frequency of contact with civilians are probably sufficient to guarantee wide dispersion of that information they do convey to soldiers. Furthermore, the quality of the information which civilians transmit to soldiers is as high, or higher, than that passed among soldiers. Soldiers consider it more credible, more important, more often unofficial, more clandestine, and almost as recent. The GPD personnel attempt a close control of soldiers' contact with civilians. For example, as operators of the army postal system, they very closely censor all correspondence between

<sup>11</sup> Woon (1960). Although corporal punishment is now officially prohibited in the CCA, numerous reports from recent CCA defectors in Hong Kong confirm that floggings and other, more cruel, punishments are still used.

between soldiers and civilians.<sup>12</sup> No soldier may subscribe through civil channels to newspapers or periodicals without the approval of the political officer. Diaries are required of reportedly all personnel and examined daily by political personnel.<sup>13</sup>

Furloughs and even overnight passes are rare for all personnel, officers and men alike.<sup>14</sup> Even the minority who are married are now officially discouraged by order of the GPD (promulgated in 1957) from having their families with them. Visits of families to the post are rare, mainly because of the expense, inconvenience, and lack of opportunity for private travel.<sup>15</sup> Marriage is discouraged for bachelors.<sup>16</sup> Liaison with prostitutes is forbidden by the military authorities, and the rigorous suppression by the civil authorities of that profession has reduced the possibility of such contact to almost negligible proportions.<sup>17</sup>

How then do soldiers make that important contact with civilians which interviews with former CCA personnel—296 Korean War POWs of 1951–53 and 28 recent escapees of 1954–57—indicate do exist? Probably the most frequent and certainly the most regular face-to-face interaction of soldiers and civilians results from the lack of a fully developed commissariat in the CCA. The army supplies only the basic essentials of daily life. There are no commissary stores or PXs which sell food, drink, or sundries. The on-post co-ops established in army units provide only simple stationery supplies and Communist Party publications. As a consequence, the enlisted men in almost every unit are organized into a purchasing detail sent each day to the local market-place. There they purchase such things as extra meat, vegetables, and personal items with pooled funds of the unit. Since the spring of 1960, the great majority of CCA units raise virtually all their own meat and vegetables; but most of the small unit troops scattered in both rural and urban posts throughout China must purchase some supplies in local markets. This daily marketing probably provides the best opportunity to converse with civilians, particularly merchants and peddlers; and, as this army purchasing detail is organized on a strict rotation, it is undoubtedly the most regular such opportunity.<sup>18</sup> That these contacts with civilians at the market-place are not restricted to commercial transactions is clearly

<sup>12</sup> Woon (1960); Lapp (1960).

<sup>13</sup> Woon (1960).

<sup>14</sup> For furloughs see Chiu (1958), p. 170.

<sup>15</sup> For contact with dependents see Annex 5-B-5.

<sup>16</sup> For marriage see Annex 5-B-5 and references in footnote 17 below.

<sup>17</sup> For CCA morality and prostitution see Snow (1938), pp. 97, 219, 258, 328; Clair and William Band (1948), pp. 332–37. For recent statements of refugees that prostitution still flourishes widely except in Peking and Shanghai, see Labin (1960), p. 316.

<sup>18</sup> Woon (1960); *SCMP*, No. 2316 (12 Aug 1960), pp. 11–12. See also Carlson (1940), pp. 118–119.

indicated by recent reports in the Chinese Communist press of wide-scale "loitering," "gossiping," and "flirting" by these very troops. These press comments point out that these soldiers take the occasion to remain away from post as long as possible, usually the better part of a morning or afternoon.<sup>19</sup> Officers presumably may participate in marketing; but, as they clearly do not do so on an organized or rotation basis, their contact is probably much more restricted in both frequency and regularity.

A further opportunity for peacetime contact of both officers and men with civilians in China is provided by the participation of army units in civilian agriculture, industry, and construction projects. It is usual for most army units to spend several weeks a year in such labor, mostly in agriculture.<sup>20</sup> This is also true of CCA units in the national minority areas.<sup>20a</sup> This effort is usually contributed all at one time, but occasionally distributed between several periods. Although this practice is partly an aid to the overall national economy, its principal purpose seems to be to encourage an image of a helpful, friendly army among the civilians. Although such labor certainly provides some opportunity for contact of soldiers with civilians, it does not appear from the SORO interviews that this was the case at the time of the Korean War. However, the degree to which the army participates in such labor has greatly increased since that time. Nevertheless, in view of the presumably close supervision of these labor teams by political personnel and the intermittent character of this labor, it seems unlikely that close or long-standing relationships are established in this manner.

In wartime, Chinese armies including both Nationalist and Communist have traditionally used vast numbers of civilian laborers in their supply and medical services. For at least the near future, the CCA will depend mainly on civilian porters because of the shortage of motor vehicles, the lack of railways and roads, and a deliberate policy of capitalizing on the ready availability of cheap local mass labor throughout most of China and its bordering countries. Local civilians are impressed into this service and replaced by others when the unit moves on. In Korea, for example, the CCF employed many Manchurian civilians as horse-cart drivers and stretcher bearers and

<sup>19</sup> Personal communication of Stephen Ho.

<sup>20</sup> According to dispatches of the official Chinese news agency, NCNA, dated 27 Jan 1961 and 14 Feb 1961, the CCA contributed 46 million man-days of labor to the civil economy, 70 percent to agriculture alone during 1960. This works out to be 18 days per man per year. In 1958 the CCA diverted 59 million man-days to the civil economy, or 22 days per man per year. Rigg (1960), p. 71. See also *SCMP*, No. 2311 (5 Aug 1960), p. 16; *SCMP*, No. 2447 (2 Mar 1961), pp. 2-4; Shenyang Radio, 25 July 1961, 1100 GMT; Alexandrov (1959), p. 28. For an early account see Rigg (1952), pp. 294-296.

<sup>20a</sup> Peking Radio, 26 July 1961, 1618 GMT; Peking Radio, 29 July 1961, 1137 GMT.

some locally employed Korean civilians as coolie labor. Wherever linguistic or other cultural barriers are partly surmounted, some *exchange* of information, particularly concerning the current military situation, must occur. This suggests that the CCA itself may function as a disseminator of information about military developments to civilians, particularly rural folk, during a time of fluid troop movement.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Carlson (1940), p. 62; Rigg (1952), pp. 73-74, 289-290.

## ANNEX 7

### A SURVEY OF POST-KOREAN WAR CCA PERSONNEL

During the data collection phase of Project PROPIN-China on Taiwan in 1959, 1449 adult Chinese males who had left Mainland China since 1953 were interviewed. Of this grouping, 28 were former CCA soldiers.<sup>1</sup> These men had presumably deserted the CCA and fled the mainland between 1954 and 1957. Although they answered a somewhat different questionnaire than that given the 296 former POWs captured in 1951, many questions were sufficiently similar to permit comparing this small but recent sample with the larger sample of CCA Korean War POW veterans.<sup>2</sup>

As the sample of 28 recent (i.e., 1954-57) veterans consists entirely of EM, except for one NCO, it is treated as comparable only with the sample of 192 earlier (i.e., 1951) veteran EM.

This annex analyzes the communication behavior of the 28 recent veterans and compares this analysis for consistency with that for the 192 earlier EM. The purpose of this comparison is to gauge roughly the degree of similarity in communication behavior, wherever comparable, between the two samples of CCA personnel.

Because of the small size of the 1954-57 sample and the fact that the questionnaire was not specifically designed for military respondents, this special analysis is not suitable for a statistical approach. It is offered, rather, for its impressionistic value.

#### A. PERSONAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

The major personal background characteristics in which the sample of recent veterans can be compared with the earlier main sample<sup>3</sup> are

<sup>1</sup> PROPIN-CHINA Chapters II-B-9, IV-B-3, and Annex 1-E. In the PROPIN-CHINA analysis, the 28 CCA veterans were dispersed between two categories on the basis of their degree of participation in the communication process: 26 were combined in analysis with 14 other (non-CCA) soldiers and 31 officials or policemen; and the remaining two were combined in a residual grouping including 2 other (non-CCA) soldiers and 40 persons representing some 8 occupational types. Consequently, it was necessary for the purpose of this annex to perform an additional analysis of the recent sample of CCA soldiers alone.

<sup>2</sup> For English versions of the two questionnaires given the Korean War and post-Korean War samples respectively see PROPIN-CCA, Annex 8, and PROPIN-CHINA Annex 2.

<sup>3</sup> Annex 2.

detailed in Table D at the end of this annex. These points and others of interest are briefly as follows:

In age, the recent sample of veterans averages 4 years older than the earlier EM sample and nearly 11 years older than the EM of today. However, age as such did not appear from analyses of the earlier sample to be a major indicator of communication behavior. Therefore the marked difference in age between the two samples probably does not greatly affect their comparability regarding communication behavior.

The memory interval, the mean number of years between leaving active service in the CCA and the time of the interviews by SORO, differs by some 5 years between the two samples. Again it is the researcher's impression that this factor did not materially affect the responses of either of the two CCA samples or of the Chinese civilian sample, whose memory interval ranged from less than 1 up to 6 years.

Differences between the two samples in terms of formal education and religious affiliation appear insignificant. The two samples also seem quite similar in terms of geographical dispersion, although the questionnaires are only approximate in their geographical queries. Regarding occupation prior to CCA service, the fact that the great majority of recent veterans were professional soldiers is perhaps an index of sample bias, as they may be among the CCA types most likely to be disaffected and seek refuge abroad.

## **B. COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR**

The major communication characteristics in which the sample of recent veterans can be compared with the earlier sample <sup>4</sup> are detailed in Table E. These points and others of interest are briefly as follows:

The entire sample of 2,075 recent refugees was analyzed in terms of "disseminator types": Key Communicators, Communicators, and Nulls, depending on their degree of participation as disseminators of news and information.<sup>5</sup> There was no inquiry into the disseminator types of the earlier sample; hence the two CCA samples are not comparable in this regard. However it is possible to compare the

<sup>4</sup> Annexes 1, 3.

<sup>5</sup> See PROPIN-CHINA, Chapter V. Each respondent was described in terms of the number of persons outside his immediate family who came to him regularly each week for news and information. The three types derived from this criterion are:

Key Communicator	= 6 or more persons
Communicator	= 1 to 5 persons
Null	= 0 persons

28 CCA veterans with others of the PROPIN-China sample, as, for example:

Disseminator type	CCA vets=28		Males =1,449 percent	Females =626 percent	Total =2,075 percent
	Number	Percent			
Key Communicator.....	2	7	6	2	5
Communicator.....	14	50	44	23	38
Null.....	12	43	49	75	57
Totals.....		100	99	100	100

It may be observed above that the distribution of the recent veterans among disseminator types closely parallels that of all males in the sample of civilians. Even if one could confidently generalize to the mass of CCA soldiers today, it would be rash to speculate as to the implications regarding word-of-mouth communication networks in the CCA. If such a distribution exists in the CCA it would verify the earlier (Annex 3-E) conclusions about the existence of a type of friendship network in the CCA; that is, it would indicate that small cliques exist. However, as it does not indicate the degree of isolation or interaction between either cliques and cliques or cliques and individuals, nothing can be concluded from these data about information diffusion rates through the CCA.

Regarding sources of information about events in China while the respondents were in China, both samples gave very similar answers. In each sample more respondents mentioned word-of-mouth both as a source and as the most important source than all other sources taken together. The newspaper, the second most important source, was of substantially equal importance for both samples. Radio, personal observation, and official Communist indoctrination meetings were minor sources for both groupings.

Regarding their sources of information about events outside China, the recent veterans responded as follows:

Type of source	All sources		Source of most information	
	Num-ber	Percent	Num-ber	Percent
Word-of-mouth.....	21	75	20	71
Newspaper.....	10	36	3	11
Communist meetings.....	3	11	3	11
Radio.....	0	0	0	0
Received no information.....	2	7	2	7
Totals (N=28).....	(*)	(*)	28	100

\*Not additive because of multiple responses.

Again, word-of-mouth was listed both as a source and as the most important source by more of the recent veterans than all other sources taken together.

In addition to these sources of information, 8 (or 29%) of the 28 recent veterans mentioned Nationalist leaflets as a source of information and/or a topic of conversation. This rather large percentage of responses is particularly noteworthy because the questionnaire did not specifically touch this point, the references arising spontaneously in answer to certain open-end questions.

All 28 of the recent veterans were asked if they had ever heard a foreign radio broadcast. A single veteran said he had listened, but only once, to the Voice of Free China (Taipei) on short-wave.

In regard to the occupations of their principal word-of-mouth informants about events in China, both samples gave closely similar answers. In fact, while fellow EM were the principal informants for nearly half the EM, civilians were principal informants for about one-fourth. In addition, 9 of the 28 mentioned another, or secondary, informant. Of these nine, five were civilians. By specific occupation of the 13 civilians mentioned as either primary or secondary informants:

- 5 were manual laborers,
- 5 were Communist officials or cadres,
- 2 were peasants, and
- 1 was a miner.

The frequency with which respondents met their principal informants for discussion was similar for both samples.

The quality of the information received from principal informants was generally similar for both samples. That is, it was usually novel, recent, accurate, unofficial, clandestine, and varied in topics.

### C. CONCLUSIONS

The marked similarity between the two samples of CCA personnel gives greater confidence in the representativeness of responses on communication behavior despite the great divergence between these samples in terms of biased motives: the earlier sample being men who *chose* surrender against death in battle in Korea and subsequently exercised a limited freedom of choice to accept repatriation to Taiwan rather than Mainland China; the later sample being men who deliberately deserted the CCA in peacetime and sought asylum on Taiwan.

A further analysis of the recent veterans was made in terms of the recency of their experience in the CCA. For this purpose they were divided into two groupings: the 12 who came out in 1957 and the 16 who left in 1954-56. These two groupings were then compared in terms of *all* responses. Both groupings were virtually the same in all particulars of background and communication behavior. For this



reason the recent sample substantiates the up-dating to 1957 of the communication behavior of the earlier sample and does not merely provide insight on the gross period of 1954-57.

*Table D. Comparisons Between The Two PROPIN-CCA Samples*

Background characteristics		Samples		
Main categories	Sub-categories	1954-57 Veterans*	1951 POW EM*	
Age on leaving CCA.....	Mean age in years..... Age range of 90%.....	30 23-36	26 18-37	
Memory interval (mean No. years between leaving CCA and interview).....		3	8	
		Number	Percent	Percent
Year left CCA.....	1951.....	0	0	100
	1954.....	9	32	0
	1955.....	2	7	0
	1956.....	5	18	0
	1957.....	12	43	0
Education.....	None.....	7	25	16
	Primary.....	12	43	60
	Middle.....	9	32	24
	University.....	0	0	1
Pre-CCA occupation.....	Professional soldier.....	22	79	49
	Peasant.....	4	14	22
	Merchant.....	1	4	7
	Teacher.....	1	4	22
	Other.....	0	0	
Religion.....	None.....	13	46	34
	Buddhist.....	5	18	41
	Protestant.....	5	18	3
	Confucianist.....	4	14	12
	Taoist.....	2	7	7
	Catholic (Roman).....	1	4	2
Regional residence.....	Yangtse lowlands.....	11	39	22
	North China plains.....	8	30	29
	Szechuan.....	5	18	23
	South coast.....	4	14	7
	Manchuria.....	0	0	4
	Other.....	0	0	15

See footnotes at foot of table E.

Table E. Comparisons Between The Two PROPIN-CCA Samples

Communication characteristics		Samples		
Main categories	Sub-categories	1954-57 Veterans <sup>a</sup>		1951 POW EM <sup>b</sup>
		Number	Percent	Percent
All information sources about events in China while in China.	Word-of-mouth.....	23	82	97
	Newspaper.....	14	50	40
	Radio.....	1	4	2
	Personal observation, etc....	1	4	20
Source of most information about events in China while in China.	Word-of-mouth.....	20	71	81
	Newspaper.....	7	25	16
	Radio.....	0	0	0
	Personal observation, etc....	1	4	3
Occupation of principal informant about events in China while in China.	EM.....	15	54	46
	Civilian.....	8	29	21
	Officer.....	3	11	12
	Political officer.....	1	4	-----
	NCO.....	1	4	14
	Civilian in army.....	0	0	5
Frequency.....	Daily.....	10	38	36
	Several times a week.....	5	10	31
	Weekly.....	0	0	10
	Less often.....	7	27	22
	Irregularly.....	4	15	1
Novelty of information.....	New.....	13	52	69
	Both new and old.....	5	20	21
	Old.....	7	28	10
Truth of information.....	Usually true.....	14	54	59
	Usually false.....	3	12	11
	Don't know.....	9	35	29
Recency of events discussed..	Within a fortnight.....	13	52	55
	Both within and more.....	6	24	14
	More than a fortnight.....	6	24	31
Information sometimes of type not available from government newspapers or radio.	Not Available.....	13	50	48
	Available.....	13	50	52

Notes. All percentages are approximate.

<sup>a</sup> The number of respondents varies from 25 to 28. Occasional single "no responses" are omitted from the tables; multiple responses are counted separately for each occurrence. The two "Key Communicators" were not asked certain questions about their communication behavior and are accordingly omitted from calculation of these questions.

<sup>b</sup> Percentages generally based on an N of 192 although occasional "no responses" are omitted if they total less than 5 percent.

## **ANNEX 8**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH RETRANSLATION)**

*(Note. Copies of the Chinese translation used in the interviews and the original English edition of this questionnaire, administered to 296 former CCA personnel on Taiwan in June 1959, are on file at the Special Operations Research Office.)*

**PROJECT PROPIN—[Special]**

**FACE SHEET**

1A. Serial number of Respondent

--	--	--

1B. Name of Interviewer

-----

2. Date of Interview

-----

3. Location of Interview

-----

4. Dialect used in Interview

-----

5. Name of Supervisor

-----

6. SORO Staff Member

-----

7. Name of Translator

-----

Time begun [interview] -----

Time ended [interview] -----

**INSTRUCTIONS [to the Interviewer]:**

1. Read Introduction aloud to respondent.
2. Ask each of the questions and record the verbatim answer of the respondent in the space provided below each question. Supplementary instructions are appended to some of the following questions.

**COMMENTS [of the Interviewer]:**

## INTRODUCTION

Now I will ask you questions about how you got news and to whom you talked about events when you were in the Bandit Army\*. We need to get this information from each person we talk to so that we can learn how people differ in the ways they get information. Your name will not be used in connection with any of your answers and any information you give will be kept in strict confidence by your government and the Americans who are working with us.

If you feel that you do not understand any question which is asked, please mention this to your interviewer and he will explain exactly what information is being asked for.

---

\*The Chinese translation consistently rendered the original "CCF" by the term *fei-chün*, "Bandit Army." On Taiwan, this is virtually both the universally understood and mandatory usage.

## SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. When you were in the Bandit Army, stationed in Mainland China, how did you find out what was happening in other parts of China?

You relied on:

- (1) Radio -----
- (2) Newspapers -----
- (3) Conversation with other people -----
- (4) Other methods (Specify) -----

Instructions: If more than one source of information is given in question 1, ask question 2. If only one source of information is mentioned, read instruction following question 2 and proceed with interview.

2. From what source did you obtain most of your information?

- (1) Radio -----
- (2) Newspapers -----
- (3) Other people -----
- (4) Other (Specify) -----

Instructions: If other people were mentioned in response to question 1, ask question 3. If other people were not mentioned, skip to question 5.

3. Who were these people from whom you found out what was happening in other parts of China?

Instructions: If only one type of person is mentioned in answer to question 3, skip to question 5. If more than one type of person is mentioned in answer to question 3, ask question 4.

4. From which of these people did you learn most about what was happening in other parts of China?

Instructions: If member of the Bandit Army other than the political officer, is mentioned in response to question 4, skip to question 6. If the political officer or persons other than Bandit Army personnel are mentioned in response to question 4, ask question 5.

5. Excluding the political officer, from whom did you learn most about what was happening in other parts of China?

6. What was the rank of this person from whom you got news about events in other parts of China?

Instructions: If this person is a civilian (non-Bandit Army personnel), record his occupation. Then skip to question 8.

7. What was the military specialty of this person?
8. To what ethnic group did this person belong?
  - (1) Chinese [Han] -----
  - (2) Manchu -----
  - (3) Mongol -----
  - (4) Tibetan -----
  - (5) Turk [Hui] -----
  - (6) Other (Specify) -----
9. To what religion did this person incline?
  - (1) Catholic (Roman) -----
  - (2) Protestant -----
  - (3) Muslim -----
  - (4) Buddhist -----
  - (5) Taoist -----
  - (6) Other (Specify) -----
  - (7) None -----
10. Was this person:
  - (1) In his young years -----
  - (2) In his green years -----
  - (3) In his middle years -----
  - (4) In his old years -----
11. How was this person regarded by the other members of your unit?
  - (1) Highly regarded -----
  - (2) Highly regarded by some and not highly by others -----
  - (3) Poorly regarded -----
12. Where did this person obtain the information he told you?  
 Instructions: If another person is mentioned in answer to question 12, ask question 13, otherwise skip to question 14.
13. Who was this other person?
  - (1) Age -----
  - (2) Military specialty -----
  - (3) Rank -----
  - (4) Ethnic group -----
  - (5) Religion -----
14. How often did you obtain information from this person?
  - (1) Every day -----
  - (2) Several times a week -----
  - (3) Once a week -----
  - (4) At longer intervals -----
15. Was the information you got from this person usually about:
  - (1) Things you were not very familiar with -----
  - (2) Things you already knew -----

16. Was the information you heard from this person usually about:
- (1) Things that happened one or two weeks prior to your conversation -----
  - (2) Things that happened before that time -----
17. Did you think the information you obtained from this person was usually accurate?
- (1) Yes -----
  - (2) No -----
  - (3) Don't know -----
18. Tell me what this person usually talked to you about?
- (1) Political affairs -----
  - (2) Economic problems -----
  - (3) Military information -----
  - (4) Religious problems -----
  - (5) Information about friends or relatives -----
  - (6) Other things (Specify) -----
19. Did this person who told you the most information sometimes discuss things which were not mentioned over the radio or in the newspaper?
- (1) Yes -----
  - (2) No -----
- Instructions: If answer to question 19 is "yes," ask question 20.  
If answer to question 19 is "no," skip to question 21.
20. What information did he discuss with you that was not mentioned in the newspapers or over the radio?
21. Did this person who told you the most information sometimes discuss things which, in your opinion, the Communist regime\* would not want soldiers to hear?
- (1) Yes -----
  - (2) No -----
22. Where did you converse with this person who told you the most information?
- Instructions: If more than one place is mentioned in response to question 22, ask question 23. If only one place is mentioned, skip to question 24.
23. At which one of these places did you usually converse with this person who gave you the most information?
24. Did this person, I mean the person who gave you the most information, usually talk to you privately or did he talk to you and other people at the same time?
- (1) Talked to me privately -----
  - (2) Talked to me and other people at the same time -----

\*The term "Communist regime" was correctly translated into Chinese as *Kung-tung cheng-ch'uan*.



25. At what time did you usually meet this person at that place?

(1) During duty hours -----

(2) During off-duty hours -----

26. Did you feel the news and information you obtained from this person, I mean the person who told you the most information, was more reliable than the information you obtained from other sources, or did you feel that it was less reliable?

(1) More reliable -----

(2) Less reliable -----

27. Why did you feel that way?

28. When you were on active duty in Korea, how did you find out what was happening on the Chinese Mainland?

(1) Radio -----

(2) Newspapers -----

(3) Other people -----

(4) Other (Specify) -----

Instructions: If more than one source of information is given in answer to question 28, ask question 29. If only one source is mentioned, then read the instruction following question 29 and proceed accordingly.

29. The source from which you obtained the most information was:

(1) Radio -----

(2) Newspapers -----

(3) Other people -----

(4) Other -----

Instructions: If other people were mentioned in response to question 28, ask question 30. If other people were not mentioned, skip to question 32.

30. Who were these people from whom you learned what was happening on the Chinese Mainland?

Instructions: If only one type of person is mentioned in answer to question 30, skip to question 32. If more than one person is mentioned in answer to question 30, ask question 31.

31. From which of these people did you learn most about what was happening on the Chinese Mainland?

Instructions: If a member of the Bandit Army other than the political officer, is mentioned in response to question 31, skip to question 33. If the political officer or a person other than Bandit Army personnel is mentioned, then ask question 32.

32. Excluding the political officer, from whom did you learn most about what was happening in Mainland China?

33. Was this the same person we talked about before, I mean the one who gave you the most information about events in China before you were sent to Korea?

Instructions: If answer to question 33 is "yes," skip to question 52.

If answer to question 33 is "no," proceed with question 34.

34a. What was the rank of this person?

Instructions: If this person is a civilian (non-Bandit Army personnel), record his occupation. Then skip to question 35.

34b. What was the military specialty of this person?

35. To what ethnic group did this person belong?

- (1) Chinese [Han] -----
- (2) Manchu -----
- (3) Mongol -----
- (4) Tibetan -----
- (5) Turk [Hui] -----
- (6) Other (Specify) -----

36. To what religion did this person incline?

- (1) Catholic (Roman) -----
- (2) Protestant -----
- (3) Muslim -----
- (4) Buddhist -----
- (5) Taoist -----
- (6) Other (Specify) -----
- (7) None -----

37. Was this person:

- (1) In his young years -----
- (2) In his green years -----
- (3) In his middle years -----
- (4) In his old years -----

38. How was this person regarded by the other members of your unit?

- (1) Highly regarded -----
- (2) Highly regarded by some and not highly regarded  
by others -----
- (3) Poorly regarded -----

39. Where did this person obtain the information he told you?

Instructions: If another person is mentioned in answer to question 39, ask question 40, otherwise skip to question 41.

40. Who was this other person?  
(1) Age -----  
(2) Military specialty -----  
(3) Rank -----  
(4) Ethnic group -----  
(5) Religion -----
41. How often did you obtain information from this person?  
(1) Every day -----  
(2) Several times a week -----  
(3) Once a week -----  
(4) At longer intervals -----
42. Was the information you got from this person usually about:  
(1) Things you were not very familiar with -----  
(2) Things you already knew -----
43. Was the information you heard from this person usually about:  
(1) Things that happened one or two weeks prior to your conversation -----  
(2) Things that happened before that time -----
44. Did you think the information you obtained from this person was usually accurate?  
(1) Yes -----  
(2) No -----  
(3) Don't know -----
45. Tell me what this person usually talked to you about:  
(1) Political affairs -----  
(2) Economic problems -----  
(3) Military information -----  
(4) Religious problems -----  
(5) Information about friends or relatives -----  
(6) Other things (Specify) -----
46. Did this person who told you the most information sometimes discuss things which, in your opinion, the Communist regime would not want soldiers to hear?  
(1) Yes -----  
(2) No -----
47. Where did you converse with this person who gave you the most information?

Instructions: If more than one place is mentioned in response to question 47, ask question 48. If only one place is mentioned, skip to question 49a.

48. At which one of these places did you usually converse most often with this person who gave you the most information?

49a. Did this person, I mean the person who gave you the most information, usually talk to you privately or did he talk to you and other people at the same time?

(1) Talked to me privately -----

(2) Talked to me and other people at the same time -----

49b. At what time did you usually meet this person at that place?

(1) During duty hours -----

(2) During off-duty hours -----

50. Did you feel the news and information you obtained from this person, I mean the person who told you the most information, was more reliable than the information you obtained from other sources, or did you feel that it was less reliable?

(1) More reliable -----

(2) Less reliable -----

51. Why did you feel that way?

52. When you were on active duty in Korea, how did you usually learn about the military situation?\*

(1) From the Political Officers -----

(2) From the military (non-military)\*\* officers -----

(3) From the non-commissioned officers -----

(4) From enlisted men -----

(5) From UN leaflets -----

(6) From UN loudspeakers -----

(7) Other (Specify) -----

Instructions: If more than one source of information is given in answer to question 52, ask question 53. If only one source is mentioned, skip to question 54.

53. The source from which you obtained the most information was:

(1) Political Officers -----

(2) Officers -----

(3) Non-commissioned officers -----

(4) Enlisted men -----

(5) UN leaflets -----

(6) UN loudspeakers -----

(7) Other (Specify) -----

\*The intention that the question specify "the *current* military situation" was overlooked in the Chinese translation.

\*\*Misprint for "(nonpolitical)" in Chinese translation. This error was corrected by verbal instructions to the interviewers prior to interviewing.

54a. Recall when you were in Korea the one person, other than the political officer, from whom you got most information about the military situation. Was this the same person we discussed previously, i.e., the one who gave you the most information about Mainland China, while you were still in China?

(1) Yes -----

(2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 54a is "no," ask question 54b.

If answer to question 54a is "yes," skip to question 74.

54b. Was this the same person who gave you the most information about Mainland China, while you were in Korea?

(1) Yes -----

(2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 54b is "yes," skip to question 74. If answer to question 54b is "no," proceed to question 55.

55a. What was the rank of the person who gave you the most information about the military situation while you were in Korea?

55b. What was his military specialty?

56. To what ethnic group did this person belong?

(1) Chinese [Han] -----

(2) Manchu -----

(3) Mongol -----

(4) Tibetan -----

(5) Turk [Hui] -----

(6) Other (Specify) -----

57. To what religion did this person incline?

(1) Catholic (Roman) -----

(2) Protestant -----

(3) Muslim -----

(4) Buddhist -----

(5) Taoist -----

(6) Other (Specify) -----

(7) None -----

58. Was this person:

(1) In his young years -----

(2) In his green years -----

(3) In his middle years -----

(4) In his old years -----

95. How was this person regarded by the other members of your unit?

(1) Highly regarded -----

(2) Highly regarded by some and not highly regarded  
by others -----

(3) Poorly regarded -----

60. Where did this person obtain the information he told you?

Instructions: If another person is mentioned in answer to question 60, ask question 61. Otherwise skip to question 62.

61. Who was this other person?

- (1) Age -----
- (2) Military specialty -----
- (3) Rank -----
- (4) Ethnic group -----
- (5) Religion -----

62. How often did you obtain information from this person?

- (1) Every day -----
- (2) Several times a week -----
- (3) Once a week -----
- (4) At longer intervals -----

63. Was the information you got from this person usually about:

- (1) Things you were not very familiar with -----
- (2) Things you already knew -----

64. Was the information you heard from this person usually about:

- (1) Things that happened one or two weeks prior to your conversation -----
- (2) Things that happened before that time -----

65. Did you think the information you got from this person was usually true?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----
- (3) Don't know -----

66. Tell me what this person usually talked to you about.

67. Did this person who was your main source of information sometimes talk to you about things which, in your opinion, the government would not want soldiers to hear?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----

68. Where did you converse with this person who told you the most information?

Instructions: If more than one place is mentioned in answer to question 68, ask question 69. If only one place is mentioned, skip to question 70.

69. At which one of these places did you usually converse with this person who gave you the most information?

70. Did this person, I mean the person who gave you the most information, usually talk to you privately or did he talk to you and other people at the same time?

- (1) Talked to me privately -----
- (2) Talked to me and other people at the same time -----

71. At what time did you usually meet this person at the place?

(1) During duty hours -----

(2) During off-duty hours -----

72. Did you feel that news and information you obtained from this person, I mean the person who told you the most information, was more reliable than the information you obtained from other sources, or did you feel that it was less reliable?

(1) More reliable -----

(2) Less reliable -----

73. Why did you feel that way?

74. When you were in the Bandit Army in Korea did you ever see a UN leaflet or other UN written message?

(1) Yes -----

(2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 74 is "yes," ask question 75.

If answer is "no," skip to question 84.

75. Recall the leaflet which made the deepest impression and still stands out in your memory. What were the circumstances under which you saw this leaflet?

76. What did you do with the leaflet after you saw it?

77. Did you mention the contents of this leaflet to anyone other than the political officer?

(1) Yes -----

(2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 77 is "yes," ask question 78.

If answer is "no," skip to question 86.\*

78. What was the rank of the person to whom you mentioned the contents of the leaflet?

79. What was his military specialty?

80. To what ethnic group did this person belong?

(1) Chinese [Han] -----

(2) Manchu -----

(3) Mongol -----

(4) Tibetan -----

(5) Turk [Hui] -----

(6) Other (Specify) -----

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\*The instructions "skip to question 86" should have read "skip to question 84." This error was only belatedly corrected by verbal instructions to the interviewers.

81. To what religion did this person incline?

- (1) Catholic (Roman) -----
- (2) Protestant -----
- (3) Muslim -----
- (4) Buddhist -----
- (5) Taoist -----
- (6) Other (Specify) -----
- (7) None -----

82. Was this person:

- (1) In his young years -----
- (2) In his green years -----
- (3) In his middle years -----
- (4) In his old years -----

83. How was this person regarded by the other members of your unit?

- (1) Highly regarded -----
- (2) Highly regarded by some and not highly regarded  
by others -----
- (3) Poorly regarded -----

84. Did anyone mention to you that he had obtained a leaflet?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----

Instructions: If respondent answers "yes," to question 84, ask  
question 85, otherwise skip to question 86.

85. Who was this person?

- (1) Age -----
- (2) Military specialty -----
- (3) Rank -----
- (4) Ethnic group -----
- (5) Religion -----

86. When you were in the Bandit Army in Korea did you ever hear a  
UN loudspeaker message?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 86 is "yes," ask question 87.  
If answer is "no," skip to question 94.

87. Recall the UN loudspeaker broadcast which made the deepest  
impression and still stands out in your memory. What was the  
military situation at the time you heard it?



88. Did you mention this loudspeaker message to anyone other than the political officer?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 88 is "yes," ask question 89.  
If answer is "no," terminate this schedule and begin Respondent's Personal Data Form.\*

89. What was the rank of the person to whom you mentioned the loudspeaker message?

90. To what ethnic group did this person belong?

- (1) Chinese [Han] -----
- (2) Manchu -----
- (3) Mongol -----
- (4) Tibetan -----
- (5) Turk [Hui] -----
- (6) Other (Specify) -----

91. To what religion did this person belong?

- (1) Catholic (Roman) -----
- (2) Protestant -----
- (3) Muslim -----
- (4) Buddhist -----
- (5) Taoist -----
- (6) Other (Specify) -----
- (7) None -----

92. This person was:

- (1) In his young years -----
- (2) In his green years -----
- (3) In his middle years -----
- (4) In his old years -----

93. How was this person regarded by the other members of your unit?

- (1) Highly regarded -----
- (2) Highly regarded by some and not highly regarded  
by others -----
- (3) Poorly regarded -----

94. Did anyone mention to you a loudspeaker message that he had heard?

- (1) Yes -----
- (2) No -----

Instructions: If answer to question 94 is "yes," ask question 95.  
If answer is "no," terminate schedule and start Background Data Form.

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\*The instructions "terminate this . . . Form" should have read "skip to question 94." This error was only belatedly corrected by verbal instructions to the interviewers.

95. Who was this person?

- (1) Age -----
- (2) Military specialty -----
- (3) Rank -----
- (4) Ethnic group -----
- (5) Religion -----

Instructions: Proceed to *Respondent's Personal Data Form*.

### RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL DATA FORM

Instructions: Read to respondent:

"Now I shall ask you a few more questions about yourself and then this interview will be finished."

1. In what year were you born?
2. What was the last regular place of residence where you lived for over five years before you joined the Bandit Army? Please tell me the name of the city, market-town, or the village and the name of the province.
3. When you lived in this Province, was your regular place of residence most of the time a city, market-town, or a village?
  - (1) City -----
  - (2) Market-town -----
  - (3) Village -----
4. What was your main occupation before you served in the Bandit Army?
5. To what ethnic group do you belong?
  - (1) Chinese [Han] -----
  - (2) Manchu -----
  - (3) Mongol -----
  - (4) Tibetan -----
  - (5) Turk [Hui] -----
  - (6) Other (Specify) -----
6. To what religion do you incline?
  - (1) Catholic (Roman) -----
  - (2) Protestant -----
  - (3) Muslim -----
  - (4) Other (Specify) -----
  - (5) None -----

Instructions: Check the appropriate item on the basis of the respondent's answer. If answer of the respondent is "none or other", ask question 7, otherwise skip to question 8.

7. Were you primarily a follower of Confucian, Taoist or Buddhist teachings?
  - (1) Confucianist -----
  - (2) Taoist -----
  - (3) Buddhist -----

8. When you lived on the Mainland, what kind of education did you have?

- (1) No education -----
- (2) Primary school education -----
- (3) Middle school education -----
- (4) College education -----
- (5) By private tutor less than 5 years -----
- (6) By private tutor 5 years or more -----

9. For how many years did you serve in the Bandit Army?

10. With what kind of military unit did you serve?

11. What was your rank?

12. What was your military specialty?

(If political officer, please state.)

13. (a) While a member of the Bandit Army were you also a member of the Communist Party or other Communist Party organizations?\*

(1) Yes -----

(2) No -----

IF YES:

(b) Which group(s) did you belong to?

\*The term "Communist Party" was correctly rendered in the Chinese translation by *Kung-ch'an-tang*.

**ANNEX 9**  
**NUMBERED TABLES**

Table 1. Age of Ranks at Capture (1951)

Age in years	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
14-17.....	8	4.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
18-22.....	46	24.1	15	36.6	16	25.4
23-27.....	71	37.2	16	39.0	28	44.4
28-32.....	44	23.0	8	19.5	13	20.6
33-37.....	16	8.4	2	4.9	3	4.8
38-42.....	6	3.1	0	0.0	3	4.8
Totals.....	*191	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0
Mean age in years.....	25.9		24.6		26.0	

Note. \*One EM omitted from calculations because age is unknown.

Table 2. Occupational Backgrounds of Ranks

Occupation	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Soldier (Nationalist).....	91	47.4	22	53.7	29	46.0
Peasant.....	41	21.4	3	7.3	7	11.1
Student.....	20	10.4	7	17.1	13	20.6
Merchant.....	13	6.8	3	7.3	9	14.3
Government Official.....	6	3.1	1	2.4	1	1.6
Laborer.....	5	2.6	2	4.9	1	1.6
Other.....	9	4.7	2	4.9	0	0.0
No occupation.....	2	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
No answer.....	5	2.6	1	2.4	3	4.8
Totals.....	192	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0

Table 3. Educational Level of Military Ranks

Education	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No schooling.....	31	16.1	3	7.3	2	3.2
Primary.....	115	59.9	16	39.1	27	42.9
Middle.....	45	23.5	21	51.2	30	47.6
University.....	1	0.5	1	2.4	4	6.3
Totals.....	192	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0

Table 4. Educational Level of Occupational Groupings

Education	Occupations									
	Professional soldiers		Peasants		Students		Merchants		Others	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No education.....	18	12.7	11	21.6	0	0.0	1	4.0	6	15.8
Primary.....	76	53.5	37	72.5	6	15.0	19	76.0	20	52.6
Middle.....	45	31.7	3	5.9	32	80.0	5	20.0	11	28.9
University.....	3	2.1	0	0.0	2	5.0	0	0.0	1	2.6
Totals.....	142	100.0	51	100.0	40	100.0	25	100.0	38	99.9

Table 5. Sources of Information About China for All Respondents While in China

Sources	All sources		Source of most information	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	12	4.1	1	0.3
Newspapers.....	141	47.6	61	20.6
Word-of-mouth.....	283	95.6	222	75.0
Other**.....	54	18.5	10	3.4
No answer.....	0	0.0	2	0.7
Totals.....	(296)	(*)	296	100.0

Note. \*Multiple (490) responses render percentages non-additive.

\*\*Typical answers in the residual category include:

"I witnessed things myself" (Respondent #9; also #8, 10, 11, 14, etc.).

"Political officers always gave lectures in favor of the Communists." (#12; also #16, 17, etc.).

Table 6. Sources of Information About China for Educational Groupings in China

Sources	No schooling		Primary		Middle		University	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	1	2.8	4	2.5	4	4.2	3	50.0
Newspapers.....	8	22.2	67	42.4	63	65.6	3	50.0
Word-of-mouth.....	34	94.4	153	96.8	90	93.8	6	100.0
Other.....	11	30.6	31	19.6	12	12.5	0	0.0
N.....	(36)		(158)		(96)		(6)	

Note. Percentage columns are not additive because of multiple (490) answers.

Table 7. Source of Most Information About China for Educational Groupings in China

Sources	No schooling		Primary		Middle		University	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0
Newspapers.....	4	11.1	17	10.8	37	38.5	3	50.0
Word-of-mouth.....	32	88.9	133	84.2	54	56.3	3	50.0
Other.....	0	0.0	8	5.1	2	2.1	0	0.0
No answer.....	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.1	0	0.0
Totals.....	36	100.0	158	100.1	96	100.0	6	100.0

Table 8. Sources of Information About China for Ranks in China

Sources	EM		NCO		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	3	1.6	2	4.9	7	11.1
Newspapers.....	76	30.6	22	53.7	43	68.3
Word-of-mouth.....	186	96.9	39	95.1	58	92.1
Other.....	40	20.8	9	22.0	5	7.9
N.....	(192)		(41)		(63)	

Note. Percentage columns not additive because of multiple (400) answers.

Table 9. Source of Most Information About China for Ranks in China

Sources	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.6
Newspapers.....	30	15.6	12	29.3	19	30.2
Word-of-mouth.....	155	80.7	26	63.4	41	65.1
Other.....	6	3.1	3	7.3	1	1.6
No answer.....	1	0.5	0	0.0	1	1.6
Totals.....	192	99.9	41	100.0	63	100.1



Table 10. Sources of Information About China for Occupational Groupings in China

Sources	Professional soldiers		Peasants		Students		Merchants		Others	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	9	6.3	1	2.0	1	2.5	0	0.0	1	2.6
Newspaper.....	69	48.6	15	29.4	27	67.5	13	52.0	17	44.7
Word-of-mouth.....	137	96.5	48	94.1	38	95.0	23	92.0	37	97.4
Other.....	20	14.1	11	21.6	8	20.0	8	32.0	7	18.4
N.....	(142)		(51)		(40)		(25)		(38)	

Note. Percentage columns not additive because of multiple (484) answers.

Table 11. Source of Most Information About China for Occupational Groupings in China

Sources	Professional soldiers		Peasants		Students		Merchants		Others	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	1	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Newspaper.....	23	16.2	8	15.7	17	42.5	7	28.0	5	15.8
Word-of-mouth.....	114	80.3	42	82.4	20	50.0	15	60.0	31	81.5
Other.....	4	2.8	1	2.0	1	2.5	3	12.0	1	2.6
No answer.....	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	5.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Totals.....	142	100.0	51	100.1	49	100.0	25	100.0	38	100.0

Table 12. All Types of Persons Functioning as Word-of Mouth Sources of Information About China for Respondents in China and Korea

Sources	Respondents			
	In China		In Korea	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
EM and NCOs.....	156	52.7	93	31.4
Officers (political).....	133	44.9	72	24.3
Officers (military).....	78	26.4	28	9.5
Civilians (miscellaneous).....	54	18.2	8	2.7
Officers (cultural).....	27	9.1	5	1.7
Civilians (farmers).....	21	6.8	1	0.3
Civilians (relatives).....	4	1.4	0	0.0
Civilians (laborers).....	2	0.7	1	0.3
Other persons.....	11	3.7	7	2.4
No word-of-mouth source.....	13	4.4	20	6.8
Did not get any information about China.....	0	0.0	101	34.1
No answer.....	2	0.7	10	3.4
N.....	(296)	(*)	(296)	(**)

\*Percentages non-additive because of multiple (601) responses

\*\*Percentages non-additive because of multiple (346) responses

Table 13. Word-of-Mouth Sources for Information About China by Ranks in China

Sources	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
EM and NCOs.....	106	55.2	28	68.3	22	34.9
Officers (military).....	45	23.4	7	17.1	26	41.3
Officers (political).....	94	49.0	19	46.3	20	31.8
Officers (cultural).....	18	9.4	5	12.2	4	6.3
Civilians (miscellaneous).....	33	17.2	8	19.5	13	20.6
Civilians (farmers).....	15	7.8	0	0.0	6	9.5
Civilians (laborers).....	2	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Civilians (relatives).....	1	0.5	0	0.0	3	4.8
Other persons.....	7	3.6	2	4.9	2	3.2
No answer (13 are no word-of-mouth).....	7	3.6	3	7.3	5	7.9
N.....	(192)	-----	(41)	-----	(63)	-----

Note. Multiple responses (328 by EM, 72 by NCOs and 101 by Officers) render percentages non-additive.

Table 14. Occupation of Main Informant About China by Ranks in China

Occupations	EM		NCOs		Officers		Total respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
EM.....	89	46.4	13	31.7	9	14.3	111	37.5
NCOs.....	27	14.1	12	29.3	8	12.7	47	15.9
Junior Officers.....	14	7.3	5	12.2	16	25.4	35	11.8
Senior Officers.....	9	4.7	3	7.3	11	17.5	23	7.8
Civilians w/army.....	10	5.2	1	2.4	0	0.0	11	3.7
Peasants.....	18	9.4	2	4.9	6	9.5	26	8.8
Merchants.....	8	4.2	2	4.9	6	9.5	16	5.4
Other civilians.....	14	7.3	2	4.9	7	11.1	23	7.8
No answer.....	3	1.6	1	2.4	0	0.0	4	1.4
Totals.....	192	100.2	41	100.0	63	100.0	296	100.1

Table 15. Occupation of Main Informant About China of Occupational Groupings in China

Occupation of informant	Professional soldiers		Peasants		Other civilians	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Military (incl. civilians in army).....	115	81.0	42	84.0	70	70.0
Civilian.....	27	19.0	8	16.0	30	30.0
Totals.....	142	100.0	50	100.0	100	100.0

Note. Four "no answers" on occupation of informant are omitted.

Table 16. Frequency of Contact of Troops in China with Main Informant (by Occupational Type) About China

Occupation of Informant	Every day		Several times a week		Once a week		Less often		Totals	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
EM.....	48	43.6	31	28.2	12	10.9	19	17.3	*110	100.0
NCOs.....	27	57.4	16	34.0	1	2.1	3	6.4	47	99.9
Junior Officers.....	14	41.2	17	50.0	2	5.9	1	2.9	*34	100.0
Senior Officers.....	8	34.8	9	39.1	3	13.0	3	13.0	23	99.9
Civilians w/army.....	5	45.5	2	18.2	3	27.3	1	9.1	11	100.1
Peasants.....	1	3.8	9	34.6	3	11.5	13	50.0	26	99.9
Merchants.....	4	25.0	2	12.5	4	25.0	6	37.5	16	100.0
Other civilians.....	11	50.0	3	13.6	1	4.5	7	31.8	**22	99.9
No answer.....	3	75.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	25.0	4	100.0

\*One "no specified time" omitted from calculations.

\*\*One "no answer" as to time omitted from calculations.

Table 17. Frequency of Contact with Main Informant About China by Ranks in China

Frequency	Ranks										PEOPIN-China main informants
	EM			NCOs		Officers		Totals			
	Num-ber	Percent	Num-ber	Percent	Num-ber	Percent	Num-ber	Percent			
Every day-----	69	35.9	21	51.2	31	49.2	121	40.9	367	18.6	
Several times a week-----	60	31.3	12	29.3	17	27.0	89	30.1	584	29.6	
Once a week-----	19	9.9	5	12.2	5	7.9	29	9.8	227	11.5	
Less often-----	43	22.4	2	4.9	9	14.3	54	18.3	579	29.4	
No specified time-----	1	.5	1	2.4	0	0.0	2	0.7	219	11.1	
No answer-----	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.6	1	0.3	19	1.0	
Totals-----	192	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0	296	100.0	(N=1,971)	(*)	

\*Multiple (1,993) responses render percentages non-additive.

Table 18. *Antiregime (Clandestine) Information from Main Informant (by Occupation) About China in China*

Clandestine	EM, NCOs and civilians in Army		Officers		Civilians		*Total informants		PROPIN-China main informants	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Yes, sometimes.....	84	49.7	24	42.9	48	75.0	159	54.3	1,219	62.6
No, never.....	35	50.3	32	57.1	16	25.0	134	45.7	723	37.4
Totals.....	169	100.0	56	100.0	64	100.0	**293	100.0	1,933	100.0

\*Includes 4 "no answers" as to informant's occupation.

\*\*Omits 3 "no answers" as to type of information.

Table 19. *Topics Unavailable in Radio or Newspaper from Main Informant (by Occupation) About China in China*

Availability	EM, NCOs and civilians in Army		Officers		Civilians		*Total informants		PROPIN-China main informants	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Unavailable.....	80	47.3	23	39.7	42	65.6	147	49.8	886	45.4
Available.....	87	51.5	34	58.6	20	31.3	143	48.5	927	47.5
No basis for judgment.....	2	1.2	1	1.7	2	3.1	5	1.7	137	7.0
Totals.....	169	100.0	58	100.0	*64	100.0	**295	100.0	1,950	99.9

\*Includes 4 "no answers" as to informant's occupation.

\*\*Omits 1 "no answer" as to availability.

Table 20. "Truth" of Information from Main Informant About China in China

Truthfulness	EM, NCOs, Army civilians		Officers		Civilians		*Total informants		PROPIN-China main informants	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Usually true-----	98	58.0	33	56.9	46	71.9	180	61.0	1,195	61.6
Usually false-----	19	11.2	9	15.5	3	4.7	31	10.5	48	2.5
Equally true or false-----	3	1.8	0	0.0	1	1.6	4	1.4	4	0.2
Don't know-----	49	29.0	16	27.6	14	21.9	80	27.1	694	35.8
Totals-----	169	100.0	58	100.0	64	100.1	**295	100.0	1,941	100.1

\*Includes 4 "no answers" as to informant's occupation.

\*\*Omits 1 "no answer" as to "truth".

Table 21. Reliability of Information from Main Informant About China Compared with Other Sources for Ranks in China

Reliability	EM		NCOs		O Ranks		Total respondents		PROPIN-China main informants	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
More reliable-----	118	61.5	33	80.5	47	74.6	198	66.9	1,387	70.4
Less reliable-----	61	31.8	6	14.6	9	14.3	76	25.7	160	8.1
Both-----	2	1.0	0	0.0	4	6.3	6	2.0	3	0.2
Don't know-----	11	5.7	2	4.9	1	1.6	14	4.7	376	19.1
No answer-----	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	3.2	2	0.7	45	2.3
Totals-----	192	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0	296	100.0	1,971	100.1

Table 22. Usual Time of Meeting Main Informant About China by Ranks in China

Time	EM		NCOs		Officers		Total respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Duty hours-----	30	15.6	4	9.8	0	0.0	34	11.5
Off-duty-----	153	79.7	35	85.4	60	95.2	248	83.8
Both-----	7	3.6	1	2.4	2	3.2	10	3.4
No specified time-----	1	0.5	1	2.4	0	0.0	2	0.7
No answer-----	1	0.5	0	0.0	1	1.6	2	0.7
Totals-----	192	99.9	41	100.0	63	100.0	296	100.1

Table 23. Privacy of Conversations with Main Informant About China of Ranks in China

Privacy	EM		NCOs		Officers		Total respondents		PROPIN-China main informants	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Private conversation usually-----	116	60.4	20	48.8	42	66.7	178	60.1	827	42.0
Group conversation usually-----	64	33.3	14	34.1	15	23.8	93	31.4	915	46.4
Both-----	12	6.3	7	17.1	5	7.9	24	8.1	202	10.2
No answer-----	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.6	1	0.3	27	1.4
Totals-----	192	100.0	41	100.0	63	100.0	296	99.9	1,971	100.0



Table 24. Sources of Information About China for Respondents While in Korea

Sources	All respondents				Respondents with specified sources only			
	All sources		Source of most information		All sources		Source of most information	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	6	2.0	2	0.7	6	3.1	2	1.1
Newspaper.....	33	11.1	11	3.7	33	17.0	11	5.8
Word-of-mouth.....	176	59.5	160	54.1	176	90.7	160	84.7
Other.....	21	7.1	16	5.4	21	10.8	16	8.5
Did not find out.....	101	34.1	101	34.1	NA	NA	NA	NA
No answer.....	1	0.3	6	2.0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Totals.....	(296)	(*)	296	100.0	(194)	(**)	189	100.1

\*Percentages not additive because of multiple (338) responses.

\*\*Percentages not additive because of multiple (236) responses.

NA—not applicable.

Table 25. Sources of Information About China of Ranks While in Korea

Sources	All respondents						Informed respondents only					
	EM		NCOs		Officers		EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Radio.....	1	0.5	2	5.0	3	4.8	1	0.8	2	7.4	3	6.8
Newspapers.....	11	5.7	6	15.0	16	25.4	11	8.9	6	22.2	16	36.4
Word-of-mouth.....	114	59.4	24	60.0	38	60.3	114	92.7	24	83.9	38	86.4
Other.....	11	5.7	6	15.0	4	6.3	11	8.9	6	22.2	4	9.1
No information.....	69	36.0	13	32.5	19	30.2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Totals.....	(192)		(*40)		(63)		(123)		(27)		(44)	

Source percentages are not additive because of multiple answers in these columns.

\*One NCO supplied no data in this section and is omitted from the table.

NA—not applicable.

Table 26. Utilization of the Word-of-Mouth Channel for Information About China of Ranks While in Korea

Conditions	EM		NCOs		Officers		Total respondents	
	EM		NCOs		Officers		Total respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Had informant.....	114	59.4	24	60.0	38	60.3	176	59.7
No informant but used other media.....	9	4.7	3	7.5	6	9.5	18	6.1
Had no information.....	69	35.9	12	32.5	19	30.2	101	34.2
Totals.....	192	100.0	*40	100.0	63	100.0	*295	100.0

\*One NCO supplied no data in this section and is omitted from this table.

Table 27. Word-of-Mouth Sources of Information About China of Ranks While in Korea

Source	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
EM and NCOs.....	66	57.9	13	54.2	14	36.8
Officers (political).....	41	36.0	12	50.0	19	50.0
Officers (cultural).....	4	3.5	1	4.2	0	0.0
Officers (military).....	16	14.0	3	12.5	9	23.7
Civilians (miscellaneous).....	5	4.4	0	0.0	3	7.9
Civilians (farmers).....	1	.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
Civilians (laborers).....	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.6
Civilians (relatives).....	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Others.....	4	3.5	2	8.3	1	2.6
No answer.....	5	4.4	2	8.3	2	5.3
N.....	(114)		(24)		(38)	

Percentages are not additive because of multiple answers.

Table 28. Sources of Information About Military Situation While in Korea

Sources	All sources		Source of most information	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
U.N. Loudspeakers.....	224	75.7	35	11.8
Officers (political).....	215	72.6	91	30.7
U.N. Leaflets.....	214	72.3	65	22.0
Officers (military).....	149	50.3	52	17.6
EM.....	116	39.2	31	10.5
NCOs.....	72	24.3	12	4.1
Other.....	28	9.5	12	4.1
No answer.....	0	0.0	1	0.3
N.....	(296)	(*)	(296)	(**)

\*Multiple (1,018) responses render percentages non-additive.

\*\*Multiple (302) responses render percentages non-additive.

Table 29. Sources of Information About Military Situation of Ranks While in Korea

Sources	All sources*										Source of most information**			
	EM		NCOs		Officers		EM		NCOs		Officers		Number	Percent
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
U.N. Loudspeakers-----	138	71.9	34	82.9	53	82.5	29	15.1	3	7.3	5	8.1		
U.N. Leaflets-----	125	65.1	34	82.9	55	87.3	38	19.8	9	22.0	18	29.0		
Political Officers-----	139	72.4	31	75.6	45	71.4	57	29.7	16	39.0	18	29.0		
Officers-----	100	52.1	17	41.5	32	50.8	30	15.6	6	14.6	16	25.8		
EM-----	91	47.4	13	31.7	12	19.0	25	13.0	2	4.9	4	6.5		
NCOs-----	45	23.4	13	31.7	14	22.2	7	3.6	4	9.8	1	1.6		
Others-----	19	9.9	5	12.2	3	4.8	10	5.2	2	4.9	0	0.0		
N-----	(192)	-----	(41)	-----	(63)	-----	(192)	-----	(41)	-----	(**62)	-----		

\*Multiple (1018) answers render non-additive the percentages for section on all sources.

\*\*Multiple (302) answers render non-additive the percentages for section on most important source.

\*\*\*One "no-answer" omitted from calculations.

Table 30. Ranks of Recipient Talked to About Leaflet by Ranks of Respondents

Ranks of recipients	Ranks					
	EM		NCOs		Officers	
	Num- ber	Per- cent	Num- ber	Per- cent	Num- ber	Per- cent
EM.....	42	81	7	44	12	52
NCOs.....	4	8	8	50	3	13
Officers.....	6	11	1	6	8	35
Totals.....	52	100	16	100	23	100

Table 31. Transmission of Leaflet Messages by Educational Level of Respondents

Transmission	No schooling		Primary		Middle and uni- versity		Total respond- ents	
	Num- ber	Percent	Num- ber	Percent	Num- ber	Percent	Num- ber	Percent
Talked.....	9	25.0	42	26.6	40	39.2	91	30.7
Did not talk.....	23	63.9	105	66.5	57	55.9	185	62.5
Never saw a leaf- let.....	4	11.1	11	7.0	5	4.9	20	6.8
Totals.....	36	100.0	158	100.1	102	100.0	296	100.0

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